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Abstract
In a world that is increasingly relying on digital technologies, the ability to securely
communicate and distribute information is of crucial importance. Cryptography
plays a key role in this context and the research presented in this thesis focuses on
developing cryptographic primitives whose properties address more closely the needs
of users.
We start by considering the notion of robustness in public-key encryption, a
property which models the idea that a ciphertext should not decrypt to a valid mes-
sage under two different keys. In contexts where anonymity is relevant, robustness
is likely to be needed as well, since a user cannot tell from the ciphertext if it is
intended for him or not. We develop and study new notions of robustness, relating
them to one another and showing how to achieve them.
We then consider the important issue of protecting users’ privacy in broadcast
encryption. Broadcast encryption (BE) is a cryptographic primitive designed to
efficiently broadcast an encrypted message to a target set of users that can decrypt
it. Its extensive real-life application to radio, television and web-casting renders
BE an extremely interesting area. However, all the work so far has striven for
efficiency, focusing in particular on solutions which achieve short ciphertexts, while
very little attention has been given to anonymity. To address this issue, we formally
define anonymous broadcast encryption, which guarantees recipient-anonymity, and
we provide generic constructions to achieve it from public-key, identity-based and
attribute-based encryption. Furthermore, we present techniques to improve the
efficiency of our constructions.
Finally, we develop a new primitive, called time-specific encryption (TSE), which
allows us to include the important element of time in the encryption and decryption
processes. In TSE, the sender is able to specify during what time interval a ciphertext
can be decrypted by a receiver. This is a relevant property since information may
become useless after a certain point, sensitive data may not be released before a
particular time, or we may wish to enable access to information for only a limited
period. We define security models for various flavours of TSE and provide efficient
instantiations for all of them.
These results represent our efforts in developing public-key encryption schemes
with enhanced properties, whilst maintaining the delicate balance between security
and efficiency.
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Introduction
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1.1 A delicate balance
Claude Shannon’s famous paper “Communication Theory of Secrecy Systems” [83]
can be regarded as the pivotal work which transformed cryptography from an almost
recreational brain-teasing activity to the official science of secrets [88]. It was in [83],
in fact, that the bases of the theory of cryptography were set and that a first rigorous
mathematical proof of the perfect secrecy of the Vernam cipher (also known as the
one-time pad) was given.
One of the original goals of cryptography can be considered that of enabling
secure communication. Therefore, having designed a perfectly secure cipher could
seem to have already solved this problem. On the other hand, we know that research
in this area has rapidly evolved since this result and it is still progressing at a very
high pace. So, what is the catch?
It is well-known that, however secure the one-time pad is, it suffers from se-
vere practical limitations. Indeed, the secret key to encrypt can be used only once
and it has to be as long as the message, raising the fundamental real-world issue
of key-management. The realization of the need of practicality in the design of
cryptosystems characterizes the advances of the cryptographic research community,
which has tried to find the delicate balance between security and efficiency ever
since.
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One may ask why efficiency is actually needed. Why isn’t the mere intellectual
satisfaction of achieving a perfectly secure way of communicating enough? A simple
answer to these questions is because cryptography is used. In a world that is in-
creasingly relying on digital technologies cryptography has become part of our daily
life. Mobile phone communications, credit card payments, web browsing are only
a few examples of cryptographically enabled operations that are widely used today.
One does not have to look too far to see many more: e-voting, e-commerce, on-line
banking, distribution of digital copyright media are further examples of this.
Given the widespread use of cryptography in a variety of applications, it is fairly
natural that the related research has focused on developing systems capable of pro-
viding the required security guarantees whilst maintaining acceptable levels of prac-
ticality for real-life deployment. One could regard this quest as being the leitmotif
behind the progress of cryptography through the years. In this respect, we view
the results in this thesis as making a contribution to the theme of designing crypto-
graphic schemes delicately balanced between security and efficiency.
1.2 Anonymity and time in public-key encryption
The title of this thesis, “Anonymity and time in public-key encryption”, identifies
the core features of our work. We are going to design and construct several encryp-
tion schemes in the public-key setting satisfying enhanced security properties. In
particular, we consider the important property of anonymity, the related notion of
robustness, and the ability to include the element of time in the encryption process.
Public-key encryption. Since its revolutionary introduction in 1976 [42], public-
key cryptography has developed greatly, and by now it represents a fundamental
area of cryptography. In particular, public-key encryption (PKE) has received a lot
of research attention. Indeed the cryptographic community has obtained numerous
results, by achieving various levels of security in the proposed schemes, by continu-
ously improving on the efficiency of the constructions, and by developing a variety
of additional functionalities. We recall the basic notions for PKE relevant to our
work in Chapter 2. However, since an exhaustive and detailed presentation of PKE
is beyond the scope of this thesis, we refer the interested reader to [57].
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The importance of anonymity. Addressing the issue of protecting users’ privacy
is of crucial importance. This is reflected by the great attention given to anonymity
in all the main fields of modern cryptography. In the area of PKE, anonymity
is often referred to as key-privacy [8]. This notion captures the property that an
eavesdropper is not able to tell under which one of several public keys a ciphertext
was created. The analogous concept in the identity-based setting was studied in [1,
23]. The benefit of preserving receivers’ privacy is relevant in more elaborate systems
involving for example hierarchical identity-based encryption (HIBE) [22], attribute-
based encryption (ABE) or predicate encryption [58], where achieving anonymity
guarantees becomes increasingly challenging. Furthermore, in the context of digital
signatures, a number of primitives effectively rely on anonymity – group signatures
[30], anonymous credentials [29] and e-cash [28] are well-known examples of this. In
our work, we consider anonymity in the context of public-key broadcast encryption,
a primitive designed to address a dynamically changing set of receivers for the secure
distribution of digital data.
The importance of time. As the amount of transmitted and stored digital content
rapidly increases, concerns naturally arise regarding the accessibility of such data.
In this context, the dimension of time has become significantly relevant. Indeed,
security research aims to address not only the issue of who can access the content,
but also when and for how long. In the cryptographic literature, the element of
time has appeared in several contexts, as the following examples will illustrate. In
the IBE setting [16], for instance, it was suggested to extend the identity of a user
so as to include a decryption time, allowing therefore to encrypt to the future.
A whole branch of research is dedicated to the study and development of timed-
release encryption [65, 27, 26], a primitive which precisely allows a sender to specify
a release-time for the encrypted message, before which encryption is not possible.
Some effort has also been put in developing ways to make the data unavailable after
it has passed its expiry date. The Ephemeral line of research, initiated by [74], and
the Vanish system [49] are examples of this. Our work on time-specific encryption
offers a cryptographic solution to access data in a specific time interval, and its
efficient realisation makes it suitable for many practical applications.
10
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1.3 Organization of the thesis
In this thesis we give a series of results in the context of public-key encryption.
We start by fixing the notation and giving some basic definitions and security
models, key to the development of our work, in Chapter 2.
Our contributions are then presented in the chapters that follow. More specif-
ically, in Chapter 3 we propose new notions of robustness, which (informally) is
the security property that deals with the issue of using the wrong private key for
decryption. We justify the need for such notions and provide generic ways to achieve
the strongest robustness notion we introduce. The work presented in this chapter
appears in [45].
In Chapter 4 we consider the fundamental problem of anonymity in the context
of broadcast encryption. After giving formal definitions and security models for the
corresponding primitive, we provide constructions to achieve it securely. These
results will appear in the proceedings of the international cryptographic conference
Public-Key Cryptography 2012 as part of [62].
Finally, in Chapter 5, we introduce a new primitive, called time-specific en-
cryption, which allows the sender to express a time interval during the encryption
process, specifying the period a ciphertext can be decrypted. We present several
flavours of this primitive and show how to generically and securely achieve schemes
in the different settings. This work was published as [71] at the conference Security
and Cryptography for Networks 2010 and received the Best Paper Award.
The topics presented in this thesis are connected by the dynamics of our research,
namely the study of one problem led to the consideration of another and so on. For
instance, we proposed the notion of time-specific encryption (TSE) to address a
practical issue arising from a shortcoming of timed-release encryption, a closely
related primitive. While developing ways to achieve TSE we realized that broadcast
encryption (BE) could be used for this purpose. This brought us to the study of
the relevant literature, through which we discovered the limitations of the current
BE security models and schemes. Our work on anonymous broadcast encryption
11
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developed naturally from here. Since in an anonymous setting ciphertexts do not
reveal the intended recipients, we had to address the issue of receivers using their
private key on possibly the wrong ciphertext. Precisely this was our motivation for
looking at robustness, which eventually resulted in the development of new, stronger
notions, for which we provide provably secure constructions.
This brief illustration of our research flow has hopefully made the connecting
line between our results more visible. In any case, for each topic, we will give (in
the relevant chapter) a detailed introduction, inclusive of motivation, related work
and a more in-depth description of our contributions.
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Preliminaries
Contents
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In this chapter we introduce the basic notation that will be adopted throughout
this thesis, as well as some of the fundamental concepts of provable security which
have been used in our work. We then provide the formal definitions and security
models for the cryptographic primitives relevant to the following chapters.
2.1 Notation
We introduce some basic notation that will be adopted in this and the following
chapters.
- By “:=” we denote a definition, with the definiens on the right-hand side
(RHS) and the definiendum on the left-hand side (LHS).
13
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- G denotes an algebraic group, Z denotes the integers, N the non-negative
integers and R the reals.
- p denotes a prime, Zp the cyclic group of order p and Z∗p := Zp \ {0}, i.e. the
group without the neutral element.
- MsgSp, CtSp, IdSp, SSp, KSp, VSp are the spaces for messages, ciphertexts,
identities, signatures, keys and values, respectively.
- O denotes an oracle and Osk denotes an oracle equipped with sk. The be-
haviour of an oracle will be made explicit in the relevant definitions.
- By “←” we denote a random assignment where the RHS is either a finite set or
a probabilistic algorithm. In the former case, it denotes the assignment to the
LHS of a random value chosen uniformly from the set; in the latter it denotes
choosing the algorithm’s random tape uniformly and assigning the outcome to
the LHS.
- If s and t are two bit strings, s||t denotes the concatenation of s and t, and
s⊕ t denotes their exclusive or.
- {0, 1}n denotes all bit strings of length n.
- Algorithms are assumed to be polynomial time (p.t.) or probabilistic poly-
nomial time (p.p.t.). If algorithm Alg is run on inputs x and y, we denote it
by Alg(x, y), and if r is the internal randomness we may make it explicit by
writing Alg(x, y; r).
- λ ∈ N denotes a security parameter. By convention, the running time of an
algorithm is measured as a function of the length of its input, and therefore λ
will be provided to the algorithm in unary as 1λ (i.e. the string of λ ones).
- A function f : N → R is called negligible if for all c ∈ N there exists k0 ∈ N
such that for all k > k0 : |f(k)| < 1kc .
- The symbol ⊥ denotes a distinguished output of an algorithm intended to
indicate an error.
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2.2 Provable security
The aim of this thesis is to provide constructions for public-key encryption primitives
with enhanced properties, maintaining a balance between security and efficiency
whilst achieving the desired functionality. In order to do so, we make extensive use of
the tools and techniques of provable security, which provides a rigorous mathematical
framework for the security analysis and proofs of our schemes.
In presenting the results in this thesis our approach will typically be the following.
• As a first step, we will give a formal definition of the cryptographic primitive
we wish to study. This is essentially the description of the algorithms (with
their inputs and outputs) that constitute the primitive.
• The next step is to define an adversarial model which formally specifies what
a computationally bounded adversary is allowed to do when perpetrating an
attack. Such a model should capture the idea of what it means for a prim-
itive to be secure with respect to a specific security goal (e.g confidentiality,
anonymity, ...). The security models we present will be described as games
between a benign entity called the challenger and an adversary, which may
or may not have access to a set of oracles controlled by the challenger. We
specify a winning condition for the game and we typically define the adver-
sary’s advantage as a measure of the success of its strategy over that of simply
guessing.
There are two common approaches when studying computational security: the
concrete one and the asymptotic one ([57, Chapter 3] provides an interesting
discussion on the topic). The asymptotic approach is the one we will follow
in this thesis. Here, the running time of the adversary as well as its success
probability are functions of the security parameter λ, as opposed to concrete
numbers. In particular, an adversary is a probabilistic algorithm whose run-
ning time is polynomial in λ and whose success probability we would like to
be negligible in λ. This leads to the following informal definition ([57]):
A scheme is secure if for every p.p.t. adversary A playing a game of some
specified type, the advantage of A in winning the game (where the winning
condition is also well-defined) is negligible.
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• The following step is to achieve the specified primitive with the desired security
properties. To this goal, we present possible constructions for it (typically
using simpler cryptographic primitives as building blocks), and prove that such
constructions yield secure schemes.
• To prove a scheme is secure with respect to a specific security model, we reduce
its security to that of the underlying cryptographic primitive or to the hard
problem it is based on. More specifically, providing a proof of security
(also called a reduction) involves converting any efficient adversary that has
a non-negligible advantage in winning the specific game into another efficient
algorithm that succeeds in breaking the underlying primitive or in solving a
hard problem. This is nowadays a standard proof technique in cryptography.
It is within this framework that the research presented in this thesis has been con-
ducted.
2.3 Formal definitions of cryptographic primitives
Cryptographic primitives are the basic building blocks used to construct more com-
plex cryptographic systems. Their algorithms are designed to achieve a variety of
functionalities and they are carefully crafted so as to satisfy the required security
properties. While there are many such primitives, the focus of this thesis will be on
primitives in the public-key setting. We recall the ones relevant to our work next.
2.3.1 Public-key encryption
In a public-key encryption (PKE) scheme anyone can encrypt a message with respect
to a public key, but only the holder of the corresponding secret key can recover it.
The two keys, i.e the public encryption key and the secret decryption key, have to
be mathematically related and it should be hard to obtain the secret key simply by
knowing the public key.
We present a definition for PKE. This slightly differs from the usual notation by
16
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having a parameter generation algorithm PKE.PG as an additional algorithm. This
will ease the introduction of future notions. We can recover the standard definition
simply by letting PKE.PG output the security parameter.
Definition 2.1 (PKE scheme) A public-key encryption (PKE) scheme is defined
by four algorithms (PKE.PG,PKE.KeyGen,PKE.Enc,PKE.Dec), which are as follows.
PKE.PG: This algorithm takes as input the security parameter 1λ and returns the
public parameters pars. These will include a description of the message space
MsgSp and the ciphertext space CtSp of the scheme. We write this as pars←
PKE.PG(1λ).
PKE.KeyGen: This is a key generation algorithm that on input pars outputs a
public key pk and its corresponding secret key sk. We write this as (pk, sk)←
PKE.KeyGen(pars).
PKE.Enc: This is an encryption algorithm that on input pars, a message M ∈
MsgSp and a public key pk returns a ciphertext C ∈ CtSp. We write this as
C ← PKE.Enc(pars,M, pk).
PKE.Dec: This is a decryption algorithm that on input public parameters pars, a
public key pk, a ciphertext C and a secret key sk returns either a message or the
special symbol ⊥ denoting failure. We write this as PKE.Dec(pars, pk, C, sk) =
M , where M ∈ MsgSp ∪ {⊥}.
These algorithms are required to satisfy the following correctness property: For
every λ, for every set of parameters pars output by PKE.PG, for every message M ∈
MsgSp and every key-pair (pk, sk) generated by PKE.KeyGen, if C ← PKE.Enc(pars,
M, pk) then PKE.Dec(pars, pk, C, sk) =M .
For simplicity, we will often omit the public parameters as input to the encryption
and decryption algorithm and assume they are implicit. The same holds for the
public key in the decryption algorithm.
As mentioned in the previous section, we will model security for a cryptographic
primitive in terms of a game between a challenger and an adversary. In particu-
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lar, we define the security notion of indistinguishability under chosen-ciphertext at-
tacks (IND-CCA) [52, 77] for a PKE scheme Π = (PKE.PG,PKE.KeyGen,PKE.Enc,
PKE.Dec) as follows.
IND-CCA security game for PKE
Setup. The challenger C runs PKE.PG(1λ) to generate pars and PKE.KeyGen(pars)
to obtain a key-pair (pk, sk). C gives (pars, pk) to the adversary A.
Phase 1. A has access to a decryption oracle Osk, to which it submits queries of
the type C. The oracle returns PKE.Dec(pars, pk, C, sk).
Challenge. A selects two equal-length messages M0, M1 ∈ MsgSp and passes them
to C. C chooses a random bit b ← {0, 1} and computes C" ← PKE.Enc(pars,
Mb, pk). C" is called the challenge ciphertext and it is passed to A.
Phase 2. A continues to have access to a decryption oracle Osk, with the restriction
that it cannot submit the query C" to this oracle.
Guess. The adversary outputs its guess b′ for b.
We define A’s advantage in the above game as AdvIND−CCAA,Π (λ) =
∣∣Pr[b′ = b]− 12 ∣∣.
Intuitively, the advantage is a measure of how successful the adversary’s strategy in
the game is over that of simply guessing the bit b.
Definition 2.2 (IND-CCA) A PKE scheme Π = (PKE.PG,PKE.KeyGen,
PKE.Enc,PKE.Dec) is indistinguishable under chosen-ciphertext attacks (or is IND-
CCA secure) if all p.p.t. adversaries have at most negligible advantage in the above
game.
It is possible to define a weaker notion of security, namely indistinguishability
under chosen-plaintext attacks (IND-CPA), by removing the adversary’s access to
the decryption oracle Osk in the game described above.
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Since it will be relevant in this thesis, we recall a security notion for public-key
encryption which models both indistinguishability and anonymity. In the public-key
setting, the latter is often referred to as key-privacy, and was introduced by Bellare
et al. in [8]. Informally, a PKE scheme is key-private if the ciphertext does not
leak under which public key it was created. The authors of [8] give two notions
of security of indistinguishability of keys (IK), IK-CPA and IK-CCA, which model
key-privacy under chosen-plaintext and chosen-ciphertext attacks, respectively. We
will use a combined notion of security, which helps streamline our presentation and
proofs. The relevant game and security notion are as follows.
IND-IK-CCA security game for PKE
Setup. The challenger C runs PKE.PG(1λ) to generate pars and PKE.KeyGen(pars)
twice to obtain two key-pairs (pk0, sk0) and (pk1, sk1). C gives (pars, pk0, pk1)
to the adversary A.
Phase 1. A has access to a decryption oracle Osk0,sk1 , to which it submits queries of
the type (C, pki), i ∈ {0, 1}. More specifically, the oracle returns PKE.Dec(pars,
pki, C, ski), i ∈ {0, 1}.
Challenge. A selects two equal-length messages M0, M1 ∈ MsgSp and passes them
to C. C chooses a random bit b ← {0, 1} and computes C" ← PKE.Enc(pars,
Mb, pkb). C" is called the challenge ciphertext and it is passed to A.
Phase 2. A continues to have access to the decryption oracle, with the restriction
that it cannot submit queries containing C" to the oracle.
Guess. The adversary outputs its guess b′ for b.
We defineA’s advantage in the above game asAdvIND−IK−CCAA,Π (λ) =
∣∣Pr[b′ = b]− 12 ∣∣.
Definition 2.3 (IND-IK-CCA) A PKE scheme Π = (PKE.PG,PKE.KeyGen,
PKE.Enc,PKE.Dec) is indistinguishable and key-private under chosen-ciphertext at-
tacks (or is IND-IK-CCA secure) if all p.p.t. adversaries have at most negligible
advantage in the above game.
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Also here we can define a weaker notion of security, namely IND-IK-CPA, by
removing the adversary’s access to the decryption oracles.
We note that for simplicity, and in accordance with the majority of the relevant
literature, we decided to model indistinguishability and anonymity by letting the
challenger randomly pick one bit, used to select both the message and the key.
An alternative and equivalent approach would be to let the challenger select two
bits, one for the message and one for the key. All primitives for which we model
indistinguishability and anonymity in this thesis will be analyzed and proved secure
in the 1-bit setting.
Examples of IND-IK-ATK secure schemes, where ATK ∈ {CPA,CCA}, are the
ElGamal [48] and the Cramer–Shoup [37] encryption schemes. Furthermore, in [73],
the authors present a generic way to achieve an IND-IK-CCA secure PKE scheme
from identity-based encryption, a primitive which we introduce next.
2.3.2 Identity-based encryption
Identity-based encryption (IBE) was first proposed by Shamir in 1984 [82], but
was only realized in 2000 by Sakai, Ohgishi and Kasahara [80], and in 2001 in the
works of Boneh and Franklin [16] and Cocks [34]. The key idea in IBE is that the
public key of a user can be an arbitrary string, typically representing his identity
(e.g. the user’s e-mail address), rather than a string that is output by a key generation
algorithm as in normal PKE. The main motivation behind the introduction of IBE
is that it simplifies the problem of certificate management, distinctive to public-key
cryptography. This however requires a Trusted Authority (TA) to issue the users’
corresponding secret keys. The need for such an authority is an inherent feature of
the identity-based setting.
We next formalize the description of the IBE primitive, introducing an additional
parameter generation algorithm, IBE.PG, for ease of exposition. As in the PKE
case, the standard notion is recovered simply by letting IBE.PG output the security
parameter.
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Definition 2.4 (IBE scheme) An identity-based encryption (IBE) scheme is de-
fined by five algorithms, which are as follows.
IBE.PG: This algorithm takes as input the security parameter 1λ and returns the
system’s parameters pars. These include a description of the message space
MsgSp, the ciphertext space CtSp and the identity space IdSp of the scheme.
We write this as pars← IBE.PG(1λ).
IBE.Setup: This algorithm takes as input pars and returns a master public key
ID-MPK and a master secret key ID-MSK. We write (ID-MPK, ID-MSK) ←
IBE.Setup(pars).
IBE.KeyExt: This is a key extraction algorithm that on input ID-MPK, ID-MSK
and an identity id ∈ IdSp outputs a secret key skid. We write this as skid ←
IBE.KeyExt(ID-MPK, ID-MSK, id).
IBE.Enc: This is an encryption algorithm that on input ID-MPK, a message M ∈
MsgSp and an identity id ∈ IdSp returns a ciphertext C ∈ CtSp. We write this
as C ← IBE.Enc(ID-MPK,M, id).
IBE.Dec: This is a decryption algorithm that on input ID-MPK, a ciphertext C
and a secret key skid returns either a message or a failure symbol ⊥. We write
this as IBE.Dec(ID-MPK, C, skid) =M , where M ∈ MsgSp ∪ {⊥}.
These algorithms are required to satisfy the following correctness property: For
every λ, for any pars output by IBE.PG, for every ID-MPK, ID-MSK output by
IBE.Setup, for every message M ∈ MsgSp and every identity id ∈ IdSp, if skid ←
IBE.KeyExt(ID-MPK,ID-MSK, id) and if C ← IBE.Enc(ID-MPK,M, id) then
IBE.Dec(ID-MPK, C, skid) =M .
We define the security notion of id-based indistinguishability under chosen-
ciphertext attacks (IND-ID-CCA) [16] for an IBE scheme I = (IBE.PG, IBE.Setup,
IBE.KeyExt, IBE.Enc, IBE.Dec) as follows.
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IND-ID-CCA security game for IBE
Setup. The challenger C runs IBE.PG(1λ) to generate pars and IBE.Setup(pars) to
obtain the master public key ID-MPK and the master secret key ID-MSK and
gives (pars, ID-MPK) to the adversary A.
Phase 1. A has access to a secret-key-extraction oracle OID-MSK, to obtain secret
keys of any id ∈ IdSp. A has also access to a decryption oracle OID-MSK, to
which it submits queries of the type (C, id). This oracle returns
IBE.Dec(ID-MPK, C, skid), where skid is extracted using ID-MSK.
Challenge. A selects two equal-length messages M0 and M1 ∈ MsgSp and an id" ∈
IdSp with the restriction that for none of the secret-key-extraction queries in
Phase 1 we have that id = id". A passesM0,M1, id" to C. C chooses a random
bit b ← {0, 1} and computes C" ← IBE.Enc(ID-MPK,Mb, id"). C" is called
the challenge ciphertext and it is passed to A.
Phase 2. A continues to have access to a secret-key-extraction oracle OID-MSK,
with the same restriction we have in the Challenge phase, and to a decryption
oracle OID-MSK, with the restriction that it cannot submit the query (C", id")
to this oracle.
Guess. The adversary outputs its guess b′ for b.
We defineA’s advantage in the above game asAdvIND−ID−CCAA,I (λ) =
∣∣Pr[b′ = b]− 12 ∣∣.
Definition 2.5 (IND-ID-CCA) An IBE scheme I = (IBE.PG, IBE.Setup,
IBE.KeyExt, IBE.Enc, IBE.Dec) is indistinguishable under chosen-ciphertext attacks
(or is IND-ID-CCA secure) if all p.p.t. adversaries have at most negligible advantage
in the above game.
We define the notion of IND-ID-CPA security (indistinguishability under chosen-
plaintext attacks) by removing the adversary’s access to the decryption oracle in the
game described above.
In our work we will make use of a weaker security notion for IBE called selective-
id security, introduced in [24, 13], where an adversary has to output a challenge
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identity id" at the beginning of the game. The identity id" will be then used by the
challenger as the identity to which encrypt Mb. We give details of this game next.
sID-IND-CCA security game for IBE
Initialize. The challenger C runs IBE.PG(1λ) to generate pars and gives them to
the adversary A. A outputs id" ∈ IdSp.
Setup. C runs IBE.Setup(pars) to obtain the master public key ID-MPK and the
master secret key ID-MSK and gives ID-MPK to A.
Phase 1. A has access to a secret-key-extraction oracle OID-MSK, to obtain secret
keys of any id (= id" ∈ IdSp. A has also access to a decryption oracle OID-MSK,
to which it submits queries of the type (C, id).
Challenge. A selects two equal-length messages M0 and M1 ∈ MsgSp. A passes
M0,M1 to C. C chooses a random bit b ← {0, 1} and computes C" ←
IBE.Enc(ID-MPK,Mb, id"). C" is called the challenge ciphertext and it is
passed to A.
Phase 2. A continues to have access to a secret-key-extraction oracleOID-MSK, with
the same restriction we have in Phase 1, and to a decryption oracle OID-MSK,
with the restriction that it cannot submit the query (C", id") to this oracle.
Guess. The adversary outputs its guess b′ for b.
We define A’s advantage as AdvsID−IND−CCAA,I (λ) =
∣∣Pr[b′ = b]− 12 ∣∣.
Definition 2.6 (sID-IND-CCA) An IBE scheme I = (IBE.PG, IBE.Setup,
IBE.KeyExt, IBE.Enc, IBE.Dec) is selective-id indistinguishable under chosen-
ciphertext attacks (or sID-IND-CCA secure) if all p.p.t. adversaries have at most
negligible advantage in the above game.
Removing access to the decryption oracle gives rise to the notion of sID-IND-
CPA security.
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As for the public-key setting, it is useful at this point to give the security notion
for anonymous IBE [1], which informally models the idea that a ciphertext does
not leak the identity of the intended recipient. We present a combined notion of
indistinguishability and anonymity for IBE in the following game.
ANO-IND-CCA security game for IBE
Setup. The challenger C runs IBE.PG(1λ) to generate pars and IBE.Setup(pars) to
obtain the master public key ID-MPK and the master secret key ID-MSK and
gives (pars, ID-MPK) to the adversary A.
Phase 1. A has access to a secret-key-extraction oracle OID-MSK, to obtain secret
keys of any id ∈ IdSp. A has also access to a decryption oracle OID-MSK, to
which it submits queries of the type (C, id).
Challenge. A selects two equal-length messages M0, M1 ∈ MsgSp and two iden-
tities id0, id1 ∈ IdSp with the restriction that for none of the secret-key-
extraction queries in Phase 1 we have that id = id0 or id = id1. A passes
M0,M1, id0, id1 to C. C chooses a random bit b ← {0, 1} and computes
C" ← IBE.Enc(ID-MPK,Mb, idb). C" is called the challenge ciphertext and
it is passed to A.
Phase 2. A continues to have access to a secret-key-extraction oracle OID-MSK,
with the same restriction we have in the Challenge phase, and to a decryption
oracle OID-MSK, with the restriction that it cannot submit the queries (C", id0)
or (C", id1), to this oracle.
Guess. The adversary outputs its guess b′ for b.
We define A’s advantage as AdvANO−IND−CCAA,I (λ) =
∣∣Pr[b′ = b]− 12 ∣∣.
Definition 2.7 (ANO-IND-CCA) An IBE scheme I = (IBE.PG, IBE.Setup,
IBE.KeyExt, IBE.Enc, IBE.Dec) is anonymous and indistinguishable under chosen-
ciphertext attacks (or ANO-IND-CCA secure) if all p.p.t. adversaries have at most
negligible advantage in the above game.
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As usual, removing access to the decryption oracle defines the corresponding
notion of security in a chosen-plaintext attack scenario.
Since it will be relevant to our work, we briefly recall the notion of multi-TA
IBE [72], where multiple and independent trusted authorities coexist in the system.
A typical multi-TA IBE scheme consists of five algorithms: IBE.PG, which takes as
input the security parameter and outputs the shared parameters pars and a set of
labels of the TAs in the system; IBE.TASetup, which takes as input pars and outputs
a master public key and a master secret key (this is run independently for each TA
in the system); IBE.KeyExt, IBE.Enc, IBE.Dec as for a normal IBE scheme. Security
notions such as indistinguishability and recipient anonymity have been considered
in this setting in [72], where in particular the notion of multi-TA anonymity was
introduced and studied. Informally, this models the idea that a ciphertext does
not leak the master public key under which it was created. It should therefore be
hard for an adversary to distinguish between two ciphertexts generated under two
distinct master public keys, even if for the same message and the same identity. In
[72] several security models for multi-TA IBE were put forth. We recall the one
relevant for our work next.
sID-TAA-IND-CPA security game for multi-authority IBE
Initialize. The challenger C runs IBE.PG(1λ) to generate pars and gives them to
the adversary A. A outputs id" ∈ IdSp.
Setup. C runs IBE.TASetup(pars) to obtain master public keys MPKi and master
secret keys MSKi where i ∈ {1, ..., n} for all TAs in the system. C gives
{MPKi}i∈{1,...,n} to A.
Phase 1. A has access to a corrupt oracle O{MSKi} to obtain the master secret
key of TA i where i ∈ {1, ..., n}. It has also access to a secret-key-extraction
oracle to which it can submit queries of the form (i, id), where i is a TA and
id ∈ IdSp, in order to obtain the secret key corresponding to identity id under
the trusted authority i.
Challenge. A selects two equal-length messages M0 and M1 ∈ MsgSp and two
TAs i0 and i1, with the restriction that neither i0 nor i1 was corrupted and
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none of the queries in Phase 1 was of the form (ij , id"), with j ∈ {0, 1}. A
passes M0,M1, i0, i1 to C. C chooses a random bit b ← {0, 1} and computes
C" ← IBE.Enc(MPKib ,Mb, id"). C" is called the challenge ciphertext and it is
passed to A.
Phase 2. A continues to have access to a corrupt oracle and a secret-key-extraction
oracle with the same restrictions we have in the challenge phase.
Guess. The adversary outputs its guess b′ for b.
We define A’s advantage as AdvsID−TAA−IND−CPAA,I (λ) =
∣∣Pr[b′ = b]− 12 ∣∣.
Definition 2.8 (sID-TAA-IND-CPA) A multi-TA IBE scheme I = (IBE.PG,
IBE.TASetup, IBE.KeyExt, IBE.Enc, IBE.Dec) is selective-id, TA-anonymous and in-
distinguishable under chosen-plaintext attacks (or sID-TAA-IND-CPA secure) if
all p.p.t. adversaries have at most negligible advantage in the above game.
An example of IBE scheme satisfying the notion of sID-TAA-IND-CPA security
is the multi-TA version of Gentry’s IBE scheme [50], as shown in [73].
We note that by having i0 = i1 we obtain the standard notion of selective-id
security under chosen-plaintext attacks (sID-IND-CPA) for a multi-TA IBE scheme.
2.3.3 Attribute-based encryption
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is a powerful cryptographic primitive first intro-
duced by Sahai and Waters [79]. The key idea in ABE is that a user can decrypt
only if he has the appropriate set of attributes. We are hence intuitively encrypting
to a set of users, as opposed to one as in the standard public-key and identity-
based settings. In doing so our main concern is to avoid collusion attacks, which
would allow distinct users to combine their attributes in order to decrypt something
that individually they would not have been able to. ABE historically has two main
flavours: key-policy ABE (KP-ABE) and ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE). In KP-
ABE [53, 70] the attributes are associated with the ciphertext while the policy is
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expressed in the key. In CP-ABE [12, 32] the situation is reversed, giving the sender
the control over what policy needs to be satisfied in order to decrypt. Typically,
such a policy will be expressed in terms of an access structure, as defined in [7].
Definition 2.9 (Access structure) Let P = {P1, P2, ..., Pn} be a set of parties
and let 2P denote its power set. A collection A ⊆ 2P is monotone if for every B and
C, if B ∈ A and B ⊆ C then C ∈ A. An access structure (respectively, monotone
access structure) is a collection (respectively, monotone collection) A of non-empty
subsets of P , i.e. P \ ∅. The sets in A are called the authorized sets, and the sets
not in A are called the unauthorized sets.
In our work, as in most relevant literature [53, 12], we will restrict ourselves to
monotone access structures which will be specified by access trees. In this model,
each interior node of a tree T is a threshold gate and the leaves are associated
with attributes. If a set of attributes S satisfies the access tree T , we denote it as
T (S) = 1.1 This is defined recursively for Tx, the subtree of T rooted at node x.
In particular, if x is a leaf node, then Tx(S) returns 1 if and only if the attribute
associated to the leaf node x belongs to S.
This is the framework within which we provide the formal definitions and security
models for CP-ABE and KP-ABE.
Definition 2.10 (CP-ABE scheme) A ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE) scheme
is defined by five algorithms, which are as follows.
CPABE.PG: This algorithm takes as input the security parameter 1λ and returns
the system’s parameters pars. These will include the message space MsgSp,
the ciphertext space CtSp and the universe of attributes U associated to the
scheme. We write this as pars← CPABE.PG(1λ).
CPABE.Setup: This algorithm takes as input pars and returns a master public key
CP-MPK and a master secret key CP-MSK. We write (CP-MPK,CP-MSK)←
CPABE.Setup(pars).
1In general, if S satisfies an access structure A, we denote it as S ∈ A
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CPABE.KeyGen: This is a key generation algorithm that on input CP-MPK,
CP-MSK and a set of attributes S ∈ U outputs a secret key skS . We write
this as skS ← CPABE.KeyGen(CP-MPK,CP-MSK, S).
CPABE.Enc: This is an encryption algorithm that on input CP-MPK, a message
M ∈ MsgSp and an access structure A over the universe of attributes U returns
a ciphertext C ∈ CtSp. We write this as C ← CPABE.Enc(CP-MPK,M,A).
CPABE.Dec: This is a decryption algorithm that on input CP-MPK, a ciphertext C
and a secret key skS returns either a message or a failure symbol ⊥. We write
this as CPABE.Dec(CP-MPK, C, skS) =M , where M ∈ MsgSp ∪ {⊥}.
These algorithms are required to satisfy the following correctness property: For
every λ, for every pars output by CPABE.PG, for every CP-MPK, CP-MSK output
by CPABE.Setup, for every message M ∈ MsgSp and for every access structure A
supported by the system, if skS ← CPABE.KeyGen(CP-MPK,CP-MSK, S), if C ←
CPABE.Enc(CP-MPK,M,A) and if S ∈ A, then CPABE.Dec(CP-MPK, C, skS) =M .
We define indistinguishability under chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA) for a
CP-ABE scheme Γ = (CPABE.PG,CPABE.Setup,CPABE.KeyGen,CPABE.Enc,
CPABE.Dec) in the following way.
IND-CCA security game for CP-ABE
Setup. The challenger C runs CPABE.PG(1λ) to obtain pars and CPABE.Setup(pars)
to generate the master public key CP-MPK and the master secret key CP-MSK
and gives (pars,CP-MPK) to the adversary A.
Phase 1. A has access to a secret-key-extraction oracle OCP-MSK, to obtain secret
keys for any set of attributes S ⊆ U . A has also access to a decryption
oracle OCP-MSK, to which it submits queries of the type (C, S). Such an oracle
will respond with CPABE.Dec(CP-MPK, C, skS), where skS is extracted using
CP-MSK.
Challenge. A selects two equal-length messages M0 and M1 ∈ MsgSp and a chal-
lenge access structure A" with the restriction that none of the attribute sets
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for which a key was queried in Phase 1 satisfy A". A passesM0,M1,A" to C. C
chooses a random bit b← {0, 1} and computes C" ← CPABE.Enc(CP-MPK,Mb,
A"). C" is called the challenge ciphertext and it is passed to A.
Phase 2. A continues to have access to a secret-key-extraction oracle OCP-MSK,
with the same restriction we have in the Challenge phase, and to a decryption
oracle OCP-MSK, with the restriction that it cannot submit the query (C", S),
for any S satisfying A".
Guess. The adversary outputs its guess b′ for b.
We define A’s advantage in the above game as AdvIND−CCAA,Γ (λ) =
∣∣Pr[b′ = b]− 12 ∣∣.
Definition 2.11 (IND-CCA) A CP-ABE scheme Γ = (CPABE.PG,CPABE.Setup,
CPABE.KeyGen,CPABE.Enc,CPABE.Dec) is indistinguishable under chosen-ciphertext
attacks (or is IND-CCA secure) if all p.p.t. adversaries have at most negligible
advantage in the above game.
We next recall the other type of ABE scheme, namely KP-ABE.
Definition 2.12 (KP-ABE scheme) A key-policy ABE (KP-ABE) scheme is de-
fined by five algorithms, which are as follows.
KPABE.PG: This algorithm takes as input the security parameter 1λ and returns
the system’s parameters pars. These will include a description of the mes-
sage space MsgSp, the ciphertext space CtSp and the universe of attributes U
associated to the scheme. We write this as pars← KPABE.PG(1λ).
KPABE.Setup: This algorithm takes as input pars and returns a master public key
KP-MPK and a master secret key KP-MSK. We write (KP-MPK,KP-MSK)←
KPABE.Setup(pars).
KPABE.KeyGen: This is a key generation algorithm that on input KP-MPK,
KP-MSK and an access structure A outputs a secret key skA. We write this
as skA ← KPABE.KeyGen(KP-MPK,KP-MSK,A).
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KPABE.Enc: This is an encryption algorithm that on input KP-MPK, a message
M ∈ MsgSp and a set of attributes S ∈ U returns a ciphertext C ∈ CtSp. We
write this as C ← KPABE.Enc(KP-MPK,M, S).
KPABE.Dec: This is a decryption algorithm that on input KP-MPK, a ciphertext
C and a secret key skA returns either a message or a failure symbol ⊥. We
write this as KPABE.Dec(KP-MPK, C, skA) =M , where M ∈ MsgSp ∪ {⊥}.
These algorithms are required to satisfy the following correctness property: For
every λ, for every pars output by KPABE.PG, for every KP-MPK,KP-MSK out-
put by KPABE.KeyGen, for every message M ∈ MsgSp, for every access struc-
ture A supported by the system and every set of attributes S ∈ U , if skA ←
KPABE.KeyGen(KP-MPK,KP-MSK,A), if C ← KPABE.Enc(KP-MPK,M, S) and if
S ∈ A, then KPABE.Dec(KP-MPK, C, skA) =M .
We define indistinguishability under chosen-ciphertext attacks (IND-CCA) for a
KP-ABE scheme K = (KPABE.PG,KPABE.Setup,KPABE.KeyGen,KPABE.Enc,
KPABE.Dec) in the following way.
IND-CCA security game for KP-ABE
Setup. The challenger C runs KPABE.PG(1λ) to obtain pars and KPABE.Setup(pars)
to generate the master public key KP-MPK and the master secret key KP-MSK
and gives (pars,KP-MPK) to the adversary A.
Phase 1. A has access to a secret-key-extraction oracle OKP-MSK, to obtain se-
cret keys for access structures Ai. A has also access to a decryption oracle
OKP-MSK, to which it submits queries of the type (C,A), where A is an ac-
cess structure supported by the system. Such an oracle will respond with
KPABE.Dec(KP-MPK, C, skA), where skA is extracted using KP-MSK.
Challenge. A selects two equal-length messages M0 and M1 ∈ MsgSp and a chal-
lenge set of attributes S" ⊆ U with the restriction that none of the access
structures for which a key was queried in Phase 1 are satisfied by S". A
passes M0,M1, S" to C. C chooses a random bit b ← {0, 1} and computes
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C" ← KPABE.Enc(KP-MPK,Mb, S"). C" is called the challenge ciphertext
and it is passed to A.
Phase 2. A continues to have access to a secret-key-extraction oracle OKP-MSK,
with the same restriction we have in the Challenge phase, and to a decryption
oracle OKP-MSK, with the restriction that it cannot submit the query (C",A),
for any access structure A satisfied by S".
Guess. The adversary outputs its guess b′ for b.
We define A’s advantage in the above game as AdvIND−CCAA,K (λ) =
∣∣Pr[b′ = b]− 12 ∣∣.
Definition 2.13 (IND-CCA) A KP-ABE scheme K = (KPABE.PG,KPABE.Setup,
KPABE.KeyGen,KPABE.Enc,KPABE.Dec) is indistinguishable under chosen-ciphertext
attacks (or is IND-CCA secure) if all p.p.t. adversaries have at most negligible
advantage in the above game.
The security models we have presented so far address adversaries that can adap-
tively issue queries before and after the challenge phase. Most relevant work in the
area [53, 32, 12, 70], however, achieves security only in the selective setting, where
a less powerful adversary has to select a priori the set (or policy) he wishes to be
challenged on. In [61], Lewko et al. provide a fully secure ABE scheme in the
more general framework of functional encryption. Follow-up work in the area (for
instance, [69]) also achieves this level of security.
Anonymity in ABE. As for previously considered primitives such as PKE and
IBE, also in the context of ABE the issue of anonymity arises naturally. In the case
of CP-ABE we call it policy-hiding property, reflecting that the ciphertext does not
leak under what policy (access structure) it was created. Similarly for KP-ABE we
denote it attribute-hiding property, capturing the idea that an adversary cannot tell
what set of attributes a message was encrypted for. This notion was first introduced
and achieved in the context of predicate encryption [58] for the special class of
predicates defined by inner products.
These security notions are modeled in the natural way: an adversary selects two
access structures (respectively, attribute sets) in the challenge phase and he will
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have to guess under what access structure (attribute set) encryption was performed.
Throughout the game the adversary will have access to secret-key-extraction and
decryption oracles, to which he can submit queries having the obvious restrictions
that prevent him from winning trivially.
We have so far introduced several encryption primitives. We next give the basic
notions for two other primitives in the public-key setting which will be relevant to
our work, namely digital signatures and commitments.
2.3.4 Digital signatures
In a digital signature scheme, or simply a signature scheme, a signer uses a secret
key to sign a message and anyone can verify its validity using the corresponding
(public) verification key. This is formalized in the following definition.
Definition 2.14 (Signature scheme) A signature scheme Σ = (Gen, Sign,Ver) is
defined by three algorithms, which are as follows.
Gen: This is a key-generation algorithm that takes as input the security parameter
1λ and outputs the system’s parameters, which include a description of the
message space MsgSp, the key space KSp and the signature space SSp, and a
signing-verification key pair (sigk, vk). For ease of exposition, we will consider
the parameters implicit and simply write (sigk, vk)← Gen(1λ).
Sign: This is a signing algorithm that on input a signing key sigk and a message
M ∈ MsgSp outputs a signature σ ∈ SSp. We write this as σ ← Sign(sigk,M).
Ver: This is a verification algorithm that takes as input a verification key vk, a
message M and a signature σ and outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. We write this as
Ver(vk,M,σ) = b.
These algorithms are required to satisfy the following property: For every λ,
for every message M ∈ MsgSp and every key-pair (sigk, vk) generated by Gen, if
σ ← Sign(sigk,M) then Ver(vk,M,σ) = 1.
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We next define a security notion for a signature scheme Σ = (Gen, Sign,Ver)
which will be relevant in this thesis, namely the notion of strong unforgeability
under a one-time message attack (SUF-1CMA). Consider the following game.
SUF-1CMA security game for a digital signature scheme
Setup. The challenger C runs Gen(1λ) to generate a signing-verification key pair
(sigk, vk) and gives vk to the adversary A.
Signing Query. A selects a message M ∈ MsgSp and gives it to C. C computes
σ = Sign(sigk,M). σ is passed to A.
Forgery. A outputs a pair (M",σ").
A’s advantage is defined asAdvSUF−1CMAA,Σ (λ) = Pr[Ver(vk,M",σ") = 1 ∧(M",σ") (=
(M,σ)].
Intuitively, this models the idea that an adversary cannot produce a new valid
signature even on the previously signed message.
Definition 2.15 (SUF-1CMA) A signature scheme Σ = (Gen, Sign,Ver) is SUF-
1CMA secure (or strongly one-time) if all polynomial-time adversaries have at most
negligible advantage in the above game.
2.3.5 Commitments
Definition 2.16 (Commitment scheme) A non-interactive commitment scheme
CMT = (CPG,Com,Vrfy) is defined by three algorithms as follows.
CPG: This is a common parameters generation algorithm that takes as input the
security parameter 1λ and outputs the scheme’s parameters cpars. These will
include a description of the commitable value space VSp. We write this as
cpars← CPG(1λ).
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Com: This is a committing algorithm that on input the parameters cpars and a
value x ∈ VSp returns a commitment com to x and a decommitment key dec.
We write this as (com, dec)← Com(cpars, x).
Vrfy: This is a verification algorithm that takes as input the common parameters
cpars, a value x ∈ VSp, a commitment com and a decommitment key dec and
outputs a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. We write this as Vrfy(cpars, x, com, dec) = b.
These algorithms are required to satisfy the following correctness property: For every
λ, for every set of parameters cpars generated by CPG and for every value x ∈ VSp,
if (com, dec)← Com(cpars, x) then Vrfy(cpars, x, com, dec) = 1.
Let CMT = (CPG,Com,Vrfy) be a commitment scheme. We recall two standard
security properties for CMT , namely hiding and binding. The former property
models the idea that an adversary cannot learn information about the committed
value, while the latter that an adversary cannot find two distinct inputs that commit
to the same value. Consider the following game.
Hiding security game for a commitment scheme
Setup. The challenger C runs CPG(1λ) to generate the common parameters cpars
and gives cpars to the adversary A.
Challenge. A selects two values x0 and x1 ∈ VSp and gives them to C. C chooses a
random bit b← {0, 1} and computes (com, dec) = Com(cpars, xb). The value
com is passed to A.
Guess. The adversary outputs its guess b′ for b.
A’s advantage is defined as AdvHidingA,CMT (λ) =
∣∣Pr[b′ = b]− 12 ∣∣.
Definition 2.17 (Hiding) A commitment scheme CMT = (CPG,Com,Vrfy) is
hiding if all polynomial-time adversaries have at most negligible advantage in the
above game.
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Binding security game for a commitment scheme
Setup. The challenger C runs CPG(1λ) to generate the common parameters cpars
and gives cpars to the adversary A.
Collision finding. A outputs a tuple (com, x0, x1, dec0, dec1).
A’s advantage is defined as AdvBindingA,CMT (λ) = Pr[Vrfy(cpars, x0, com, dec0) = 1 ∧
Vrfy(cpars, x1, com, dec1) = 1 ∧ x0, x1 ∈ VSp such that x0 (= x1].
Definition 2.18 (Binding) A commitment scheme CMT = (CPG,Com,Vrfy) is
binding if all polynomial-time adversaries have at most negligible advantage in the
above game.
2.4 Cryptographic tools and techniques
We have introduced the definitions and security models for some cryptographic prim-
itives, selecting the ones which will be used in this thesis as building blocks for more
advanced primitives. We next recall two useful cryptographic tools which are rel-
evant in achieving some of the results in the following chapters: the first is an
important proof technique based on hybrid arguments, and the second is a powerful
transformation to build IND-CCA secure PKE from sID-IND-CPA secure IBE.
2.4.1 A useful proof technique
As mentioned in Section 2.2 and seen in the sections which followed, we define
security for a primitive as a game between an adversary and a challenger modelled
as probabilistic algorithms interacting with each other. The winning condition for
the game typically depends on some particular event E occurring, and security is
defined in terms of its probability being negligibly close to a “target probability”,
such as 0, 1/2 or the probability of some other event in some other game (where the
same adversary is interacting with a different challenger). Showing that this holds
is a proof of security for the primitive.
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A very popular security proof technique in modern cryptography is to consider
a sequence of games, instead of just the single one defined in the model. Since we
extensively make use of such technique in this thesis, we briefly recall the main idea
behind it, referring to [85] for a more detailed exposition of the topic.
We start by describing a sequence of games G0, G1 up to Gn, where G0 is the
original game, as defined in a security model specific to a primitive and an adversary
type. For each game Gi we define an event Ei, somehow related to E, the event
on which the winning condition for game G0 depends. The aim is to show that
Pr[Ei] is negligibly close to Pr[Ei+1] for all i ∈ {0, ..., n − 1} and that Pr[En] is
negligibly close to the target probability. To prove security we need to evaluate
|Pr[Ei]− Pr[Ei+1]|, and this is typically done by basing the transitions between Gi
and Gi+1 on one of the following [85]: indistinguishability, failure events or a formal
change. In the first case, the idea is that we show that if an adversary detects the
change between two successive games then we can build another adversary that is
able to distinguish between two distributions that are meant to be indistiguishable.
In the second case, when two successive games Gi and Gi+1 are identical up to the
occurrence of a certain failure event, we show that if the probability of such event
occurring is negligible then so is |Pr[Ei]− Pr[Ei+1]|. This is known as the Difference
Lemma [85, Lemma 1]. Finally, it could be the case that simple formal changes
are made between Gi and Gi+1, so as to make the proof easier to follow, and hence
Pr[Ei] = Pr[Ei+1]. Examples of this proof technique being adopted can be found
for instance in Sections 4.3.1 and 4.3.2 of this thesis.
2.4.2 A useful transformation
In 2004, Canetti et al. [25] introduced a very powerful transformation to achieve
IND-CCA secure PKE schemes from any weakly CPA-secure IBE scheme.
Informally, the transformation works as follows: the public key and secret key of
the PKE scheme are simply the master public key and master secret key of the IBE
scheme, respectively. To encrypt a message, the sender first generates a signing-
verification key pair (sigk, vk) for a strong one-time signature scheme, and then he
runs the identity-based encryption algorithm on input the message and the identity
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vk. The resulting ciphertext c is then signed using sigk to obtain a signature σ.
The final ciphertext consists of the verification key vk, the IBE ciphertext c, and the
signature σ. To decrypt a ciphertext (vk, c,σ), the receiver first verifies the signature
on c with respect to the verification key vk. If it fails, he outputs ⊥. Otherwise, the
receiver runs the identity-based key-extraction algorithm on identity vk to obtain
the corresponding secret key skvk, which he then uses to decrypt c.
We recall the details of this transformation next.
Let I = (IBE.PG, IBE.Setup, IBE.KeyExt, IBE.Enc, IBE.Dec) be an IBE scheme
and let Σ=(Gen,Sign,Ver) be a signature scheme. The PKE scheme Π = (PKE.PG,
PKE.KeyGen,PKE.Enc,PKE.Dec) is constructed from I and Σ as follows.
PKE.PG(1λ): Run IBE.PG(1λ) and return pars.
PKE.KeyGen(pars): Run IBE.Setup(pars) to obtain a master public key ID-MPK
and a master secret key ID-MSK. These will be the public key pk and secret
key sk of the PKE scheme, respectively.
PKE.Enc(pars,M, pk): Run Gen(1λ) to obtain a signing-verification key pair (sigk,
vk). Compute c← IBE.Enc(pk,M, vk), where pk acts as the master public key
of the IBE scheme and vk acts as an identity. Run Sign(sigk, c) and let σ be
the resulting signature. The final ciphertext is C = (vk, c,σ).
PKE.Dec(pars, pk, C, sk): Parse C into (vk, c,σ) and check whether Ver(vk, c,σ) =
1. If not, output ⊥. Otherwise compute skvk ←IBE.KeyExt(pk, sk, vk), the
secret key corresponding to identity vk, and output IBE.Dec(pk, c, skvk).
In [25], the following result is shown to hold.
Theorem 2.19 [25, Theorem 1] If I is an sID-IND-CPA secure IBE scheme and
Σ is a SUF-1CMA secure signature scheme then Π is an IND-CCA secure PKE
scheme.
Not only is this transformation an extremely powerful tool, it has also the ad-
vantage of being very flexible. Indeed, we will suitably adapt the key ideas behind
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it to achieve CCA security in a variety of settings, as we will explore in detail in
Chapter 4 and Chapter 5.
We are now ready to present our results. We start with our contributions to the
area of robust public-key encryption.
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In this chapter we study the notion of robustness in public-key encryption. After
recalling existing definitions, we define stronger notions and provide motivation for
our work. Furthermore, we classify these new notions in terms of implications and
separation results, and we show how to generically achieve the strongest one we
introduce. Part of the content of this chapter appears in [45], which is joint work
with Pooya Farshim, Benoˆıt Libert and Kenneth G. Paterson.
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3.1 Introduction
3.1.1 Robustness and related work
A commonly pursued goal in cryptography is message privacy, which is typically
achieved by means of encryption. In recent years, the privacy of users has be-
come an equally relevant concern. It has led the research community to strive for
anonymity properties when designing cryptographic primitives. In particular, key-
privacy was introduced by [8] in the public-key setting to capture the idea that a
ciphertext does not leak any information about the public key under which it was
created, making therefore the communication anonymous. In this context, Abdalla,
Bellare and Neven [2] raised a fundamental question: how does a legitimate user
know if an anonymous ciphertext is intended for him? Moreover, what happens if
he uses his secret key on a ciphertext not created under his public key? To ad-
dress this question, Abdalla et al. formalized a property called robustness, which
(informally speaking) guarantees that decryption attempts fail with high probabil-
ity if the “wrong” private key is used, and argued that, in all applications requiring
anonymous public-key encryption, robustness is usually needed as well. These appli-
cations include auction protocols with bid privacy [81], consistency [1] in searchable
encryption [15] and anonymous broadcast encryption (Chapter 4). As shown by
Mohassel [66], robustness is also important in guaranteeing the anonymity of hybrid
encryption schemes resulting from the combination of anonymous asymmetric and
symmetric components.
Robustness ensures that a ciphertext cannot correctly decrypt under two different
secret keys. This notion has (often implicitly) been present in the literature (e.g.
[81, 58, 6]), but formal definitions remained lacking until the recent foundational
work of Abdalla et al. [2]. In particular, the authors introduced two flavours of
encryption robustness: weak and strong robustness. Weak robustness is modeled as
a game in which a winning adversary outputs a valid message M and two distinct
public keys pk0 and pk1 such that the encryption of M under pk0 decrypts to a valid
message under sk1, the secret key corresponding to pk1. Strong robustness allows
for a more powerful adversary which gets to choose a ciphertext C (as opposed
to a message which will be honestly encrypted) and outputs it together with two
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distinct public keys. The adversary wins if C decrypts to a valid message under
both corresponding secret keys.
Achieving robustness is not as straightforward as it might seem. As pointed out
by Abdalla et al. [2], merely appending the receiver’s public key to the ciphertext
is not an option for providing robustness, since it destroys key-privacy properties.
Abdalla et al. also showed that the seemingly natural solution of using an unkeyed
redundancy function to modify the message before encryption does not achieve even
weak robustness, thus demonstrating the non-triviality of the problem. The authors
of [2] then gave anonymity-preserving constructions to obtain both weak and strong
robustness for public-key encryption. Using a simple tweak, they also showed how
to render the Cramer-Shoup cryptosystem [36] strongly robust without introducing
any overhead.
More recently, Mohassel [66] studied robustness in the context of hybrid encryp-
tion [37]. He showed that weak robustness (and not only anonymity) is needed in the
asymmetric part of a hybrid encryption scheme to ensure anonymity of the overall
scheme. Mohassel also considered relaxations, called collision-freeness, of both weak
and strong robustness. He showed that many constructions in the literature are na-
tively collision-free and showed how to generically turn any weakly (resp. strongly)
collision-free cryptosystem into a weakly (resp. strongly) robust one.
In [62] we proved the strong robustness of a variant of the Kurosawa-Desmedt
[60] cryptosystem.
3.1.2 Our contributions
This chapter is dedicated to the development and study of new notions of robustness
in the context of public-key encryption. We will first look at existing definitions and
point out some of their limitations, justifying the need for stronger notions. These
are obtained by progressively removing various restrictions on the capabilities of the
adversary in the strong robustness security model. We then show how these notions
relate to each other and thus give a more complete picture of robustness in general.
We finally present ways of achieving the introduced notions.
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This work wishes to provide a more in depth study and an overall better un-
derstanding of robustness. We do this by introducing stronger and simpler notions
which help unify and clarify this research area. Robustness is an important property
which is relevant especially in the context of anonymity. Indeed, it will be key in
achieving anonymous broadcast encryption, a primitive we develop in Chapter 4.
3.2 Weak and Strong Robustness
This section recalls the definitions of robust public-key encryption given by Abdalla,
Bellare and Neven [2]. We first present the notion of weak robustness, which
informally models the idea that an adversary cannot come up with a message and
two distinct public keys such that the encryption of that message under the first
public key returns a valid message when decrypted with the secret key corresponding
to the second public key. We formalize this next.
Let Π = (PKE.PG,PKE.KeyGen,PKE.Enc,PKE.Dec) be a PKE scheme. Let us
consider the following game.
WROB-CCA security game
Setup. The challenger C runs PKE.PG(1λ) to generate the common parameters
pars, which are passed on to A.
Query Phase. On a polynomial number of occasions, A may submit the following
queries:
– Public-key query: C generates and stores a key-pair (pk, sk) and returns
pk to A. We call pk a valid public key.
– Secret-key query for pk: If pk is valid, C returns sk, the secret key corre-
sponding to pk. Otherwise, it returns ⊥.
–Decryption query (C, pk): If pk is valid, C returns PKE.Dec(pars, pk, C, sk).
Otherwise, it returns ⊥.
Finalize. A outputs (M,pk0, pk1).
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A is a winning adversary if its output satisfies the following conditions:
1. both pk0 and pk1 are valid public keys (i.e. they are honestly generated public
keys output by C in the Query Phase);
2. neither sk0 nor sk1, the secret keys corresponding to pk0 and pk1 respectively,
has been queried in the query phase;
3. pk0 (= pk1;
4. M (=⊥ ∧ PKE.Dec(PKE.Enc(M,pk0), sk1) (=⊥.
We define A’s advantage as being the probability, taken over all random coins, of
outputting a tuple (M,pk0, pk1) satisfying all of the above conditions.
Definition 3.1 (WROB-CCA[2]) A PKE scheme Π = (PKE.PG,PKE.KeyGen,
PKE.Enc,PKE.Dec) is weakly robust under chosen-ciphertext attacks (or WROB-
CCA) if all polynomial-time adversaries have at most negligible advantage in the
above game.
In [2] the authors present a generic transformation, for both the public-key and
the identity-based settings, conferring weak robustness to chosen-ciphertext (and
chosen plaintext) secure schemes. The key idea is to append some publicly-known
and keyed redundancy to the message before encryption, and to check for it upon de-
cryption. This allows for weak robustness to be efficiently and generically achieved.
The notion of weak robustness is of interest since it precisely addresses the issue of
using the wrong key that arises in anonymity contexts (such as anonymous broadcast
encryption [6, 62], for instance), but it is also useful in achieving strong robustness.
Strong robustness was proposed by Abdalla et al. [2] as a, not surprisingly,
stronger notion of robustness, which allows for adversarially generated ciphertexts.
Roughly speaking, a scheme is strongly robust if an adversary cannot produce a
ciphertext that decrypts to a valid message under two distinct keys. We formalize
this idea next.
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Let Π = (PKE.PG,PKE.KeyGen,PKE.Enc,PKE.Dec) be a PKE scheme. Let us
consider the following game.
SROB-CCA security game
Setup. The challenger C runs PKE.PG(1λ) to generate the common parameters
pars, which are passed on to A.
Query Phase. On a polynomial number of occasions, A may submit the following
queries:
– Public-key query: C generates and stores a key-pair (pk, sk) and returns
pk to A. We call pk a valid public key.
– Secret-key query for pk: If pk is valid, C returns sk, the secret key corre-
sponding to pk. Otherwise, it returns ⊥.
–Decryption query (C, pk): If pk is valid, C returns PKE.Dec(pars, pk, C, sk).
Otherwise, it returns ⊥.
Finalize. A outputs (C, pk0, pk1).
A is a winning adversary if its output satisfies the following conditions:
1. both pk0 and pk1 are valid public keys;
2. neither sk0 nor sk1, the secret keys corresponding to pk0 and pk1 respectively,
has been queried in the query phase;
3. pk0 (= pk1;
4. PKE.Dec(C, sk0) (=⊥ ∧ PKE.Dec(C, sk1) (=⊥.
We define A’s advantage as the probability of outputting a tuple (C, pk0, pk1) satis-
fying all of the above conditions.
Definition 3.2 (SROB-CCA[2]) A PKE scheme Π = (PKE.PG,PKE.KeyGen,
PKE.Enc,PKE.Dec) is strongly robust under chosen-ciphertext attacks (or SROB-
CCA) if all polynomial-time adversaries have at most negligible advantage in the
above game.
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The authors of [2] show, and it is easy to see, that SROB-CCA implies WROB-
CCA. Indeed, an adversary against the weak robustness of a scheme can be trans-
formed into a strong robustness adversary simply by taking its output (M,pk0, pk1),
encrypting M under pk0 and outputting the resulting ciphertext together with pk0
and pk1.
We note that it is possible to define the chosen-plaintext analogues of weak and
strong robustness (WROB-CPA and SROB-CPA, respectively) simply by disallow-
ing decryption queries.
Abdalla et al. show that also strong robustness is achievable generically by apply-
ing a particular transformation. The main idea of the transformation is to include,
as part of the ciphertext, a commitment to the public key: the decommitment key is
encrypted along with the message and the commitment is appended to the cipher-
text. We give details of this transformation, which we call the ABN transformation,
in Section 3.5.1.
We stress that the difference between WROB-CCA and SROB-CCA is that in the
former the adversary has to produce a message, while in the latter it has to output
a ciphertext, which may not have been obtained as an honest encryption. In [2] the
need for the strong robustness notion is motivated by scenarios where ciphertexts
can be adversarially chosen. The authors of [2] give Sako’s auction protocol [81] as
an example of such a situation, explaining that strong robustness is required in order
to prevent an attack on its fairness mounted by a cheating bidder and a colluding
auctioneer.
As a first motivating step towards the development of new and stronger notions
of robustness we show that strong robustness is actually not sufficient to prevent
such types of attack. We next take a closer look at Sako’s protocol [81] and present
a new attack on its fairness.
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3.2.1 An attack on the fairness of Sako’s protocol
Sako’s auction protocol [81] was the first practical protocol to ensure bid privacy,
i.e. to hide the value of losing bids. The basic idea is the following1: Let V =
{v1, ..., vN} be the set of possible bid values. The auctioneer prepares N key-pairs
(pki, ski)i∈{1,...,N} and publishes the N public keys. To bid for a value vi a bidder
encrypts a pre-determined message M under the public key pki. This is signed and
posted by the bidder. To open a bid the auctioneer takes the largest value vN in V
and attempts to decrypt the encrypted bids one by one using skN . If at least one
decrypts to M , the auctioneer publishes the winning bid vN , a list of all the winning
bidders and the secret key skN for the bidders to verify. If no decryption returns
M , the auctioneer repeats the procedure using skN−1, and so on. For the auction
to hide the values of losing bids, the underlying public-key encryption scheme is
required to be key-private, in the sense of [8].
In [81], Sako provides an example of an auction protocol scheme based on the
ElGamal cryptosystem, which is key-private. In [2], Abdalla et al. give an attack
which allows a cheating bidder and a colluding auctioneer to break the fairness of
the protocol. Informally, this property ensures that a cheating bidder does not have
an unfair advantage over an honest one (for instance, a bidder should not be able to
see another bidder’s encryption and produce an encryption of a bid that is one value
higher). This attack is based on the fact that ElGamal is not robust and results in
the auctioneer being able to open the cheating bidder’s bid to an arbitrary (winning)
value. To prevent this attack, the authors of [2] suggest using any strongly robust
scheme (strong robustness, instead of simply weak robustness, is required since the
ciphertexts are generated adversarially).
We now show that strong robustness is not sufficient to prevent an attack of this
type to the fairness of Sako’s protocol. More precisely, we present an attack to the
protocol when instantiated with a variant of the Cramer–Shoup encryption scheme,
CS∗, which is key-private and strongly robust (the latter result was proved in [2]).
We first recall the CS∗ scheme.
1For the purpose of this thesis, we focus on the public-key setting.
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CS∗ encryption scheme
The common public parameters consist of a group G of prime order p and the
description of a family of functions H : Keys(H)×G3 → G.
PG(1λ): Choose K ← Keys(H), g1 ← G and w ← Z∗p. Let g2 = gw1 . Return
pars = (K, g1, g2).
KeyGen(pars): Choose random exponents x1, x2, y1, y2, z1, z2 ← Zp and compute
e = gx11 g
x2
2 , f = g
y1
1 g
y2
2 , h = g
z1
1 g
z2
2 .
The public key is pk = (e, f, h) and the private key is sk = (x1, x2, y1, y2, z1, z2).
Enc(pars,M, pk): To encrypt a message M ∈ G,
1. Pick u← Z∗p and compute
a1 = g
u
1 , a2 = g
u
2 , b = h
u,
2. Let c← b ·M, v ← HK(a1, a2, c), d← eufuv
The ciphertext is C = (a1, a2, c, d).
Dec(C, sk): Parse the ciphertext C as (a1, a2, c, d). Compute v = HK(a1, a2, c),
M = c · a−z11 a−z22 . If d (= ax1+y1v1 ax2+y2v2 then set M =⊥. If a1 = 1 then set
M =⊥. Return M .
Just as with the attack of Abdalla et al. [2], the attack we present below on the
Sako protocol instantiated with the scheme CS∗ assumes a dishonest bidder and a
colluding auctioneer, and works as follows.
Let V = {v1, ..., vN} be the set of possible bid values. The auctioneer runs
PG(1λ) to obtain the public parameters (K, g1, g2). He chooses a fixed message
M ∈ G as per Sako’s protocol. He selects u, z1, z2 ← Z∗p and computes a1 = gu1 ,
a2 = gu2 , b = a
z1
1 a
z2
2 and c = b ·M . He then computes v = HK(a1, a2, c). If v = 0, the
auctioneer re-samples and re-computes the values, until v (= 0. He then considers
the following system of linear equations
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{
x1 + vy1 = α1 mod p
x2 + vy2 = α2 mod p
for some α1, α2 in Zp, and finds N distinct solutions (x1,i, x2,i, y1,i, y2,i) with i ∈
{1, ..., N}, where all the values are in Zp.
The auctioneer sets ski to be (x1,i, x2,i, y1,i, y2,i, z1, z2) for i ∈ {1, ..., N}. He
passes u to the cheating bidder and publishes all the public keys pki = (g
x1,i
1 g
x2,i
2 ,
g
y1,i
1 g
y2,i
2 , g
z1
1 g
z2
2 ) with i ∈ {1, ..., N}.
The cheating bidder can now bid for the value vi by encrypting M with ran-
domness u under the public key pki to get ciphertext C. Such an encrypted bid C
will decrypt to M under any skj with j ∈ {1, ..., N}, since x1,i + vy1,i = xj1 + vyj1
and x2,i + vy2,i = xj2 + vyj2 , by construction. This means that during the protocol,
the auctioneer can first observe the highest honest bid (say h < N). Then, he can
declare the cheating bidder as the winner (for the bid h + 1) by revealing the pri-
vate key skh+1. This clearly gives the dishonest bidder and colluding auctioneer a
cheating strategy and breaks the fairness of the protocol.
Remark 1 It may be argued that the above attack can be detected by the bid-
ders, as the maliciously generated public keys all share the same third component.
Although this is a valid point, it may be unreasonable to assume that the bidders
perform such checks outside the protocol description. Indeed, one (or the) goal of ro-
bustness is to ensure that such checks are already implemented within the decryption
algorithm. Let us note that the attack of Abdalla et al. on the robustness of ElGamal
also falls within the category of such “traceable” attacks, as the ciphertexts in their
attack are of the form (1, C). To further justify the relevance of the new notions, we
demonstrate an untraceable attack on the modified Kurosawa–Desmedt encryption
scheme (which is proven strongly robust under chosen-ciphertext attacks [62]) in
Section 3.3.4.
Evidently, this attack shows that strong robustness is not enough to guarantee
fairness in Sako’s auction protocol. Intuitively what is needed is a stronger notion
of robustness, wherein all the public keys and ciphertexts in the system may be
adversarially generated. This is precisely the notion we will develop next.
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3.3 A Direct Strengthening: Full Robustness
The attack in the previous section highlights the need for stronger notions of robust-
ness. Developing such notions will not only address the limitations of the existing
ones but it will also help in providing a more complete picture of the various flavours
of robustness. We start by directly strengthening strong robustness. This will lead
to a very natural and simple notion which we name full robustness. We then con-
sider what later can be seen as its “dual” notion, namely key-less robustness. In this
section, we define and relate these notions, providing implications and separating
examples.
3.3.1 Full robustness
Recall that an SROB-CCA adversary has to output a ciphertext C and two public
keys pk0 and pk1 such that C decrypts to a valid message M0 under sk0 and to a
valid message M1 under sk1. The notion poses three restrictions on the public keys
output by the adversary:
1. the public keys are honestly generated;
2. the corresponding secret keys cannot have been queried by the adversary;
3. pk0 and pk1 have to be distinct.
We will next see that by removing some of these restrictions we obtain increas-
ingly stronger notions of robustness.
We start by observing that the last condition is inherent to modeling the be-
haviour of an encryption scheme when used on different public keys, and removing
it would make it trivial for an adversary to win. In fact, an adversary can always
encrypt a valid message M under a valid public key pk, obtaining C. By submitting
(C, pk, pk) the adversary will win with probability 1, due to the correctness of the
scheme2.
2We assume that the public-key schemes we consider are perfectly correct.
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We now look at the notion resulting from the removal of restriction 2, i.e. the
adversary is now allowed to query secret keys even for the finally output public
keys. We call this notion unrestricted strong robustness (USROB). This game
therefore proceeds as the SROB-CCA game in Definition 3.2 except that condition
2 is removed. This notion is powerful enough to model scenarios where keys are
honestly generated, but an adversary trying to break the robustness of the scheme
may know the secret keys.
If an adversary can control the generation of keys, it may be unreasonable to
assume that it can only generate the keys honestly. We therefore strengthen USROB
further by removing the first restriction on the adversary. We ask, however, that
the adversary return the secret keys for the public keys that it chooses. Two points
deserve further attention at this point. First, returning the secret keys is to allow
for a polynomial-time game definition which is not excessively strong. Second, we
do not require the secret keys to be valid. Indeed, it is the responsibility of the
decryption algorithm to check that the key-pair it receives is valid. Note that as a
result of removing the two restrictions, the adversary has now full control over the
keys, and we no longer need to provide the adversary with the oracles present in the
SROB-CCA and USROB games. These modifications result in a simple, but strong,
notion which we call full robustness (FROB), and which we formalize below.
Let Π = (PKE.PG,PKE.KeyGen,PKE.Enc,PKE.Dec) be a PKE scheme. Let us
consider the following game.
FROB security game
Setup. The challenger C runs PKE.PG(1λ) to generate the common parameters pars
and passes them on to A.
Finalize. A outputs (C, pk0, pk1, sk0, sk1).
A is a winning adversary if its output satisfies the following conditions:
1. pk0 (= pk1;
2. PKE.Dec(pars, pk0, C, sk0) (=⊥ ∧ PKE.Dec(pars, pk1, C, sk1) (=⊥.
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We defineA’s advantage as the probability of outputting a tuple (C, pk0, pk1, sk0, sk1)
satisfying both of the above conditions.
Definition 3.3 (FROB) A PKE scheme Π = (PKE.PG,PKE.KeyGen,PKE.Enc,
PKE.Dec) is fully robust (or FROB) if all polynomial-time adversaries have at most
negligible advantage in the above game.
We note that we no longer require public key, secret key and decryption oracles
and therefore there is no CPA or CCA notion for full robustness. This is because a
FROB adversary is not restricted by conditions 1 and 2 and, having access to pars,
it can implement the oracles on its own.
3.3.2 Key-less robustness
The new notion of full robustness accounts for an adversary which is allowed to
output self-generated public keys. However, in order for the game to test the winning
condition in polynomial time, such an adversary also has to output the corresponding
secret keys. Such a requirement may be inconvenient for the adversary (who prefers
not to give away the secret keys) or may even be unsatisfiable (the adversary may
not know them!). To address this issue, we propose an alternative definition of
robustness, called key-less robustness (KROB), where the adversary no longer
needs to return any secret keys, but instead “opens” a ciphertext by providing the
random coins and the message used in the encryption. More precisely, the adversary
outputs two messages, two distinct public keys and two sets of random coins, and
its goal is to produce a collision in the encryption algorithm. The game for key-less
robustness is described next.
KROB security game
Setup. The challenger C runs PKE.PG(1λ) to generate the common parameters pars
and passes them on to A.
Finalize. A outputs (M0,M1, pk0, pk1, r0, r1).
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WROB-CPA SROB-CCA USROB FROB
KROB
Figure 3.1: Relations among notions of robustness.
A is a winning adversary if its output satisfies the following conditions:
1. pk0 (= pk1;
2. PKE.Enc(pars,M0, pk0; r0) = PKE.Enc(pars,M1, pk1; r1).
We define A’s advantage as the probability of outputting (M0,M1, pk0, pk1, r0, r1)
satisfying the above conditions.
Definition 3.4 (KROB) A PKE scheme Π = (PKE.PG,PKE.KeyGen,PKE.Enc,
PKE.Dec) is key-less robust (or KROB) if all polynomial-time adversaries have at
most negligible advantage in the above game.
Intuitively this notion appears to be the strongest amongst the ones considered
so far, since the adversary has the liberty to choose the public keys and does not have
to reveal any secret information. Surprisingly, we will see that key-less robustness
does not imply any of the other notions (FROB, SROB-CCA, and not even weak
robustness). Furthermore, we will show that FROB does not imply KROB either.
3.3.3 Relations among notions of robustness
We now study how the various notions of robustness relate to each other. We
summarize our initial findings in Figure 3.1. It is clear that FROB ⇒ USROB ⇒
SROB-CCA as the adversary becomes progressively more restricted in each game.
For completeness, we provide proofs of these relations below.
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Proposition 3.5 (FROB ⇒ USROB ⇒ SROB-CCA) Let Π be a PKE scheme
which is FROB (resp. USROB). Then it is also USROB (resp. SROB-CCA).
Proof. We want to prove that if a PKE scheme Π = (PKE.PG,PKE.KeyGen,
PKE.Enc,PKE.Dec) is FROB, then it is also USROB. Suppose there exists an ad-
versary A breaking Π’s USROB, then we can build an adversary B that interacts
with A to break Π’s FROB.
The game proceeds as follows. B’s challenger C runs PKE.PG(1λ) to obtain pars,
which are passed to B. B handles all of A’s queries by simulating A’s oracles (it can,
since it knows pars). Finally A outputs (C, pk0, pk1) and B outputs (C, pk0, pk1,
sk0, sk1), where sk0 and sk1 are the secret keys corresponding to pk0 and pk1,
respectively. We note that B knows such keys since it created them when generating
the valid public keys pk0 and pk1 for A. B provides a perfect simulation of A’s
environment and therefore has exactly the same advantage in winning the FROB
game as A has in winning the USROB one.
For the second implication, we want to prove that if a PKE scheme Π = (PKE.PG,
PKE.KeyGen,PKE.Enc,PKE.Dec) is USROB, then it is also SROB-CCA. Suppose
there exists an adversary A breaking Π’s SROB-CCA, then we can build an adver-
sary B that interacts with A to break Π’s USROB.
The game proceeds as follows. B’s challenger C runs PKE.PG(1λ) to obtain pars.
B handles all of A’s queries by forwarding them to C. Finally A outputs (C, pk0, pk1)
and B outputs the same. B has exactly the same advantage in winning the USROB
game as A has in winning the SROB-CCA one. !
Next we show that USROB is strictly stronger than SROB-CCA, and that FROB
is strictly stronger than USROB.
Proposition 3.6 (SROB-CCA ! USROB) Let Π = (PKE.PG,PKE.KeyGen,
PKE.Enc,PKE.Dec) be SROB-CCA. Then there is a scheme Π1 = (PKE.PG1,
PKE.KeyGen1,PKE.Enc1, PKE.Dec1) which is SROB-CCA, but fails to be USROB.
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Proof. Informally, Π1 is obtained from Π by running its algorithms, with the
difference that a random string is appended to the secret key output by PKE.KeyGen.
Checking for such string will be an alternative decryption rule in case PKE.Dec
returns ⊥. More precisely, we define the required scheme Π1 as follows.
PKE.PG1(1λ): Run PKE.PG(1λ) to obtain pars. Return pars.
PKE.KeyGen1(pars): Run PKE.KeyGen(pars) to obtain (pk, sk). Sample s ←
{0, 1}λ and return (pk, (sk||s)).
PKE.Enc1(pars,M, pk): Run PKE.Enc(pars,M, pk) to obtain ciphertext C. Return
C.
PKE.Dec1(pars, pk, C, (sk||s)): Parse C as C||C ′. Run PKE.Dec(pars, pk, C, sk). If
the output is a valid message M , return M . Otherwise, check if s = C ′, and
if so return a message M from the message space for pk. Else, return ⊥.3
We first prove Π1 is not USROB by constructing an adversary A which wins
the USROB game against Π1. Algorithm A queries the public-key oracle to obtain
public keys pk0 and pk1. It then queries the secret-key-extraction oracle to receive
(sk0||s0), the secret key corresponding to pk0. It runs PKE.Enc1(pars,M1, pk1),
where M1 is any (valid) message, obtaining C1. A then sets C ′1 := s0 and outputs
(C := (C1||C ′1), pk0, pk1) as its final output. It is easy to see that this is a winning
strategy for A: C when decrypted with respect to pk1 will return M1 due to the
correctness of the scheme. Now, if we run the decryption algorithm on C = (C1||C ′1)
with respect to pk0, C1 will not decrypt to a valid message, due to the strong
robustness of Π, however C ′1 = s0 and therefore we obtain a valid message M .
We now prove that Π1 is SROB-CCA. Suppose there is an adversary A which
wins the SROB-CCA game against Π1. We construct an adversary B that interacts
with A to win the SROB-CCA game against Π. A’s challenger generates pars. B
handles A’s queries as follows:
– Public-key query: B invokes C to get a valid public key pk. It then selects
and stores a random bit-string s of length λ. B gives pk to A.
3An alternative decryption rule, which checks for the equality before running PKE.Dec, is possible
but only guarantees overwhelming, instead of perfect, correctness.
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– Secret-key query for pk: B queries C for the corresponding secret key sk. B
then appends s to sk and gives (sk||s) as the response to A.
– Decryption query (C||C ′, pk): B passes (C, pk) to its own oracle. If the
answer is a valid message M , B forwards M to A. If the output is ⊥, B checks
whether C ′ is equal to s (which it holds). If so, B outputs a valid message as a
response to A’s query. If not, B returns ⊥.
Finally, when A outputs (C||C ′, pk0, pk1), B outputs (C, pk0, pk1).
We note that B provides a perfect simulation of A’s environment and that B
wins whenever A wins unless A does so by guessing the s-component of either sk0
or sk1. Since the s-components are random and information theoretically hidden
from A’s view the probability of this event is at most 2 · 1
2λ
. This completes the
proof. !
Proposition 3.7 (USROB ! FROB) Let Π = (PKE.PG,PKE.KeyGen,PKE.Enc,
PKE.Dec) be USROB. Then there is a scheme Π2 = (PKE.PG2,PKE.KeyGen2,
PKE.Enc2,PKE.Dec2) which is USROB, but fails to be FROB.
Proof. Informally, the required scheme Π2 is derived from Π simply by prepending a
zero-bit to the public key output by PKE.KeyGen. This zero-bit is then discarded by
the encryption and decryption algorithms. We define Π2 more precisely as follows.
PKE.PG2(1λ): Run PKE.PG(1λ) to obtain pars. Return pars.
PKE.KeyGen2(pars): Run PKE.KeyGen(pars) to obtain (pk, sk). Return (0||pk, sk).
PKE.Enc2(pars,M, b||pk): Run PKE.Enc(pars,M, pk) to obtain C. Return C.
PKE.Dec2(pars, b||pk, C, sk): Return PKE.Dec(pars, pk, C, sk).
Π2 is not FROB. Consider the adversary A which runs PKE.KeyGen2(pars) to
get a valid key-pair (0||pk, sk), picks a randomM and runs PKE.Enc2(pars,M, 0||pk)
to obtain a ciphertext C. A gives (C, 0||pk, 1||pk, sk, sk) as its final output. It is
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easy to see that A wins with probability 1: 0||pk (= 1||pk and the decryption of C
with the secret key sk returns a valid message due to correctness.
We now show Π2 is USROB. Suppose there is an adversary A which wins the
USROB game against Π2. We construct an adversary B that interacts with A to win
the USROB game against Π with the same probability. The challenger C generates
pars. B handles A’s queries by forwarding them to its own oracles prepending or
removing a zero-bit to all the public keys sent and received as appropriate. Finally,
when A outputs (C, 0||pk0, 0||pk1) with pk0 (= pk1, B also outputs (C, pk0, pk1). It’s
easy to see that B provides a perfect simulation of A’s environment, and that if A
wins so does B. !
The next proposition shows that KROB does not even imply WROB-CPA. It
follows that KROB ! USROB and KROB ! FROB.
Proposition 3.8 (KROB ! WROB-CPA) Let Π = (PKE.PG,PKE.KeyGen,
PKE.Enc,PKE.Dec) be KROB. Then there is a scheme Π3 = (PKE.PG3,PKE.KeyGen3,
PKE.Enc3,PKE.Dec3) which is KROB, but fails to be WROB-CPA.
Proof. We define the required scheme Π3 to be identical to Π except for its decryp-
tion algorithm, which we modify as follows:
PKE.Dec3(pars, pk, C, sk): If PKE.Dec(pars, pk, C, sk) is a valid messageM , return
M . If not, return a valid fixed message M from the message space.
It is easy to see that Π3 is not even WROB-CPA as the decryption algorithm
never returns ⊥. However, the modified scheme is still KROB as the tweaked de-
cryption algorithm does not affect the KROB game. !
Finally, we show also that FROB does not imply KROB, separating the two
seemingly stronger notions so far and completing the relations represented in Figure
3.1.
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Proposition 3.9 (FROB ! KROB) Let Π = (PKE.PG,PKE.KeyGen,PKE.Enc,
PKE.Dec) be FROB. Then there is a scheme Π4 = (PKE.PG4,PKE.KeyGen4,
PKE.Enc4,PKE.Dec4) which is FROB, but fails to be KROB.
Proof. We define the required scheme Π4 as follows.
PKE.PG4(1λ): Run PKE.PG(1λ) to obtain pars. Return pars.
PKE.KeyGen4(pars): Run PKE.KeyGen(pars) to obtain (pk, sk). Return (0||pk, sk).
PKE.Enc4(pars,M, b||pk): If b = 1, output a fixed ciphertext C". If b = 0, run
PKE.Enc(pars,M, pk), obtain ciphertext C and output it.
PKE.Dec4(pars, b||pk, C, sk): If b = 1 return ⊥. Else, output PKE.Dec(pars, pk, C,
sk).
To see that Π4 is not KROB, note that an adversary which outputs 1||pk0 and
1||pk1, for two valid public keys pk1 and pk0 wins the KROB game (for any pair of
messages and any pair of random coins) as the resulting ciphertext in both cases is
C".
In order to show that Π4 is still FROB, suppose an adversary A on input pars
outputs a winning tuple (C, b0||pk0, b1||pk1, sk0, sk1), where b0||pk0 and b1||pk1 are
two distinct public keys. Note it must be the case that b0 = b1 = 0, as otherwise
A cannot win the FROB game. Therefore it is necessarily the case that pk0 (= pk1,
and B can win its FROB game against Π by outputting (C, pk0, pk1, sk0, sk1). !
The separations we provided were crafted in order to systematically relate the
new notions of robustness to one another. We next show an example of a more
natural separating example between SROB-CCA and the stronger notions of FROB
and KROB.
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3.3.4 KD∗ is neither FROB nor KROB
We provide a separating example between the existing notion of strong robustness
and the newly defined full and key-less robustness. Indeed we show that a variant
of the Kurosawa-Desmedt (KD) encryption scheme [60], proved strongly robust in
[62], achieves neither full nor key-less robustness. We recall the KD cryptosystem.
KD encryption scheme
The common public parameters consist of a group G of prime order p > 2λ, with
generators g1, g2 ← G. They also include the description of a universal one-way
hash function H : {0, 1}∗ → Zp, a key derivation function KDF : G → {0, 1}k, for
some integer k ∈ poly(1λ) and a symmetric authenticated encryption scheme (E,D)
of key length k.
KeyGen(pars): Given common public parameters pars = (G, g1, g2, H,KDF, (E,D)),
choose random exponents x1, x2, y1, y2 ← Zp and compute
e = gx11 g
x2
2 , f = g
y1
1 g
y2
2
The public key is pk = (e, f) and the private key is sk = (x1, x2, y1, y2).
Enc(pars,M, pk): To encrypt a message M ∈ G,
1. Pick u← Zp and compute
a1 = g
u
1 , a2 = g
u
2 , d = (e · fv)u,
where v = H(a1, a2) ∈ Zp.
2. Compute K = KDF(d) ∈ {0, 1}k, c = EK(M).
The ciphertext is C = (a1, a2, c).
Dec(pars, pk, C, sk): Parse the ciphertext C as (a1, a2, c). Compute v = H(a1, a2),
d = ax1+v·y11 · ax2+v·y22 and K = KDF(d) ∈ {0, 1}k. Then, return M = DK(c)
(which may be ⊥ if c fails to properly decrypt under the key K).
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The above algorithms describe the original Kurosawa–Desmedt encryption scheme.
Following [2], we denote by KD∗ the modified KD scheme where the encryption ex-
ponent u = 0 is explicitly disallowed: namely, the sender chooses u← Z∗p (instead of
u← Zp) during encryption and the receiver outputs ⊥ upon receiving a ciphertext
(a1, a2, c) such that a1 = 1G. In [62] it is proven that KD∗ is strongly robust (with
some conditions on the symmetric components).
We will next see that KD∗ is not fully robust. We construct an adversary A
which gets as input pars, picks M ← G and u,α1,α2 ← Z∗p. It then computes
a1 = g
u
1 , a2 = g
u
2 , v = H(a1, a2), d = a
α1
1 a
α2
2 .
If v = 0, A re-samples and re-computes the values, until v (= 0. Now consider the
following system of linear equations
{
x1 + vy1 = α1 mod p
x2 + vy2 = α2 mod p
for some α1, α2 in Zp. Let (x10, x20, y10, y20) and (x11, x21, y11, y21) be two distinct
integer solutions to the system.
Now A sets pk = (e, f) and pk′ = (e′, f ′) where
e = gx101 g
x20
2 , f = g
y10
1 g
y20
2 ,
e′ = gx111 g
x21
2 , f
′ = gy111 g
y21
2 ,
i.e., the public keys corresponding to secret keys sk = (x10, x20, y10, y20) and sk′ =
(x11, x21, y11, y21), respectively. A finally computes d = aα11 aα22 , K = KDF(d) and
c = EK(M). Let C = (a1, a2, c).
A’s output for the FROB game will be (C, pk, pk′, sk, sk′). Now, pk (= pk′ and
by the choice of sk and sk′ it is clear that C, decrypted under both secret keys,
will return a valid message M with overwhelming probability. It is easy to see that
this same strategy allows A to win also the KROB game. A’s output will simply be
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(M,M, pk, pk′, u, u), where pk (= pk′ and Enc(pars,M, pk;u) = Enc(pars,M, pk′;u)
by construction.
We therefore have an attack against the full and key-less robustness of KD∗,
providing a natural separation between these notions and that of strong robustness.
We note that in a similar way we can show that CS∗ is neither fully robust nor
key-less robust. In fact, we can view the auctioneer in the attack in Section 3.2.1
as the adversary which is allowed to maliciously generate keys and therefore, using
the same strategy, it can come up with winning outputs for both the FROB and the
KROB games.
3.4 A Unified Approach: Complete Robustness
3.4.1 Complete robustness
At this point it can be asked if there are attacks which fall outside the FROB/KROB
model. To answer this question, we take a somewhat different approach towards ro-
bustness and view it in terms of the behaviour of the encryption and decryption
routines of a scheme with respect to each other. In fact, this is the underlying in-
tuition behind not only the original weak robustness notion (which disappears in
the SROB game because the adversary outputs ciphertexts), but also the standard
correctness property for a PKE scheme (albeit for a single key). This approach leads
to a new notion which we term complete robustness (CROB). In this notion the
shared parameters of the system are passed to an adversary, which then arbitrar-
ily interacts with the encryption and decryption routines on plaintexts, ciphertexts,
keys, and even random coins of its choice. The adversary’s goal is to find an “un-
expected collision” in the cryptosystem (i.e., one outside the natural restrictions
imposed by correctness). We formalize the CROB notion next.
Let Π = (PKE.PG,PKE.KeyGen,PKE.Enc,PKE.Dec) be a PKE scheme. Consider
the following game.
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CROB security game
Setup. The challenger C runs PKE.PG(1λ) to generate the common parameters pars
and initializes a list L to the empty list. C passes pars on to A.
List building phase. A can make the following queries.
• Encryption query: A gives a public key pk, a message M and random-
ness r to C and obtains C = PKE.Enc(pars,M, pk; r). C adds to the list
L the tuple (pk,M,C,⊥, r).
• Decryption query: A gives a public key pk, a secret key sk and a
ciphertext C to C and obtains M = PKE.Dec(pars, pk, C, sk). C adds to
the list L the tuple (pk,M,C, sk,⊥).
A is a winning adversary if there exist two tuples (pk0,M0, C0, e01, e02), (pk1,M1, C1,
e11, e12) in list L, where (ei1, ei2) ∈ {(⊥, ri), (ski,⊥)} for i ∈ {0, 1}, such that:
1. pk0 (= pk1;
2. M0 (=⊥ ∧ M1 (=⊥; and
3. C0 = C1.
We define A’s advantage as the probability of outputting two tuples (pk0,M0, C0,
e01, e02), (pk1,M1, C1, e11, e12) satisfying all of the above conditions.
Definition 3.10 (CROB) A PKE scheme Π = (PKE.PG,PKE.KeyGen,PKE.Enc,
PKE.Dec) is completely robust (or CROB) if all polynomial-time adversaries have
at most negligible advantage in the above game.
It can be seen through an easy inspection that full robustness is a sub-case
of complete robustness and it can be viewed as the “decryption component” of
the above definition. Key-less robustness, its dual, can similarly be viewed as the
encryption component and therefore it is also implied by complete robustness.
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WROB-CPA SROB-CCA USROB FROB
KROB
XROB
CROB
Figure 3.2: Relations among notions of robustness.
3.4.2 Relations among notions of robustness
Let us now see where CROB stands in relation to the other notions. For instance,
it may be asked if FROB and KROB are strong enough together to jointly imply
CROB. We show this is not the case. To this end, we first characterize CROB in
terms of three notions of robustness consisting of FROB, KROB and a new mixed
notion which we call XROB. We then show that XROB is necessary in the sense that
it is not always implied by FROB and KROB put together. Figure 3.2 summarizes
the main relations among notions of robustness we establish in our work.
Before proving our results we formally define the XROB game. LetΠ = (PKE.PG,
PKE.KeyGen,PKE.Enc,PKE.Dec) be a PKE scheme. Consider the following game.
XROB security game
Setup. The challenger C runs PKE.PG(1λ) to generate the common parameters pars
and passes them on to A.
Finalize. A outputs ((M0, pk0, r0), (C1, pk1, sk1)).
A is a winning adversary if its output satisfies the following conditions:
1. pk0 (= pk1;
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2. PKE.Enc(pars,M0, pk0; r0) = C1 ∧ (M0 (=⊥) ∧ PKE.Dec(pars, pk1, C1, sk1) (=⊥.
We defineA’s advantage as the probability of outputting ((M0, pk0, r0), (C1, pk1, sk1))
satisfying all of the above conditions.
Definition 3.11 (XROB) A PKE scheme Π = (PKE.PG,PKE.KeyGen,PKE.Enc,
PKE.Dec) is XROB if all polynomial-time adversaries have at most negligible ad-
vantage in the above game.
The following results hold.
Proposition 3.12 (CROB ⇔ FROB ∧ KROB ∧ XROB) A PKE scheme is
CROB if and only if it is simultaneously FROB, KROB and XROB.
Proof. A pair of winning tuples can arise in one of three possible ways:
• Both tuples have a secret key as their fourth entry (and therefore a ⊥ as their
last entry), meaning they were added to list L as decryption queries. These
can be translated into a winning output for a FROB adversary.
• Both tuples have the encryption randomness as their last entry (and therefore
a ⊥ as their fourth entry), meaning they were added to list L as encryption
queries. These can be translated into a winning output for a KROB adversary.
• One tuple has ⊥ as its fourth entry and the other has it as its last. These
tuples can be translated into a winning output for an XROB adversary.
!
Proposition 3.13 (FROB ∧ KROB ! CROB) Let Π = (PKE.PG,PKE.KeyGen,
PKE.Enc,PKE.Dec) be FROB and KROB. Then there is a scheme Π5 = (PKE.PG5,
PKE.KeyGen5,PKE.Enc5,PKE.Dec5) which is FROB and KROB but fails to be CROB.
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Proof. We define the required scheme Π5 as follows.
PKE.PG5(1λ): Run PKE.PG(1λ) to obtain pars′. Run PKE.KeyGen(pars′) to ob-
tain (pk", sk"). Let M" and C" be, respectively, a fixed message and a fixed
ciphertext corresponding to pk". Return pars := (pars′, pk", C",M").
PKE.KeyGen5(pars): Run PKE.KeyGen(pars
′) to obtain (pk, sk). Return (0||pk, sk).
PKE.Enc5(pars,M, b||pk; r): If b = 0 return 0||PKE.Enc(pars′,M, pk; r). If b = 1
and pk = pk", output 1||C". Else return ⊥.
PKE.Dec5(pars, b||pk, c||C, sk): If b (= c return ⊥. If b = 0 return PKE.Dec(pars′, C,
sk). If b = 1, pk = pk" ⊕ 1 and C = C" return M". Else return ⊥.
We first show that Π5 is not XROB (and hence it is also not CROB). We
construct an XROB adversary A as follows. Algorithm A obtains pars and sets
r = sk = 0. It then returns the tuples (M", 1||pk"; r) and (1||C", 1||(pk" ⊕ 1), sk).
Now
PKE.Enc5(pars,M
", 1||pk"; r) = 1||C"
and
PKE.Dec5(pars, 1||(pk" ⊕ 1), sk, 1||C") =M".
Furthermore, 1||pk" (= 1||(pk" ⊕ 1), M" (=⊥, and C" (=⊥. Therefore A wins the
XROB game with probability 1.
We now show Π5 is still FROB. Take any FROB adversary A against Π5. We
construct a FROB adversary B against Π as follows. B runs on pars′ and provides
A with pars based on pars′ as in the description of the scheme. Now if the public
keys that A outputs begin with different bits, since PKE.Dec5 checks if b (= c, it
must be the case that the ciphertexts also begin with different bits, and hence A
will not win the FROB game. Suppose A returns two public keys beginning with
b = 0. It is clear that in this case B can also win its FROB game by stripping away
the redundant bits. Finally, suppose both beginning bits are b = 1. In this case
PKE.Dec5 will return a non-⊥ value only when the public keys are both 1||(pk"⊕1),
and hence A cannot win its game in this case.
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It remains to show Π5 is KROB. Take any KROB adversary A against Π5.
We construct a KROB adversary B against Π as follows. B receives pars′ and
generates pars for Π5 as in description of PKE.PG5 above. Now if the public keys
that A outputs begin with different bits, the ciphertexts will not be colliding as the
encryption algorithm attaches the first bit of the public key to the ciphertext. If A
outputs a winning pair with pk0 and pk1 starting with b = 0, it is clear that B can
break the KROB property of the underlying scheme by removing the redundant bits
from the public keys. If both public keys start with b = 1 (and the ciphertexts are
not ⊥), and A is winning, then it must be the case that the public keys are equal,
and so this case cannot lead to A winning the KROB game. !
Having defined complete robustness, CROB, and its weaker relatives, we now
want to prove that it is achievable using generic constructions. In particular, we
show that the construction for strong robustness presented in [2] (which we call the
ABN transformation for short) is actually so powerful as to also achieve CROB.
3.5 Generic Constructions for Complete Robustness
3.5.1 The ABN transformation
In [2] the authors give a generic transformation which takes a scheme Π that satisfies
IND-IK-ATK security (where ATK ∈ {CPA,CCA}), and outputs a scheme Π that
preserves IND-IK-ATK security but is also strongly robust.
Let Π = (PKE.PG,PKE.KeyGen,PKE.Enc,PKE.Dec) be a PKE scheme and let
CMT = (CPG,Com,Vrfy) be a commitment scheme. Π = (PKE.PG,PKE.KeyGen,
PKE.Enc,PKE.Dec) is constructed as follows [2].
PKE.PG(1λ): Run PKE.PG and CPG on input 1λ to obtain pars and cpars. Return
pars′ = (pars, cpars).
PKE.KeyGen(pars′): Run PKE.KeyGen(pars) to obtain (pk, sk).
PKE.Enc(pars′,M, pk): Generate (com, dec)← Com(cpars, pk). Run PKE.Enc(pars,
M ||dec, pk) to obtain ciphertext c. Return C = (c, com).
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PKE.Dec(pars′, pk, C, sk): Parse C as (c, com). Run PKE.Dec(pars, c, sk) and ob-
tain M ′. If M ′ = ⊥ then return ⊥. Otherwise, parse M ′ as M ||dec, for dec
of the appropriate length. If Vrfy(cpars, pk, com, dec) = 1 then return M ,
otherwise return ⊥.
Abdalla et al. prove that this transformation preserves the IND-IK-ATK security
of Π if Π is also WROB ([2, Theorem 4.2, part 1]), and that Π is also strongly robust
([2, Theorem 4.2, part 2]). We re-use the first part of this result but strengthen its
second part by showing that the transformation confers complete robustness.
Theorem 3.14 If CMT is binding, the ABN transformation results in a CROB
scheme.
Proof. We treat the three possible cases corresponding to FROB, KROB and
XROB.
Given an FROB adversary A against Π we construct an adversary B1 that will
interact with A to break the binding property of CMT . The game is as follows.
Let C be B1’s challenger. C runs CPG to obtain the commitment scheme’s pa-
rameters cpars and passes them on to B1. B1 runs PKE.PG to obtain pars, which it
passes to A together with cpars.
Finally, A outputs (C, pk0, pk1, sk0, sk1), where C = (c, com) and pk0 (= pk1. Now
B1 runs PKE.Dec(pars, pk0, c, sk0), obtaining M0, and PKE.Dec(pars, pk1, c, sk1),
obtaining M1. Let Succ be the event that neither M0 nor M1 are ⊥. If Succ occurs
then B1 parses M0 and M1 into M˜0||dec0 and M˜1||dec1, respectively. It then gives
(com, pk0, pk1, dec0, dec1) to C as its final output.
B1 provides a perfect simulation for A as well as a legal strategy for attacking the
binding property of CMT , provided Succ occurs. Since this happens whenever A is
a winning adversary against the full robustness of Π, we have that B1’s advantage
is the same as A’s.
Given a KROB adversary A against Π we construct an adversary B2 that will
interact with A to break the binding property of CMT . The game is as follows.
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Let C be B2’s challenger. C runs CPG to obtain the commitment scheme’s pa-
rameters cpars and passes them on to B2. B2 runs PKE.PG to obtain pars, which it
passes to A together with cpars.
A outputs (M0,M1, pk0, pk1, r0, r1), where pk0 (= pk1, r0 = (r0cmt , r0enc) and r1 =
(r1cmt , r1enc). Now B2 runs Com(cpars, pk0; r0cmt), obtaining (com0, dec0), and
Com(cpars, pk1; r1cmt), obtaining (com1, dec1). B2 computes c0 = PKE.Enc(pars,
M0||dec0, pk0; r0enc) and c1 = PKE.Enc(pars,M1||dec1, pk1; r1enc). Let C0 = (c0,
com0) and C1 = (c1, com1). Let Succ be the event that C0 = C1 (and there-
fore c0 = c1 = c and com0 = com1 = com). If Succ occurs then B2 outputs
(com, pk0, pk1, dec0, dec1) and gives it to C.
B2 provides a perfect simulation for A as well as a legal strategy for attacking the
binding property of CMT , provided Succ occurs. Since this happens whenever A is a
winning adversary against the key-less robustness of Π, we have that B2’s advantage
is the same as A’s.
Given an XROB adversary A against Π we construct an adversary B3 that will
interact with A to break the binding property of CMT . The game proceeds as
follows.
Let C be B3’s challenger. C runs CPG to obtain the commitment schemes’s
parameters cpars and passes them on to B3. B3 runs PKE.PG to obtain pars, which
it passes to A together with cpars.
A outputs (M0, pk0, r0, C1, pk1, sk1), where pk0 (= pk1, r0 = (r0cmt , r0enc) and C1 =
(c1, com1). Now B3 runs Com(cpars, pk0; r0cmt), in order to obtain (com0, dec0),
and it also runs PKE.Dec(pars, pk1, c1, sk1), obtaining M1. Then B3 computes the
ciphertext c0 = PKE.Enc(pars,M0||dec0, pk0; r0enc). Let C0 = (c0, com0). Let Succ
be the event that C0 = C1 (and therefore c0 = c1 = c and com0 = com1 = com). If
Succ occurs then B3 outputs (com, pk0, pk1, dec0, dec1) and gives it to C.
B3 provides a perfect simulation for A as well as a legal strategy for attacking the
binding property of CMT , provided Succ occurs. Since this happens whenever A is a
winning adversary against the key-less robustness of Π, we have that B3’s advantage
is the same as A’s. !
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3.5.2 Further constructions
We have presented a generic construction for complete robustness. We now pro-
vide an overview of alternative ways to achieve this notion. Details of some of the
following results can be found in [45].
3.5.2.1 Mohassel’s transformation
Mohassel [66] provides a generic transformation in the random oracle model that
converts an IND-IK-ATK encryption scheme into one which is SROB-CCA, with-
out compromising its IND-IK-ATK security. In his construction, the hash value
H(pk, r,M), where r is the randomness used in the encryption, is attached to ci-
phertexts. This immediately rules out all forms of collisions between ciphertexts, as
the hash values are unlikely to collide on two distinct public keys. It is then easy to
see that this construction also achieves complete robustness.
3.5.2.2 A modified ABN transform
While the original transformation [2] does preserve IND-IK-CCA security and con-
fers CROB security, the IND-IK-CCA security of the transformed scheme Π relies
on the weak robustness of the underlying encryption scheme Π. It is possible to
show that if the underlying encryption scheme supports labels (in which case the
encryption and decryption algorithms both take an additional public string L as
input), this assumption can be eliminated and we only need Π to be IND-IK-CCA
secure. Although the weak robustness requirement is not too demanding in the-
ory (since any encryption scheme can be made weakly robust by means of a keyed
redundancy-based transformation [2]), this construction provides better efficiency in
cases where the IND-IK-CCA encryption scheme natively supports labels (such as
for the Cramer–Shoup and Kurosawa–Desmedt schemes). Details of this approach
can be found in [45].
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3.5.2.3 Complete robustness from IBE
In [45] the authors also answer in a positive sense a question left open in [2] as to
whether the Canetti–Halevi–Katz [25] (CHK) paradigm can be leveraged so as to
obtain schemes that simultaneously offer IND-IK-CCA security and robustness in a
strong sense. Answering this question is non-trivial: Abdalla et al. pinpointed that
applying the one-time-signature-based CHK transformation to the Boyen–Waters
IBE [22], for example, does not provide SROB-CCA or even SROB-CPA security.
The construction in [45] is a variant of the Boneh–Katz construction [19] for chosen-
ciphertext security, and it requires the underlying IBE to only satisfy a weak level
of security under chosen-plaintext attacks. Because this approach simultaneously
provides complete robustness and IND-IK-CCA security, it results in schemes having
better efficiency than what would be obtained by applying the ABN transformation
of [2] to an IND-IK-CCA secure scheme obtained from the original Boneh–Katz
transformation.
3.5.2.4 Concrete schemes
It is natural to ask whether it is possible to improve upon the efficiency of generic
constructions with concrete schemes whose security rests on specific computational
assumptions. Indeed, this is the case, and another achievement in this area of
research is to directly construct a CROB and IND-IK-CCA secure scheme using, as
a starting point, certain hybrid encryption systems, such as the Hofheinz–Kiltz [55]
and the Kurosawa–Desmedt [60] schemes. This is developed in detail in [45].
3.5.3 Conclusions
We have developed new notions of robustness in the public-key setting, identifying
complete robustness as the strongest one. We have also explored the relationship be-
tween these notions. Furthermore, we have shown how to generically achieve public-
key encryption schemes which are completely robust, and provided an overview of
further results in this area of research.
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As a next step, it would be interesting to consider the newly introduced notions
of robustness in the identity-based setting. In such a context, the natural extension
of our notions would be to allow the adversary to choose the IBE master keys mali-
ciously. It would also be interesting to explore the significance of robustness in more
advanced primitives such as attribute-based encryption and predicate encryption.
We leave further development of these ideas as future work.
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In this chapter we consider anonymity in the context of broadcast encryption.
We provide a security definition for anonymous broadcast encryption (ANOBE) and
show that it is achievable from public-key, identity-based and attribute-based encryp-
tion, providing secure constructions from all of these primitives. Furthermore, we
show how randomness re-use techniques can be deployed in the ANOBE context to
reduce computational and communication costs. All of our results are in the standard
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model, achieving fully collusion-resistant ANOBE schemes secure against adaptive
IND-CCA adversaries. This chapter will appear as part of [62] in the proceedings of
the international cryptographic conference Public-Key Cryptography 2012, as joint
work with Benoˆıt Libert and Kenneth G. Paterson.
4.1 Introduction
4.1.1 Broadcast encryption
Broadcast encryption (BE) addresses the issue of broadcasting a message to a dy-
namically changing privileged subset of a set of users, in a way that no user outside
the privileged set can learn the message. We will call the universe of n users U and
the privileged (or target) set S, where S ⊆ U . Since its introduction in 1993 by Fiat
and Naor this area of research has received a lot of attention. This is largely due to
the numerous real-world applications BE has, namely pay TV, multicast communi-
cation, Internet broadcast, audio streaming and, in general, any secure distribution
of copyright-protected content. In this respect, BE represents an essential compo-
nent offering solutions to several issues these applications may face: maintaining
the confidentiality of the message, protecting user privacy, revoking unauthorized
users, deploying traitor-tracing mechanisms, etc. Indeed, the BE schemes the cryp-
tographic community has put forth can be seen as building blocks upon which a
fully-fledged broadcast system can be developed.
Given BE’s inherent practical vocation, the relevant research has progressed in
achieving the desired functionalities whilst being extremely alert with respect to the
efficiency of the proposed schemes. Since the very beginning, the benchmark for
performance comparison has been what can be considered as the natural solution
to the broadcast problem, that is, encrypt the message repeatedly to each user in
the privileged set. This approach, however simple and efficient in terms of key-
storage, results in ciphertexts whose size is linear in the size of the privileged set. In
the symmetric setting, where the first BE schemes were proposed, the other natural
solution is to assign a key to every possible subset of the set of users and encrypt the
message with the appropriate key. This would result in constant-size ciphertexts but
an exponential number of keys for the user to store (one for each subset he belongs
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to). The practicality of this solution is further limited by the fact that for any new
user joining the system, the existing users would have to go on-line to update their
keys, creating even more key-management issues.
Finding a trade-off between key-storage requirements and ciphertext size was
the main concern behind the design of the first (symmetric) BE schemes. These
were predominantly presented as revocation schemes, allowing to address a large
privileged set of receivers and, at each broadcast, to revoke a small number r of
unauthorized users. The solutions of [47, 67] employ tree-based techniques to achieve
sub-linearity in both the keys and the ciphertext size. To be more precise, [67]
presents schemes with O(logn) key-storage requirements and ciphertexts of size
O(r logn). The results of [67] go even further by providing an elegant framework
called the subset cover framework, within which fully collusion-resistant broadcast
encryption schemes for stateless receivers can efficiently be obtained. Achieving
these properties is yet another advantage of this approach.
A stateless receiver is a user who does not need to update his private key,
i.e. the key is fixed for the lifetime of the system. This clearly is more practical than
having a stateful receiver, who may need a key update each time a new user joins
the system or may have to change keys based on previous message transmissions.
Collusion resistance is one of the fundamental properties of a BE scheme. This is
the requirement that no coalition of users outside the privileged set can recover the
message. In the literature we can find several schemes that resist collusion attacks
mounted by coalitions of at most t < n users, where n is the maximal number of
users; only some schemes are fully collusion-resistant, i.e., they can tolerate attacks
by coalitions of any size.
In our work, we will consider systems that allow stateless receivers and are fully
collusion-resistant. These are by now standard objectives for a BE scheme. Our
focus will be on developing schemes in the public-key setting, of which we give a
brief overview next.
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4.1.1.1 Public-key broadcast encryption
The subset cover framework was originally proposed in the symmetric setting. How-
ever, [67] suggests a way to extend this to the public-key environment, incurring
unfortunately a very large public key. The authors of [43] improve on the efficiency
of such extension by employing identity-based techniques which result in constant-
size key-storage requirements and similar ciphertext length (linear in r, sublinear
in n). We observe that the type of (revocation) schemes in [67, 43] are considered
efficient as long as the number of revoked users in the system is small (this is the
case in the context of content distribution, for example).
In the years following this work a large number of BE variants have been pro-
posed, examples of which are dynamic join [40, 76] and identity-based broadcast
encryption [39], highlighting the interest of the community in this area of research.
A major breakthrough in BE was the work by Boneh, Gentry and Waters [17]
which no longer employed combinatorial techniques but adopted groups with bilinear
maps to achieve very efficient public-key BE schemes. More specifically, two schemes
are presented in [17]: one obtains constant-size private keys and ciphertexts, consist-
ing of 1 and 2 group elements, respectively, but has a public key whose size is linear
in n, the total number of users; the second construction can be parametrized so as to
have again constant-size private keys, but ciphertexts and public key of size O(
√
n),
enabling a trade-off in sizes. This work has been regarded as ground-breaking in
terms of performance achieved.
Follow up work by Gentry and Waters [51] presented a BE scheme with similar
efficiency, in particular yielding constant-size ciphertexts, but achieving a stronger
notion of security, namely against adaptive adversaries, which we discuss next.
4.1.1.2 Static vs. adaptive security in BE
Amongst the many challenges BE poses, obtaining schemes which satisfy a strong
security notion is one of the latest to have been overcome. In fact, the impressively
efficient schemes in [17], dating from 2005, only achieve security against a static
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adversary. This type of adversary is limited with respect to the set of users he can
corrupt. More precisely, he needs to specify a priori the target set he wishes to be
challenged on. The authors of [17] leave the construction of an efficient BE scheme
secure against an adaptive adversary, i.e., one that can adaptively corrupt users
during the game, as a major open problem. Four years later, Gentry and Waters
[51] solved the problem, achieving adaptively secure BE. This stronger notion of
security is arguably the correct one for BE since it captures the most general class
of attackers who are allowed to see the system’s parameters and can arbitrarily
corrupt users before committing to a challenge set.
4.1.2 Anonymity in broadcast encryption
As discussed so far, several practical aspects need to be taken into consideration
when designing a BE scheme, especially in view of its real-life applications: strength
of security notions, public and private storage requirements, ciphertext length, and
computational costs. The specific nature of the primitive however has led researchers
to focus in particular on solutions having ciphertexts that are as short as possible. In
this respect, the results of [17] and [51] are nearly optimal. However, designing BE
schemes for real-life applications to broadcasting should not only involve efficiency
and confidentiality issues. In particular, the privacy of users should be protected
as much as possible. We believe that, to date, this aspect has not been adequately
dealt with. Our study of the literature reveals that anonymity in BE has only been
considered in a single paper [6], in the context of encrypted file systems. Surprisingly,
almost all subsequent work on BE has ignored the issue of anonymity. Moreover,
as we shall explain next, state-of-the-art BE schemes are inherently incapable of
providing any kind of anonymity.
4.1.2.1 An illustrative example
To illustrate our point, we recall one of the schemes proposed by Gentry and Waters
in [51, Section 3.1], which achieves adaptive security and appears to offer very short
(constant-size) ciphertexts, namely 3 group elements. We call this scheme GW. As
per standard BE schemes (a formal definition of which will be provided in Section
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4.2), GW consists of four algorithms: BE.Setup, which on input the security param-
eter returns the master public key and the master secret key of the system; a key
generation algorithm BE.KeyGen; an encryption algorithm BE.Enc, which on input a
message and the target set returns a ciphertext, and a decryption algorithm BE.Dec,
which returns the message if the secret key used belongs to a member of the target
set. More precisely, GW is defined as follows.
The GW broadcast encryption scheme
Let GroupGen be an algorithm that on input a security parameter 1λ generates
G and GT , groups of prime order p equipped with a bilinear map e : G×G→ GT .
We define the algorithms for GW in the following way.
Setup(1λ, n): Run GroupGen(1λ) to obtain (G,GT , e). Choose random α← Zp and
g, h1, ..., hn ← Gn+1. The master public key is
BE-MPK = (G,GT , e, g, e(g, g)
α, h1, ..., hn)
and the master secret key is BE-MSK = gα.
KeyGen(i,BE-MSK): Choose random ri ← Zp and output
di = (di,0, ..., di,n) where di,0 = g
−ri , di,i = g
αhrii , ∀j %=i di,j = hrij .
Enc(BE-MPK,M, S): Select t← Zp and set
C1 = g
t, C2 = (
∏
j∈S
hj)
t, C3 =M · e(g, g)α·t.
Output C = (C1, C2, C3).
Dec(BE-MPK, C, i, di, S): If i ∈ S, parse di as (di,0, ..., di,n) and C as (C1, C2, C3).
Compute
C ′ = e(di,i ·
∏
j∈S\{i}
di,j , C1) · e(di,0, C2).
Compute M = C3/C ′.
The scheme is proved correct and secure in [51].
76
4.1 Introduction
As we would expect from any public-key BE scheme, each user in the system can
obtain his private key from the BE.KeyGen algorithm, and the sender can choose
an arbitrary target set of users S to which he wishes to broadcast a message. A
closer look at the decryption algorithm, however, reveals something rather peculiar:
to recover the message, a legitimate user, i.e., a user in S, has to run the decryption
algorithm on input the ciphertext, his private key and a description of the target set
S. This set S is required specifically as an input to BE.Dec in the existing definitions
of BE [51, 18, 39]. We note that, as is evident from our illustrative example, this is
not just a formality issue which could be solved simply by removing this requirement
from the BE model. Current schemes such as GW explicitly rely on S as an input
to BE.Dec for decryption to work. Therefore the user needs to somehow know to
which set S the message was broadcast, otherwise he cannot decrypt.
This simple but crucial observation raises a fundamental question: where does
S come from? In the most general usage scenario intended for BE, where S is
dynamic and may be unpredictable from message to message, the ciphertexts must
effectively include a description of S as part of the ciphertexts themselves. This
leads to two considerations. Firstly, current BE schemes such as those in [51, 17, 39]
do not account for the cost of broadcasting a description of S when calculating
the size of ciphertexts. This means that the true ciphertext size in these schemes
is linear in n rather than constant-size, as a cursory examination of the schemes
might suggest1. However, we say that the results in [17] and [51] are nearly optimal
(having ciphertexts of size n bits plus a constant number of group elements) since
there is a simple counting argument showing that, for a universe of n users in which
every possible subset S should be reachable by secure broadcast, ciphertexts must
contain at least n bits. Indeed the ciphertext should be long enough to uniquely
identify the privileged subset S. The overhead provided by these schemes is therefore
impressively small, but, to repeat, the true ciphertext size is linear in n.
The second important consideration that comes from noticing S as a required
input to the decryption algorithm is that this limitation in the existing BE model
and schemes clearly causes serious privacy issues. Imagine we deploy a BE scheme,
as defined above, for television broadcasting. Suppose the privileged set is the set of
1This does not rule the use of compact encodings of S being transmitted with ciphertexts in more
restrictive usage scenarios, for example, only sending the difference in S when the set S changes
only slowly from message to message.
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all users who have paid a subscription to a certain channel. Each customer should
have access to that channel using his private key. The problem is that, to decrypt,
he will have to know who else has paid for the specific subscription! Not only is this
requirement very inconvenient for the practical deployment of BE schemes, it is also
a severe violation of the individual subscriber’s privacy. Ideally, a BE scheme should
protect users’ privacy by guaranteeing that ciphertexts do not leak any information
about the privileged set S. This is exactly what we mean for a BE scheme to
be anonymous and we view this as a highly desirable security property for BE in
practical applications.
There are many reasons why ensuring anonymity should be a top priority when
designing a BE scheme. First of all, knowledge of the target set of receivers of a
certain message may be more sensitive than the message itself. Furthermore, in most
usage scenarios, hiding the identities of the privileged users (even from each other) is
essential to guaranteeing the adequate level of security expected from the application
(pay TV, Internet broadcast, etc.). It is very surprising that this problem has been
so overlooked throughout these years.
4.1.2.2 Related work
The only prior work addressing the issue of anonymity in BE appears to be that
of Barth et al. [6] (there, it is called privacy). In [6] the authors highlight the
need for user privacy in certain applications of BE, such as encrypted file systems
and content delivery systems. To address this they introduce the notion of private
broadcast encryption and define a security model for recipient privacy. This model
suffers from the limitation that only static adversaries are considered. Indeed, the
two generic constructions for private broadcast encryption presented in [6] are proved
secure only against this less powerful type of adversary. The first construction uses
a key-private, IND-CCA secure PKE scheme as a base to encrypt the message to
each user in the target set, and then ties together the resulting ciphertexts using a
strongly secure one-time signature. This yields a private BE scheme that is secure
in the standard model. A drawback of this approach, however, is that decryption is
linear in the size of the target set S, as an intended recipient needs to perform an
average of |S|/2 decryptions before recovering the message. The second construction
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is a modification of the first one which allows for efficient decryption. The basic
idea is to append a tag to each ciphertext component so that the legitimate user
can recompute the tag with his private key and then identify his corresponding
ciphertext component. The technique presented in [6] to speed-up decryption was,
however, only analyzed in the random oracle model.
In [21] the authors provide a private linear broadcast encryption (PLBE) scheme
to realize a fully collusion-resistant traitor-tracing scheme. A PLBE, however, is a
BE system with limited capabilities (i.e. it cannot address arbitrary sets of users)
and hence this work does not provide a solution to the problem considered so far.
In very recent work [46] that builds on [6] and [62], the authors introduce the
notion of outsider -anonymous broadcast encryption, which is designed to hide the
privileged set from any outsider but provides no privacy guarantees with respect to
the legitimate users. The claim (in [46]) that this notion is justified since the content
of the communication already reveals something about the recipient set is highly
debatable, and certainly does not suit our motivation for the study of anonymity in
BE. This primitive, however artificial it may seem, can be achieved using tree-based
techniques from [67, 43], yielding schemes whose ciphertexts have similar (compact)
size, i.e. linear in the number of revoked users.
4.1.3 Our contributions
We start by giving a unified security definition for anonymous broadcast encryption
(ANOBE) in Section 4.2. Instead of separating anonymity and confidentiality as in
[6], we use a combined security notion for ANOBE which helps to streamline our
presentation and proofs. In addition, we strengthen the model to allow the adversary
to make adaptive corruptions, with all of our constructions achieving security in this
setting. In contrast, the definition of [6] is static, requiring the adversary to choose
whom to corrupt before seeing the public key of the system. As a first step we show
in Section 4.3.1 that our enhanced security definition is indeed satisfiable: adaptively
secure ANOBE can be built based only on the existence of IND-CCA secure PKE
(without requiring the base PKE scheme to have any anonymity properties itself).
This construction results in a very efficient (constant) decryption procedure but has
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ciphertexts whose size is linear in n, the number of users in the universe U .
In Section 4.3.2 we show that the generic construction for ANOBE suggested by
Barth et al. [6] actually possesses adaptive security, and not merely static security
as was established in [6]. This construction starts from any weakly robust (in the
sense of [2]), key-private PKE scheme with chosen-ciphertext security. In comparison
with our first generic construction, this result imposes stronger requirements on the
underlying encryption scheme. However, it achieves shorter ciphertexts, with the
size being linear in the size of the target set S.
In Section 4.4 we provide another generic construction which uses an identity-
based encryption (IBE) scheme having suitable security properties, in the style of
the CHK transformation (see Section 2.4.2). This alternative further increases the
set of components that can be used to obtain ANOBE.
With the aim of setting the ground for a systematic study of ANOBE and its re-
lations to other important primitives, we explore the interesting connection between
attribute-based encryption (ABE) and BE. In Section 4.5 we prove that ANOBE
can be securely achieved from ABE as well.
Having so far demonstrated the achievability of ANOBE, we next focus on im-
proving the performance of the resulting schemes. To this end, we show how ran-
domness re-use techniques originally developed for PKE in [59, 10, 9] can be modified
for secure deployment in the ANOBE setting. In particular, we identify a slightly
stronger notion of reproducibility that we call key-less reproducibility. We show in
Section 4.6 that if our base PKE scheme has this property (in addition to the other
properties needed in our generic construction) then it can be used with the same
randomness across all ciphertext components in our main ANOBE construction.
This not only allows the size of ciphertexts to be reduced further (by eliminating
repeated ciphertext elements) but also reduces the sender’s computational overhead.
We conclude the chapter by briefly presenting further results on ANOBE and by
giving possible directions for future work.
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4.2 Anonymous Broadcast Encryption
In this section we define a model for public-key broadcast encryption (BE), where
algorithms are specified to allow for anonymity (similarly to [6]) and they are general
enough to include the identity-based variant of BE introduced in [39].
Definition 4.1 (Broadcast encryption scheme) Let U = {1, ..., n} be the uni-
verse of users. A broadcast encryption (BE) scheme is defined by five algorithms,
which are as follows.
BE.PG: This algorithm takes as input the security parameter 1λ and the number
of users in the system n. It returns the system’s parameters pars. These will
include a description of the message space MsgSp and the ciphertext space
CtSp of the scheme. We write this as pars← BE.PG(1λ, n).
BE.Setup: This algorithm takes as input pars and returns a master public key
BE-MPK and a master secret key BE-MSK. We write this as (BE-MPK,
BE-MSK)← BE.Setup(pars).
BE.KeyGen: This is a key generation algorithm that on input BE-MPK, BE-MSK
and an index i ∈ U outputs a secret key ski for user i. We write this as
ski ← BE.KeyGen(BE-MPK,BE-MSK, i).
BE.Enc: This is an encryption algorithm that on input BE-MPK, a message M ∈
MsgSp and a subset S ⊆ U , the broadcast target set, returns a ciphertext
C ∈ CtSp. We write this as C ← BE.Enc(BE-MPK,M, S).
BE.Dec: This is a decryption algorithm that on input BE-MPK, a ciphertext C
and a secret key ski returns either a message M ∈ MsgSp or a failure symbol
⊥. We write this as BE.Dec(BE-MPK, C, ski) =M or ⊥.
These algorithms are required to satisfy the following correctness property: For
every λ, for every set of parameters pars output by BE.PG, for every BE-MPK,
BE-MSK output by BE.KeyGen, for every message M ∈ MsgSp, for every index
i ∈ U and for every S ⊆ U , if ski ← BE.KeyGen(BE-MPK,BE-MSK, i), if C ←
BE.Enc(BE-MPK,M, S) and if i ∈ S then BE.Dec(BE-MPK, C, ski) =M .
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We observe that this definition no longer requires the set S as an input to the de-
cryption algorithm. This is crucial in developing the notion of anonymous broad-
cast encryption (ANOBE), for which we next provide an appropriate security
model for the case of adaptive adversaries.
We define the notion of anonymity and indistinguishability under chosen-ciphertext
attacks (ANO-IND-CCA) for BE as follows.
ANO-IND-CCA security game for BE
Setup. The challenger C runs BE.PG(1λ, n) to generate pars and BE.Setup(pars)
to obtain the master public key BE-MPK and the master secret key BE-MSK
and gives BE-MPK to the adversary A.
Phase 1. A has access to a secret-key-extraction oracle OBE-MSK, to obtain se-
cret keys of any index i ∈ U . The oracle will respond by returning ski =
BE.KeyGen(BE-MPK,BE-MSK, i). A has also access to a decryption oracle
OBE-MSK, to which it submits queries of the type (C, i), where i ∈ U , and the
oracle will return the decryption BE.Dec(BE-MPK, C, ski).
Challenge. A selects two equal-length messages M0 and M1 ∈ MsgSp and sets
S0, S1 ⊆ U of users. We require that S0 and S1 be of equal size and also impose
the restriction that A has not issued key queries for any i ∈ S0 1 S1 = (S0 \
S1)∪(S1\S0). Further, if there exists an i ∈ S0∩S1 for which A has queried the
key, then we require that M0 = M1. A passes M0,M1, S0, S1 to C. C chooses
a random bit b ← {0, 1} and computes C" ← BE.Enc(BE-MPK,Mb, Sb). C"
is called the challenge ciphertext and it is passed to A.
Phase 2. A continues to have access to a secret-key-extraction oracle OBE-MSK,
with the restrictions that i /∈ S01 S1 and that, if i ∈ S0 ∩ S1, then M0 =M1.
A may continue issuing decryption queries (C, i) with the restriction that if
C = C" then either i /∈ S0 1 S1 or i ∈ S0 ∩ S1 and M0 =M1.
Guess. The adversary outputs its guess b′ for b.
Definition 4.2 A BE scheme B = (BE.PG,BE.Setup,BE.KeyGen,BE.Enc,BE.Dec)
is adaptively anonymous and indistinguishable under chosen-ciphertext attacks (or
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ANO-IND-CCA secure) if all p.p.t. adversaries have at most negligible advantage in
the above game, where A’s advantage is defined as AdvANO−IND−CCAA,BE (λ) =∣∣Pr[b′ = b]− 12 ∣∣ .
Like the corresponding definition of [6, Section 2], Definition 4.2 does not require
the ANOBE ciphertext to hide the number of receivers. However, specific schemes
(such as the one in Section 4.3.1) can also conceal the cardinality of S.
We have introduced a new notion of security for BE, namely ANO-IND-CCA
security against adaptive adversaries. Our next step is to show that this notion is
indeed feasible, and we do so by presenting a generic construction that relies solely
on the existence of an IND-CCA secure PKE scheme. We will then improve its
performance by giving alternative generic constructions whose underlying primitives
require additional security properties.
4.3 ANOBE from Public-Key Encryption
4.3.1 ANOBE from minimal assumptions
Since our aim is to provide a formal treatment of anonymous broadcast encryption,
we begin by showing that ANOBE can be achieved. Indeed, by simply assuming the
existence of an IND-CCA secure PKE scheme we can construct an adaptively secure
ANO-IND-CCA BE scheme.
The idea is simple. We will encrypt a message to all users in the system under
each of their respective public keys. More specifically, we will use the PKE scheme
to encrypt the intended message M to the users in the target set, and a special
valid message ε to all the other users. The BE ciphertext will be a concatenation
of PKE ciphertexts on which a signature is performed. The intended recipients will
efficiently recover the message M by selecting the ciphertext corresponding to their
index, while for the unauthorized users the public-key decryption algorithm will
return ε. It is fairly intuitive to see that no property other than IND-CCA security
for the PKE scheme (and strong one-time unforgeability for the signature) has to
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be assumed in order to yield a secure ANOBE scheme, proving feasibility of our
new notion. Let us explore in more detail this initial construction, for which we will
assume the message spaces and key space to be bit-strings of fixed length.
Let Π = (PKE.PG,PKE.KeyGen,PKE.Enc,PKE.Dec) be a PKE scheme with mes-
sage space MsgSp = {0, 1}m. Let Σ=(Gen,Sign,Ver) be a signature scheme. We as-
sume that the key space of Σ is KSp = {0, 1}v, for some v ∈ poly(λ). We use Π and
Σ to generically instantiate a BE scheme, with message space {0, 1}m−v. In the de-
scription hereafter, we include the symbol ε as a valid but distinguished message in
{0, 1}m−v: in other words, all the messages that receivers accept as legal plaintexts
are different from ε. The construction is as follows.
BE.PG(1λ, n): Generate pars← PKE.PG(1λ) and return (pars, n).
BE.Setup(pars, n): For i = 1 to n, generate (ski, pki) ← PKE.KeyGen(pars). The
master private key is BE-MSK = {ski}ni=1 and the master public key consists
of
BE-MPK =
(
pars, Σ, {pki}ni=1
)
.
BE.KeyGen(BE-MPK,BE-MSK, i): Parse the master secret key BE-MSK as
{ski}ni=1 and output ski.
BE.Enc(BE-MPK,M, S): To encrypt a messageM for a receiver set S ⊆ {1, . . . , n},
generate a one-time signature key pair (sigk, vk) ← Gen(1λ). Then, for each
j = 1 to n, compute Cj = PKE.Enc(pars,M ||vk, pkj) if j ∈ S and Cj =
PKE.Enc(pars, ε||vk, pkj) if j (∈ S. The ANOBE ciphertext consists of C =(
C1, . . . , Cn,σ
)
, where σ = Sign
(
sigk, (C1, . . . , Cn)
)
.
BE.Dec(BE-MPK, C, ski): Given C =
(
C1, . . . , Cn,σ
)
, computeM ′ = PKE.Dec(Ci,
ski). If M ′ (=⊥, parse M ′ as M ′ = M ||vk for some bit strings M ∈ {0, 1}m−v
and vk ∈ {0, 1}v. Then, if Ver(vk, (C1, . . . , Cn),σ) = 1 and M (= ε return M .
Otherwise, output ⊥.
The correctness of the BE scheme follows directly from the correctness of Π and
Σ. This construction is reminiscent of generic constructions of chosen-ciphertext-
secure multiple encryption [44] and it is easily seen to yield a secure ANOBE. The
following result in fact holds.
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Theorem 4.3 Let Π be an IND-CCA secure PKE scheme and let Σ be a strongly
unforgeable one-time signature scheme. The BE scheme constructed above is ANO-
IND-CCA secure against adaptive adversaries.
In our proof of adaptive security we make use of a sequence of hybrid arguments
where ciphertext components are gradually modified at each step and each hybrid
argument requires the reduction to guess upfront the identity of an uncorrupted
user. We note that Gentry and Waters [51] already briefly mentioned that such an
approach could potentially be useful to prove adaptive security but, to the best of our
knowledge, no rigorous analysis of this type was previously given in the literature.
Moreover, in the constructions that follow in the rest of this chapter, achieving
adaptive security represents even more of a challenge since it is a non-trivial task
to get this proof technique to suitably interact with the methods we present for
improving the overall efficiency.
For the proof of Theorem 4.3 we consider a sequence of games starting with
Game 0 where the adversary is given an encryption of M0 for S0. In the last game,
the adversary obtains an encryption of M1 under S1.
Game 0real: is the real game when the challenger’s bit is set to b = 0. The ANOBE
adversary A is given public parameters BE-MPK consisting of n public-key
encryption keys {pki}ni=1. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, user i’s private key is ski.
In the first stage, A adaptively chooses indices i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and obtains the
corresponding ski. The adversary may also query the decryption oracle by
sending requests (C, i) which are answered using the relevant private key ski.
In the challenge step, A chooses messages M0,M1 and two subsets S0, S1 ⊂
{1, . . . , n} of equal size |S0| = |S1| = %. The challenger generates a one-time
signature key pair (sigk", vk")← Gen(1λ) and returns the challenge ciphertext
C" =
(
C1, . . . , Cn,σ
)
where σ = Sign(sigk", (C1, . . . , Cn)) and, for j = 1
to n, Cj is computed as Cj = PKE.Enc(M0||vk", pkj) if j ∈ S0 and Cj =
PKE.Enc(ε||vk", pkj) if j (∈ S0. In the second phase, A is allowed to make
more corruption queries for indices i such that i ∈ {1, . . . , n}\(S0 1 S1) and
is granted further access to the decryption oracle under the usual restriction.
Upon termination, A outputs a bit b′ ∈ {0, 1} and we define Ereal0 to be the
event that b′ = 0.
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Game 0: is as Game 0real with the difference that the challenger now rejects all
post-challenge decryption queries
(
C = (C1, . . . , Cn,σ), i
)
for which Ci = C"i
(i.e., the i-component of C coincides with that of the challenge ciphertext).
Clearly, the only situation where the challenger rejects a ciphertext that would
not have been rejected in Game 0real is when A breaks the security of the one-
time signature. It is easy to see since Ci = C"i decrypts to a message whose
last v bits form the challenge verification key vk" as in the challenge phase.
We call E0 the event that A outputs b′ = 0 in Game 0.
To describe subsequent games, it is convenient to represent the sets S0 and S1 as n-
bit strings s01 . . . s0n ∈ {0, 1}n and s11 . . . s1n ∈ {0, 1}n such that, for each b ∈ {0, 1}
and j ∈ {1, . . . , n}, sbj = 1 if and only if j ∈ Sb.
Game k (1 ≤ k ≤ n): From the two adversarially-chosen sets S0, S1 ⊂ {1, . . . , n}
and their respective n-bit strings s01 . . . s0n and s11 . . . s1n, the challenger B
generates the challenge ciphertext as follows.
1. If s0j = s1j = 1, set Cj = PKE.Enc(M1||vk", pkj) if j ≤ k and Cj =
PKE.Enc(M0||vk", pkj) if j > k. If s0j = s1j = 0, set Cj = PKE.Enc(ε||vk",
pkj).
2. If s0j = 1 and s1j = 0, set Cj = PKE.Enc(ε||vk", pkj) if j ≤ k and
Cj = PKE.Enc(M0||vk", pkj) if j > k.
3. If s0j = 0 and s1j = 1, set Cj = PKE.Enc(M1||vk"), pkj if j ≤ k and
Cj = PKE.Enc(ε||vk", pkj) if j > k.
The adversary is then returned C" =
(
C1, . . . , Cn,σ
)
and the second phase is
handled as in previous games. We call Ek the event of A outputting b′ = 0 at
the end of Game k.
Game nreal: is identical to Game n with the difference that, when handling de-
cryption queries, the challenger no longer returns ⊥ in decryption queries
(C = (C1, . . . , Cn,σ), i) such that that Ci = C"i . Game nreal thus coincides
with the real game when the challenger’s bit equals b = 1. We let Erealn be the
event that A outputs the bit b′ = 0 at the end of Game nreal.
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Game 0real and Game 0 are clearly indistinguishable if the one-time signature is
strongly unforgeable and the same argument can be made about Game n and Game
nreal.
We thus have |Pr[Ereal0 ]−Pr[E0]| = |Pr[Erealn ]−Pr[En]| ≤ AdvSUF−1CMAA,Σ (λ). As
for other game transitions, they are justified by Lemma 4.4 which demonstrates that,
if Game k and Game k− 1 can be distinguished for some k ∈ {1, . . . , n}, there must
exist an IND-CCA adversary B against the underlying encryption scheme. Putting
the above altogether, we find
|Pr[Ereal0 ]− Pr[Erealn ]| ≤ 2 ·AdvSUF−1CMAA,Σ (λ) + n ·AdvIND−CCAB,Π (λ).
Lemma 4.4 Let Π be an IND-CCA secure PKE scheme. Then for any k ∈ {1, . . . , n},
Game k is indistinguishable from Game k − 1. More precisely, we have
|Pr[Ek]− Pr[Ek−1]| ≤ AdvIND−CCAB,Π (λ).
Proof. Towards a contradiction, let us assume that an adversary A can distinguish
Game k and Game k − 1. We show that it implies a chosen-ciphertext adversary B
against Π.
We first recall that, in the challenge phase, the adversarially-chosen messages
M0,M1 and sets S0, S1 must be such that either
- S0 = S1 and M0 (= M1, in which case the adversary cannot corrupt any user
in S0 = S1 (and, of course, we must have |S0| = |S1| ≥ 1).
- S0 (= S1, in which case the adversary is disallowed to corrupt any user in
S01S1.
If we consider the n-bit strings s01 . . . s0n ∈ {0, 1}n and s11 . . . s1n ∈ {0, 1}n asso-
ciated with S0 and S1, Game k is identical to Game k − 1 if s0k = s1k = 0 (since
Ck is an encryption of ε in both games) and we thus assume that s0k = s1k = 1 or
s0k (= s1k. Moreover, if s0k = s1k = 1 (in other words, if k ∈ S0 ∩ S1), the adversary
can only corrupt skk in the situation where M0 = M1, in which case Game k and
Game k − 1 are also identical. In the following, we can thus only consider the situ-
ation s0k (= s1k (i.e., k ∈ S01S1), in which the adversary cannot legally query skk.
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Our IND-CCA adversary B receives the public parameters pars and a pub-
lic key pk" from its challenger and, to prepare BE-MPK for A, it has to gen-
erate n encryption keys pk1, . . . , pkn. To do this, B defines pkk = pk". Then,
B runs the key generation algorithm of Π itself and generates n − 1 key pairs
(ski, pki) ← PKE.KeyGen(pars) for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}\{k}. It finally hands the
master public key BE-MPK =
(
pars, {pki}ni=1,Σ
)
to A.
At any time, A can corrupt an arbitrary user i ∈ {1, . . . , n} depending on the
previously collected information. At each corruption query, B can consistently an-
swer the query since it knows secret keys {ski}i %=k. When A queries the decryption
of a ciphertext (C = (C1, . . . , Cn,σ), i), we assume that i = k (i.e., the query in-
volves the challenge key pkk = pk
") since B can always decrypt by itself otherwise.
To simulate the behaviour of the decryption algorithm without knowing skk = sk
",
B invokes its own decryption oracle on Ck. If the IND-CCA challenger’s response is
not ⊥ and can be parsed as M ||vk, for some message M ∈ {0, 1}m−v and some bit
string vk ∈ {0, 1}v, B returns M to A if Ver(vk, (C1, . . . , Cn),σ) = 1 and M (= ε. In
any other situation, B returns ⊥, meaning that Ck fails to decrypt properly under
skk.
In the challenge phase, A outputs messages M0,M1 and two subsets S0, S1 ⊆
{1, . . . , n}. At this step, B generates a one-time signature key pair (sigk", vk") ←
Gen(1λ) and constructs two messages M ′0,M
′
1 as follows.
- If s0k = 1 and s1k = 0, it sets M ′0 =M0||vk" and M ′1 = ε||vk".
- If s0k = 0 and s1k = 1, it sets M ′0 = ε||vk" and M ′1 =M1||vk".
The two messages M ′0 and M
′
1 are sent to B’s IND-CCA challenger which returns
a challenge ciphertext C" = PKE.Enc(M ′b, pk
"), for some internally flipped random
bit b ← {0, 1}. The ANOBE challenge ciphertext is generated by setting C"k = C"
and by defining the remaining ciphertext components as follows, for j = 1 to n.
1. If s0j = s1j = 1, set C"j = PKE.Enc(M1||vk", pkj) if j ≤ k − 1 and C"j =
PKE.Enc(M0||vk", pkj) if j > k. If s0j = s1j = 0 set Cj = PKE.Enc(ε||vk", pkj).
2. If s0j = 1 and s1j = 0, set C"j = PKE.Enc(ε||vk", pkj) if j ≤ k − 1 and
C"j = PKE.Enc(M0||vk", pkj) if j > k.
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3. If s0j = 0 and s1j = 1, set C"j = PKE.Enc(M1||vk", pkj) if j ≤ k − 1 and
C"j = PKE.Enc(ε||vk", pkj) if j > k.
The ANOBE adversary A is given C = (C"1 , . . . , C"n,σ), where σ = Sign(sigk",
(C"1 , . . . , C
"
n)).
In Phase 2, A makes another series of adaptive corruption queries for indices i (∈
S01S1 (and a fortiori such that i (= k) and B deals with them as in Phase 1. When
A makes a decryption query (C, i), B parses the ciphertext C as C = (C1, . . . , Cn,σ)
and handles the query using {ski}i %=k if i (= k. If i = k, B returns ⊥ if Ck = C"k . If
Ck (= C"k , B can query Ck for decryption to its IND-CCA challenger and proceed as
in pre-challenge decryption queries.
At the end of the game, A outputs a bit b′ ∈ {0, 1} and B outputs the same
result. It is easy to see that B’s advantage as an IND-CCA adversary is exactly the
difference between A’s probabilities of outputting 0 in Game k and Game k − 1.
Indeed, if B’s challenger chooses b = 0 (and encrypts M ′0 in the challenge phase), B
is playing Game k − 1. If b = 1, B is rather playing Game k. !
We have described an ANOBE scheme from minimal assumptions. We note that
the encryption time is linear in n but decryption is performed in constant time, since
a user simply selects the ciphertext component to decrypt according to its index.
However, the ciphertext size is linear in n, as we encrypt to each user in the universe.
It is desirable to improve on this and achieve a realization of ANOBE with more
compact ciphertexts.
We will next see how to modify this first generic construction, obtaining an
ANOBE scheme whose ciphertext size is linear in the size of the target set S.
4.3.2 ANOBE from robust and key-private PKE
As mentioned in the introduction, a solution to the broadcast encryption problem
is to encrypt the message under the public key of each user in the privileged set
(there we call it the natural solution). This approach, so often discarded in most BE
literature due to efficiency reasons, turns out to provide another generic construction
for ANOBE, which differs from the previous one as now we deploy a public-key
89
4.3 ANOBE from Public-Key Encryption
encryption scheme only to encrypt the message to the users in the target set.
However natural this solution may seem, it should not be approached naively.
For this to yield an ANO-IND-CCA secure BE scheme, the underlying PKE scheme
has to be IND-CCA and key-private as per Definition 2.3. While the need for this
property is fairly intuitive, the requirement for the PKE scheme to be additionally
weakly robust [2] is slightly more involved. Weak robustness is necessary for the
correctness of the scheme but also for simulation consistency in the security proof.
We have thoroughly studied the notion of robustness in Chapter 3 and seen many
flavours of varying strength. For this application, weak robustness suffices and it
can be generically achieved for any PKE scheme by appending some publicly-known
redundancy to the message and checking it upon decryption. We refer to [2] for
further details.
The construction we present is essentially the same as the construction that
was already suggested by Barth, Boneh and Waters [6]. The novelty is that we
now prove that it is actually adaptively secure, rather than just statically secure, as
was established in [6]. Indeed, achieving security against such a strong adversary
represents an important advance in the context of BE, as discussed in Section 4.1.1.2.
The construction is as follows.
Let Π = (PKE.PG,PKE.KeyGen,PKE.Enc,PKE.Dec) be a PKE scheme and Σ =
(Gen, Sign,Ver) be a signature scheme. We construct an ANOBE scheme in the
following way.
BE.PG(1λ, n): Generate pars← PKE.PG(1λ) and return (pars, n).
BE.Setup(pars, n): For i = 1 to n, generate (ski, pki) ← PKE.KeyGen(pars). The
master private key is BE-MSK = {ski}ni=1 and the master public key consists
of
BE-MPK =
(
pars, Σ, {pki}ni=1
)
.
BE.KeyGen(BE-MPK,BE-MSK, i): Parse the master secret key BE-MSK as
{ski}ni=1 and output ski.
BE.Enc(BE-MPK,M, S): To encrypt messageM for a receiver set S = {i1, . . . , i$} ⊆
{1, . . . , n} of size %, generate a one-time signature key pair (sigk, vk)← Gen(1λ).
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Then, for each j = 1 to %, compute Cj = PKE.Enc(pars,M ||vk, pkij ). The
ANOBE ciphertext consists of C =
(
vk, Cτ(1), . . . , Cτ($),σ
)
, where σ =
Sign
(
sigk, (Cτ(1), . . . , Cτ($))
)
and τ : {1, . . . , %} → {1, . . . , %} is a random per-
mutation.
BE.Dec(BE-MPK, C, ski): Parse the ciphertext C as a tuple
(
vk, C1, . . . , C$,σ
)
. If
Ver
(
vk, C1, . . . , C$,σ
)
= 0, return ⊥. Otherwise, repeat the following steps for
j = 1 to %.
1. Compute M ′ = PKE.Dec(Cj , ski). If M ′ (=⊥ and can moreover be parsed
as M ′ =M ||vk for some M of appropriate length, return M .
2. If j = % output ⊥.
The correctness of the ANOBE scheme follows directly from the correctness and
weak robustness of Π.
We note that actually this construction differs from the one presented in [6,
Section 4.1] in a subtle way. Our construction, in fact, enjoys a slightly more effi-
cient decryption procedure, since a legitimate user first checks whether the one-time
signature verifies and then attempts decryption on the various PKE ciphertext com-
ponents, a step which requires linear time. In [6], the analogous construction allows
the receiver to perform the signature check only after having identified the correct
ciphertext component, from the decryption of which he can recover the necessary
verification key.
Theorem 4.5 Let Π be an IND-CCA, key-private and weakly robust PKE scheme,
and let Σ be a strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme. Then the BE scheme
constructed above is adaptively ANO-IND-CCA.
Similarly to the proof of Theorem 4.3, for the proof of Theorem 4.5 we consider
a sequence of games where the adversary is given an encryption of M0 under S0 in
Game 0 while, in the last game, the adversary gets an encryption of M1 under S1.
Game 0real: corresponds to the real game when the challenger’s bit is b = 0.
Namely, the ANOBE adversary A is given public parameters BE-MPK con-
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taining pars and n public keys {pki}ni=1. For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, user i’s
private key is ski. In the first phase, the adversary A adaptively chooses in-
dices i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and obtains the corresponding ski. The adversary may
also invoke the decryption oracle by making queries (C, i) which are han-
dled using the relevant private key ski. In the challenge phase, the adversary
A comes up with messages M0,M1 and two subsets S0, S1 ⊂ {1, . . . , n} of
equal size |S0| = |S1| = % with S0 (= S1. The challenger generates a one-
time signature key pair (sigk", vk") ← Gen(1λ), parses S0 as {θ1, . . . , θ$} and
returns the challenge ciphertext C" =
(
vk", Cτ(1), . . . , Cτ($),σ
)
where Cj =
PKE.Enc(pars,M0||vk", pkθj ) for j = 1 to % and τ : {1, . . . , %}→ {1, . . . , %} is a
random permutation. In the second phase, A is allowed to make more decryp-
tion queries (under the usual restriction) and key queries for arbitrary indices
i such that i ∈ {1, . . . , n}\(S0 1 S1). Eventually, A outputs a bit b′ ∈ {0, 1}
and we define Ereal0 to be the event that b
′ = 0.
Game 0: is as Game 0real but the challenger now rejects all post-challenge decryp-
tion queries (C, i) where C contains the same verification key vk" as in the
challenge phase. We call E0 the event that A outputs b′ = 0 in Game 0.
Game k (1 ≤ k ≤ %): From the two adversarially-chosen sets S0, S1 ⊆ {1, . . . , n},
the challenger B defines the value φ = |S0∩S1| and then considers two ordered
sets S′0 = {θ1, . . . , θφ, θφ+1, . . . , θ$}, S′1 = {ρ1, . . . , ρφ, ρφ+1, . . . , ρ$} that are
obtained by ordering S0 and S1 in such a way that θj = ρj for each j ∈
{1, . . . ,φ} and θj (= ρj if j ∈ {φ + 1, . . . , %}. Then, B generates the challenge
ciphertext as follows.
1. For j = 1 to φ, set Cj = PKE.Enc(pars,M1||vk", pkθj ) if j ≤ k and
Cj = PKE.Enc(pars,M0||vk", pkθj ) if j > k.
2. For j = φ+ 1 to %, set Cj = PKE.Enc(pars,M1||vk", pkρj ) if j ≤ k and
Cj = PKE.Enc(pars,M0||vk", pkθj ) if j > k.
The adversary is then returned C" =
(
vk", Cτ(1), . . . , Cτ($),σ
)
, for a randomly
chosen permutation τ : {1, . . . , %} → {1, . . . , %}, and the second phase is han-
dled as in previous games. We call Ek the event of A outputting b′ = 0 at the
end of Game k.
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Game %real: is identical to Game % with the difference that, when handling de-
cryption queries, the challenger no longer rejects ciphertexts that contain the
verification key vk". Game %real actually proceeds like the real game when the
challenger’s bit is b = 1. We let Ereal$ be the event that A outputs the bit
b′ = 0 at the end of Game %real.
Game 0real and Game 0 are indistinguishable if the one-time signature is strongly
unforgeable and the same argument can be made about Game % and Game %real.
We thus have |Pr[Ereal0 ]−Pr[E0]| = |Pr[Ereal$ ]−Pr[E$]| ≤ AdvSUF−1CMAA,Σ (λ). As
for other game transitions, they are justified by Lemmas 4.6 and 4.7 that separately
consider the situations where k ≤ φ and k > φ. More precisely, we have that, if
Game k and Game k − 1 can be distinguished for some k ∈ {1, . . . , %}, Lemmas 4.6
and 4.7 show that there exists either a IND-IK-CCA adversary B or a WROB-CCA
adversary B′ (see sections 2.3.1 and 3.2 for definitions of these two notions) against
the encryption scheme. Putting the above arguments altogether, we obtain
|Pr[Ereal0 ]− Pr[Ereal$ ]| ≤ 2 ·AdvSUF−1CMAA,Σ (λ) + n2 · % ·
(
AdvIND−IK−CCAB,Π (λ)
+AdvWROB−CCAB′,Π (λ)
)
≤ 2 ·AdvSUF−1CMAA,Σ (λ) + n3 ·
(
AdvIND−IK−CCAB,Π (λ)
+AdvWROB−CCAB′,Π (λ)
)
.
Lemma 4.6 Let Π be an IND-CCA PKE scheme. Then for each k ∈ {1, . . . ,φ},
Game k is indistinguishable from Game k − 1. More precisely, we have
|Pr[Ek]− Pr[Ek−1]| ≤ n ·AdvIND−CCAB,Π (λ).
Proof. Assuming that an attacker A can distinguish Game k and Game k − 1,
we build a chosen-ciphertext adversary B against Π. For each k ∈ {1, . . . ,φ}, we
observe that Game k and Game k − 1 are identical when M0 = M1 and we thus
assume M0 (=M1, so that the adversary cannot corrupt any user in S0 ∩ S1.
B obtains pars and a public key pk" from its challenger and it has to prepare
a master public key BE-MPK comprising n encryption keys pk1, . . . , pkn for the
ANOBE adversary A. To this end, picks i" ← {1, . . . , n} at random and defines
pki" = pk
". Then, B runs PKE.KeyGen and generates n − 1 key pairs (ski, pki)
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on its own for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}\{i"}. It finally gives the master public key
BE-MPK =
(
pars,Σ, {pki}ni=1
)
to A.
At any time, A is allowed to corrupt an arbitrary user i ∈ {1, . . . , n} depending
on the information it gathered so far. At each corruption query, B aborts and fails
in the event that A chooses to corrupt user i". Otherwise, B is necessarily able
to consistently answer the query since it knows secret keys {ski}i %=i" . When the
adversary A makes a decryption query (C = (vk, C1, . . . , C$,σ), i), we assume that
the query involves the challenge key pk" since B can always decrypt itself using
ski otherwise. To simulate the decryption algorithm without knowing the challenge
private key sk", B proceeds as follows. For j = 1 to %, it resorts to its IND-CCA
challenger and asks it for the decryption of Cj . If the IND-CCA challenger’s response
differs from ⊥ and can be parsed as M ||vk, for some message M of appropriate
length, B returns M to A. If the counter j reaches its maximal value % and no
decryption query provided a result of the form M ||vk, B returns ⊥ to indicate that
the ciphertext fails to decrypt properly.
In the challenge phase, A outputs two equal-length messages M0,M1 and two
subsets S0, S1 ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of equal size. B re-orders S0, S1 as S′0 = {θ1, . . . , θφ, θφ+1,
. . . , θ$}, S′1 = {ρ1, . . . , ρφ, ρφ+1, . . . , ρ$} where θj = ρj for each j ∈ {1, . . . ,φ}. If
θk (= i", B aborts and declares failure and we denote by Good the event that θk = i".
If the event Good occurs, B chooses a one-time signature key pair (sigk", vk")←
Gen(1λ) and sends the messages (M0||vk"), (M1||vk") to its IND-CCA challenger.
The latter replies by generating a challenge ciphertext C" = PKE.Enc(pars,Mb||vk",
pk"), for some internally flipped random bit b ← {0, 1}. The ANOBE challenge
ciphertext is then generated as follows.
1. For j = 1 to k − 1, B sets Cj = PKE.Enc(pars,M1||vk", pkθj
)
.
2. For j = k + 1 to %, B sets Cj = PKE.Enc(pars,M0||vk", pkθj
)
.
3. Finally, set Ck = C".
A then receives C = (vk", Cτ(1), . . . , Cτ($),σ), where σ = Sign(sigk",
Cτ(1), . . . , Cτ($)) and τ : {1, . . . , %}→ {1, . . . , %} is a random permutation.
In the second phase, A makes another series of adaptive corruption queries for
indices i (∈ S01S1 and B deals with them as in the first phase. Whenever A makes
a decryption query (C, i), B parses the ciphertext C as C = (vk, C1, . . . , C$,σ) and
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outputs ⊥ if vk = vk" or if σ is invalid. Otherwise, if i (= i", B simply runs the
legal decryption procedure on its own since it knows ski. If i = i", B appeals to
its IND-CCA challenger and the decryption oracle it is given access to. Namely,
ciphertexts {C1, . . . , C$} are handled by repeating the following steps for j = 1 to %.
- If Cj = C", B considers that Cj decrypts to ⊥ under sk" (which is legitimate
since C" would decrypt to Mb||vk" and vk (= vk") and does not make use of
its decryption oracle.
- If Cj (= C", B queries the decryption of Cj . If the result can be parsed as
M ||vk for some plaintext M of appropriate length, B outputs M .
If the counter j reaches % and no decryption query resulted in a plaintext of the form
M ||vk, B returns ⊥.
Eventually, the adversary A outputs a bit b′ ∈ {0, 1} and B outputs the same
result. If B did not abort, its advantage as an IND-CCA adversary is as large as
the difference between A’s probabilities of outputting 0 in Game k and Game k− 1.
Indeed, if B’s challenger chooses b = 0, then B is clearly playing Game k−1 whereas,
if b = 1, B is playing Game k.
Now, let us assess B’s probability not to abort. First, sinceM0 (=M1 by hypoth-
esis, A is not allowed to corrupt any user in S0∩S1 = {θ1, . . . , θφ}. Since θk ∈ S0∩S1,
a sufficient condition for B not to be asked for the unknown private key ski" is to be
lucky when drawing i" ← {1, . . . , n} and have event Good occurring. This is the case
with probability Pr[Good] = 1/n since the choice of i" is completely independent of
A’s view. !
Lemma 4.7 Let Π be a IND-IK-CCA and weakly robust PKE scheme. Then for
each k ∈ {φ+1, . . . , %}, Game k is indistinguishable from Game k−1. More precisely,
for any ANOBE adversary distinguishing the two games, there exists either an IND-
IK-CCA adversary B or a WROB-CCA adversary B′ such that
|Pr[Ek]− Pr[Ek−1]| ≤ n2 ·
(
Adv
IND−IK−CCA
B,Π (λ) +Adv
WROB−CCA
B′,Π (λ)
)
.
Proof. We prove that, if an ANOBE attacker A is able to distinguish Game k and
Game k − 1 for some k ∈ {φ+ 1, . . . , %}, we can either translate A into an IND-IK-
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CCA adversary B against Π or break its WROB-CCA property.
The IND-IK-CCA adversary B takes as input pars and two public keys pk"0, pk"1
from its IND-IK-CCA challenger and we call sk"0 and sk
"
1 the underlying private
keys. Algorithm B has to generate a master public key BE-MPK containing n pub-
lic key keys pk1, . . . , pkn. To this end, B picks two distinct indices i"0, i"1 ← {1, . . . , n}
and defines pki"0 = pk
"
0 and pki"1 = pk
"
1. Then, B runs PKE.Keygen and generates
n − 2 key pairs (ski, pki) for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}\{i"0, i"1}. The master public key
BE-MPK =
(
pars,Σ, {pki}ni=1
)
is provided as input to A.
Throughout the game, A can adaptively corrupt any user i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. At
each corruption query, B aborts if the queried index i falls in {i"0, i"1}. Otherwise, B
necessarily knows the queried secret key ski and hands it to A. For each decryption
query (C = (vk, C1, . . . , C$,σ), i) made by A, B can handle the query on its own
whenever i (∈ {i"0, i"1}. If i = i"0 (resp. i = i"1), B queries its own decryption oracle
up to % times and successively asks for the decryption of C1, . . . , C$ under sk
"
0 (resp.
sk"1). At the first answer that differs from ⊥ and can be parses asM ||vk, for someM
of the right length, B returns M . If B fails to obtain a decryption result of the form
M ||vk, for some M , B returns ⊥ to A, meaning that C does not properly decrypt
under sk"0 (resp. sk
"
1).
In the challenge phase, A outputs two equal-length messagesM0,M1 and subsets
S0, S1 ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of equal size %. These sets are re-ordered as S′0 = {θ1, . . . , θφ, θφ+1,
. . . , θ$} and S′1 = {ρ1, . . . , ρφ, ρφ+1, . . . , ρ$} where θj = ρj for each j ∈ {1, . . . ,φ}. If
θk (= i"0 or ρk (= i"1, B aborts. We denote by Good the event (θk = i"0) ∧ (ρk = i"1),
which implies pkθk = pk
"
0 and pkρk = pk
"
1.
If Good occurs, B generates a one-time signature key pair (sigk", vk")← Gen(λ)
and sends the messages (M0||vk"), (M1||vk") to its IND-IK-CCA challenger. The
latter returns a challenge ciphertext C" ← PKE.Enc(pars,Mb||vk", pk"b), for some
internally flipped random bit b← {0, 1}. The ANOBE adversary’s challenge cipher-
text is then obtained as follows.
1. For j = 1 to k − 1, B sets Cj = PKE.Enc(pars,M1||vk", pkρj
)
.
2. For j = k + 1 to %, B computes Cj = PKE.Enc(pars,M0||vk", pkθj
)
.
3. Finally, set Ck = C".
A receives the challenge C = (vk", Cτ(1), . . . , Cτ($),σ), where σ = Sign(sigk",
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(Cτ(1), . . . , Cτ($))) and τ : {1, . . . , %}→ {1, . . . , %} is a random permutation.
In the second phase, A makes further adaptive corruption queries for indices
i (∈ S0 1 S1 and B handles them as previously. Decryption queries are han-
dled as in the first phase with one difference: if A makes a decryption query
(C = (vk, C1, . . . , C$,σ), i) for which we simultaneously have i ∈ {i0, i1}, vk (= vk"
and Cj = C" for some j ∈ {1, . . . , %}, B considers that Cj decrypts to ⊥ under ski
without invoking its own decryption oracles on Cj . Since vk (= vk", it is clear that
C" cannot correctly decrypt to a message ending with vk under the private key sk"b .
Still, we have to rule out the possibility to have PKE.Dec(C", sk"1−b) = M ||vk, for
some plaintext M , since this could render A’s view inconsistent. If this event were
to happen with non-negligible probability, algorithm B could be turned into a weak
robustness (more precisely, WROB-CCA) adversary B′. The latter would simply
generate the ANOBE challenge ciphertext by computing C1, . . . , C$ itself and wait-
ing for A to make a decryption query C = (vk, C1, . . . , C$,σ) for which there exists
j ∈ {1, . . . , %} such that Cj correctly decrypts under both skb and sk1−b.
When A halts, it outputs a result b′ ∈ {0, 1} and B outputs b′ as well. If B
did not abort, its IND-IK-CCA advantage is as large as the gap between A’s prob-
abilities of outputting 0 in Game k and Game k − 1. Indeed, if B’s IND-IK-CCA
challenger sets its challenge bit as b = 0, B is playing Game k − 1 with A whereas,
if the IND-IK-CCA challenger sets b = 1, B is playing Game k.
Now, let us assess B’s probability not to abort. Recall that the adversary A can-
not legally corrupt any user in S01S1 = {θφ+1, . . . , θ$, ρφ+1, . . . , ρ$}. For this reason,
a sufficient condition for A not to query the private keys skθk or skρk is to have Good
occurring. Since event Good occurs with probability Pr[Good] = 1/n(n− 1) > 1/n2,
the claimed result follows. !
In terms of efficiency, from this construction we will obtain secure ANOBE
schemes with typically very small (constant) private key storage requirements and
ciphertexts which are |S| times the size of the ciphertext of the underlying PKE
scheme. Encryption and decryption have both cost linear in the size of S. If, for
example (as suggested in [6]), we use the Cramer–Shoup PKE scheme to instantiate
the ANOBE scheme, the private keys will have constant size (namely 5 elements in
Zp), and the resulting ciphertext will consist of roughly 4 · |S| group elements. The
scheme will be adaptively secure in the standard model under the DDH assumption.
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If we look at recent efficient instantiations of BE, for example that of Gentry and
Waters [51], we have private keys whose size is linear in the number of users, and
ciphertexts which consist of n bits plus 3 group elements (if we include the cost of
transmitting a description of S as part of the ciphertext). It is clear that in general
the solution of [51] is more efficient in terms of ciphertext size. The key point though
is that it is not anonymous.
4.4 ANOBE from Identity-Based Encryption
In this section we present a generic construction for ANOBE from identity-based
encryption (IBE). For this approach, we build upon the Canetti-Halevi-Katz (CHK)
transformation [25] by applying carefully-crafted modifications. As recalled in Sec-
tion 2.4, the CHK transformation takes a weakly secure IBE scheme (and a strongly
one-time unforgeable signature scheme) and returns an IND-CCA secure PKE scheme.
The idea is first to consider the master keys (MPK,MSK) of the IBE scheme as the
key-pair (pk, sk) for the resulting PKE scheme and then to generate a signature
key-pair (sigk, vk). To encrypt message M to public key MPK run the identity-
based encryption algorithm on master public key MPK, messageM and identity vk.
Finally sign the ciphertext and the verification key with sigk.
We modify the original transformation as follows. First of all, borrowing ideas
from [73], we adapt it to be suitable for the anonymity setting. This involves using
a multi-TA IBE scheme (as defined in Section 2.3.2), with the appropriate security
property, namely sID-TAA-IND-CPA security. The work in [73] does this to achieve
a key-private IND-CCA secure PKE scheme. For our purposes, we need to extend
this technique to the BE setting, where multiple users are being addressed. The idea
is that, within this transform, we encrypt m for the same identity vk under the |S|
different public keys. We then sign all ciphertexts and append the verification key vk
(note that this signature binds all these ciphertexts together). Upon decryption, a
user verifies the signature against vk and, if valid, proceeds to derive the decryption
key for identity vk by running the IBE key-extraction algorithm on input his private
key. We formalize this idea next.
Let I = (IBE.PG, IBE.TASetup, IBE.KeyExt, IBE.Enc, IBE.Dec) be a weakly robust,
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in a sense to be defined below, multi-TA IBE scheme and let Σ=(Gen,Sign,Ver) be
a signature scheme. A multi-TA IBE scheme is weakly robust (as defined in [62])
if a polynomial-time adversary cannot find a valid message such that its encryption
for identity id under a master public key returns a valid message when decrypted
using the secret key corresponding to id, but extracted under another master public
key. We use I and Σ to generically instantiate a BE scheme in the following way.
BE.PG(1λ, n): Run IBE.PG on input 1λ to obtain the system’s parameters pars.
Return (pars, n).
BE.Setup(pars, n): For i = 1 to n, generate (MSKi,MPKi)← IBE.TASetup(pars).
The master private key is BE-MSK = {MSKi}ni=1 and the master public key
consists of
BE-MPK =
(
pars, Σ, {MPKi}ni=1
)
.
BE.KeyGen(BE-MPK,BE-MSK, i): Parse the master secret key BE-MSK as
{MSKi}ni=1 and output MSKi.
BE.Enc(BE-MPK,M, S): To encrypt M for a receiver set S = {i1, . . . , i$} ⊆
{1, . . . , n} of size %, generate a one-time signature key pair (sigk, vk)← Gen(1λ).
Then, for each j = 1 to %, compute Cj ← IBE.Enc(MPKi,M, vk). The ANOBE
ciphertext is
C =
(
vk, Cτ(1), . . . , Cτ($),σ
)
,
where σ ← Sign(sigk, Cτ(1), . . . , Cτ($)) and τ : {1, . . . , %} → {1, . . . , %} is a
random permutation.
BE.Dec(BE-MPK, C,MSKi): Parse the ciphertext C as a tuple
(
vk, C1, . . . , C$,σ
)
.
If Ver
(
vk, C1, . . . , C$,σ
)
= 0, return ⊥. Otherwise, compute skivk ←
IBE.KeyExt(MPKi,MSKi, vk) and repeat the following steps for j = 1 to %.
1. Compute M ′ = IBE.Dec(MPKi, skivk , Cj). If M
′ (=⊥ return M ′.
2. If j = % output ⊥.
The correctness of the BE scheme follows directly from the correctness and the
weak robustness of the IBE scheme I used to construct it.
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From the details of the security proof which we give next it will become apparent
that in this construction the weak robustness of the underlying primitive is only
needed for correctness, and it is not required in the simulation.
If instantiated with the multi-TA version of Gentry’s IBE scheme [50, 73] (which
can be made weakly robust simply by applying the transform in [2], as proved in
[62]), this construction yields very short constant size private keys (just one element
in Z∗p) and ciphertexts consisting of roughly 3 · |S| group elements (|S| in G and
2 · |S| in GT ) plus a signature and a verification key. Encryption and decryption
have both cost linear in the size of S.
The following result holds.
Theorem 4.8 Let I be a sID-TAA-IND-CPA secure IBE scheme and let Σ be a
strongly unforgeable one-time signature. Then, the above BE scheme is adaptively
ANO-IND-CCA secure.
We first give some intuition for the proof. As observed earlier, in [73], the authors
apply a modified version of the CHK transformation [25] using the same primitives
as our generic construction to obtain a key-private IND-CCA PKE scheme. We
introduced further modifications to build an ANO-IND-CCA secure broadcast en-
cryption scheme. By similar arguments to those in [25] and [73], and by applying
techniques analogous to those proving adaptive security in Theorem 4.5, we can
show that adaptive ANO-IND-CCA security is achieved. We give details of the
proof next.
Let us consider a sequence of games where the adversary is given an encryption
of M0 for S0 in Game 0 while, in the last game, the adversary obtains an encryption
of M1 under S1.
Game 0real: corresponds to the real game when the challenger’s bit is b = 0.
In this game the challenger C first generates a one-time signature key pair
(sigk", vk")← Gen(1λ). It then gives the ANOBE adversary A the public pa-
rameters BE-MPK containing pars and n public keys {MPKi}ni=1. For each
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i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, user i’s private key is MSKi. In the first phase, the adver-
sary A adaptively chooses indices i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and obtains the correspond-
ing MSKi. The adversary may also invoke the decryption oracle by making
queries (C, i) which are handled using the relevant private key MSKi. In the
challenge phase, the adversary A comes up with two equal-length messages
M0,M1 and two subsets S0, S1 ⊂ {1, . . . , n} of equal size |S0| = |S1| = % with
S0 (= S1. The challenger parses S0 as {θ1, . . . , θ$} and returns the challenge ci-
phertext C" =
(
vk", Cτ(1), . . . , Cτ($),σ
)
where Cj ← IBE.Enc(MPKθj ,M0, vk")
for j = 1 to %, τ : {1, . . . , %} → {1, . . . , %} is a random permutation and
σ ← Sign(sigk", (Cτ(1), . . . , Cτ($))). In the second phase, A is allowed to make
more decryption queries (under the usual restriction) and key queries for ar-
bitrary indices i such that i ∈ {1, . . . , n}\(S0 1 S1). Eventually, A outputs a
bit b′ ∈ {0, 1} and we define Ereal0 to be the event that b′ = 0.
Game 0: is as Game 0real but the challenger now rejects all decryption queries
(C, i) where C contains the verification key vk". We call E0 the event that A
outputs b′ = 0 in Game 0.
Game k (1 ≤ k ≤ %): From the two adversarially-chosen sets S0, S1 ⊆ {1, . . . , n},
the challenger B defines the value φ = |S0∩S1| and then considers two ordered
sets S′0 = {θ1, . . . , θφ, θφ+1, . . . , θ$}, S′1 = {ρ1, . . . , ρφ, ρφ+1, . . . , ρ$} that are
obtained by ordering S0 and S1 in such a way that θj = ρj for each j ∈
{1, . . . ,φ} and θj (= ρj if j ∈ {φ + 1, . . . , %}. Then, B generates the challenge
ciphertext as follows.
1. For j = 1 to φ, set Cj = IBE.Enc(MPKθj ,M1, vk
") if j ≤ k and
Cj = IBE.Enc(MPKθj ,M0, vk
") if j > k.
2. For j = φ+ 1 to %, set Cj = IBE.Enc(MPKρj ,M1, vk
") if j ≤ k and
Cj = IBE.Enc(MPKθj ,M0, vk
") if j > k.
The adversary is then returned C" =
(
vk", Cτ(1), . . . , Cτ($),σ
)
, for a randomly
chosen permutation τ : {1, . . . , %} → {1, . . . , %}, and the second phase is han-
dled as in previous games. We call Ek the event of A outputting b′ = 0 at the
end of Game k.
Game %real: is identical to Game % with the difference that, when handling de-
cryption queries, the challenger no longer rejects ciphertexts that contain the
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verification key vk". Game %real actually proceeds like the real game when the
challenger’s bit is b = 1. We let Ereal$ be the event that A outputs the bit
b′ = 0 at the end of Game %real.
Game 0real and Game 0 are indistinguishable if the one-time signature is strongly
unforgeable and the same argument can be made about Game % and Game %real.
We thus have |Pr[Ereal0 ]−Pr[E0]| = |Pr[Ereal$ ]−Pr[E$]| ≤ AdvSUF−1CMAA,Σ (λ). As
for other game transitions, they are justified by Lemmas 4.9 and 4.10 that separately
consider the situations where k ≤ φ and k > φ. More precisely, we have that, if
Game k and Game k − 1 can be distinguished for some k ∈ {1, . . . , %}, Lemmas 4.9
and 4.10 show that there exists a sID-TAA-IND-CPA adversary B against the IBE
scheme. Putting the above arguments altogether, we obtain
|Pr[Ereal0 ]− Pr[Ereal$ ]| ≤ 2 ·AdvSUF−1CMAA,Σ (λ) + n2 · % ·AdvsID−TAA−IND−CPAB,Π (λ)
≤ 2 ·AdvSUF−1CMAA,Σ (λ) + n3 ·AdvsID−TAA−IND−CPAB,Π (λ).
Lemma 4.9 Let I be a sID-IND-CPA multi-TA IBE scheme. Then for each k ∈
{1, . . . ,φ}, Game k is indistinguishable from Game k − 1. More precisely, we have
|Pr[Ek]− Pr[Ek−1]| ≤ n ·AdvsID−IND−CPAB,I (λ).
Proof. Assuming that an attacker A can distinguish Game k and Game k − 1, we
build a selective-id chosen-plaintext adversary B against I. For each k ∈ {1, . . . ,φ},
we observe that Game k and Game k − 1 are identical when M0 =M1 and we thus
assume M0 (=M1, so that the adversary cannot corrupt any user in S0 ∩ S1.
B first generates a one-time signature key pair (sigk", vk")← Gen(1λ) and gives
vk" to its challenger C. It then obtains pars and the master public keys {MPKi}ni=1
of all TAs in the system from its challenger. At this point B selects the master
public key MPK" it wishes to be challenged on. To this end, it picks i" ← {1, . . . , n}
at random and defines MPKi" = MPK
". It finally gives the master public key
BE-MPK =
(
pars,Σ, {MPKi}ni=1
)
to A.
At any time, A is allowed to corrupt an arbitrary user i ∈ {1, . . . , n} depend-
ing on the information it gathered so far. At each corruption query, B aborts and
fails in the event that A chooses to corrupt user i". Otherwise, B is able to consis-
tently answer the query since it can forward the same corruption query to its own
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challenger. When the adversary A makes a decryption query (C, i), B simulates
the decryption algorithm in the following way. First, it parses the ciphertext C as
C = (vk, C1, . . . , C$,σ) and outputs ⊥ if vk = vk" or if σ is invalid. Otherwise, B
submits the query (i, vk) to its challenger to obtain skivk , the secret key correspond-
ing to identity vk under TA i. Then, for j = 1 to %, it runs IBE.Dec(MPKi, skivk , Cj)
and returns M to A if it obtains a message M of the appropriate length. If the
counter j reaches its maximal value % and no decryption provided such a message,
B returns ⊥ to indicate that the ciphertext fails to decrypt properly.
In the challenge phase, A outputs two equal-length messages M0,M1 and two
subsets S0, S1 ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of equal size. At this step, B re-orders S0, S1 as S′0 =
{θ1, . . . , θφ, θφ+1, . . . , θ$}, S′1 = {ρ1, . . . , ρφ, ρφ+1, . . . , ρ$} where θj = ρj for each
j ∈ {1, . . . ,φ}. If θk (= i", B aborts and declares failure and we denote by Good the
event that θk = i".
If the event Good occurs, B sends i" and the two messages M0, M1 to its
IND-CPA challenger. The latter replies by generating a challenge ciphertext C" =
IBE.Enc(MPKi" ,Mb, vk
"), for some internally flipped random bit b ← {0, 1}. The
ANOBE challenge ciphertext is then generated as follows.
1. For j = 1 to k − 1, B sets Cj = IBE.Enc(MPKρj ,M1, vk").
2. For j = k + 1 to %, B sets Cj = IBE.Enc(MPKθj ,M0, vk").
3. Finally, set Ck = C".
A then receives C = (vk", Cτ(1), . . . , Cτ($),σ), where σ = Sign(sigk",
Cτ(1), . . . , Cτ($)) and τ : {1, . . . , %}→ {1, . . . , %} is a random permutation.
In the second phase, A makes another series of adaptive corruption queries for
indices i (∈ S01S1 and B deals with them as in the first phase. Similarly, whenever
A makes a decryption query (C = (vk, C1, . . . , C$,σ), i), B handles it as before. In
fact, (i, vk) is always a valid query to its challenger since vk (= vk". Eventually,
the adversary A outputs a bit b′ ∈ {0, 1} and B outputs the same result. If B did
not abort, its advantage as an IND-CCA adversary is as large as the difference be-
tween A’s probabilities of outputting 0 in Game k and Game k − 1. Indeed, if B’s
challenger chooses b = 0, then B is clearly playing Game k − 1 whereas, if b = 1, B
is playing Game k.
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Now, let us assess B’s probability not to abort. First, sinceM0 (=M1 by hypoth-
esis, A is not allowed to corrupt any user in S0∩S1 = {θ1, . . . , θφ}. Since θk ∈ S0∩S1,
a sufficient condition for B not to be asked for the unknown private key MSKi" is
to be lucky when drawing i" ← {1, . . . , n} and have event Good occurring. This
is the case with probability Pr[Good] = 1/n since the choice of i" is completely
independent of A’s view. !
Lemma 4.10 Let I be a sID-TAA-IND-CPA secure IBE scheme. Then for each
k ∈ {φ + 1, . . . , %}, Game k is indistinguishable from Game k − 1. More precisely,
for any ANOBE adversary distinguishing the two games, there exists an sID-TAA-
IND-CPA adversary B such that
|Pr[Ek]− Pr[Ek−1]| ≤ n2 ·AdvsID−TAA−IND−CPAB,Π (λ).
Proof. We prove that, if an ANOBE attacker A is able to distinguish Game k
and Game k − 1 for some k ∈ {φ + 1, . . . , %}, we can translate A into a successful
sID-TAA-IND-CPA adversary B against I.
B first generates a one-time signature key pair (sigk", vk")← Gen(1λ) and gives vk"
to its challenger C. It then obtains pars and the master public keys {MPKi}ni=1
of all TAs in the system from its challenger. At this point B selects the master
public keys MPK0" and MPK1" it wishes to be challenged on. To this end, it picks
i"0, i
"
1 ← {1, . . . , n} at random and defines MPKi"0 = MPK0" and MPKi"1 = MPK1" .
It finally gives the master public key BE-MPK =
(
pars,Σ, {MPKi}ni=1
)
to A.
Throughout the game, A can adaptively corrupt any user i ∈ {1, . . . , n}. At
each corruption query, B aborts if the queried index i falls in {i"0, i"1}. Otherwise, B
simply passes the corruption query to its challenger and forwards its response to A.
For each decryption query (C, i) made by A, B parses C as (vk, C1, . . . , C$,σ) and
outputs ⊥ if vk = vk" or or if σ is invalid. Otherwise, B submits the query (i, vk) to
its challenger to obtain skivk , the secret key corresponding to identity vk under TA
i. Then, for j = 1 to %, it runs IBE.Dec(MPKi, skivk , Cj) and returns M to A if it
obtains a message M of the appropriate length. If the counter j reaches its maximal
value % and no decryption provided such a message, B returns ⊥ to indicate that
the ciphertext fails to decrypt properly.
In the challenge phase, A outputs two equal-length messagesM0,M1 and subsets
S0, S1 ⊆ {1, . . . , n} of equal size %. These sets are re-ordered as S′0 = {θ1, . . . , θφ, θφ+1,
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. . . , θ$} and S′1 = {ρ1, . . . , ρφ, ρφ+1, . . . , ρ$} where θj = ρj for each j ∈ {1, . . . ,φ}. If
θk (= i"0 or ρk (= i"1, B aborts. We denote by Good the event (θk = i"0) ∧ (ρk = i"1),
which implies MPKθk = MPKi"0 and MPKρk = MPKi"1 .
If the event Good occurs, B sends i"0, i"1 and the two messagesM0, M1 to its IND-
CPA challenger. The latter returns a challenge ciphertext C" ← IBE.Enc(MPKi"b ,
Mb, vk"), for some internally flipped random bit b ← {0, 1}. The ANOBE adver-
sary’s challenge ciphertext is then obtained as follows.
1. For j = 1 to k − 1, B sets Cj = IBE.Enc(MPKρj ,M1, vk").
2. For j = k + 1 to %, B computes Cj = IBE.Enc(MPKθj ,M0, vk").
3. Finally, set Ck = C".
A receives the challenge C = (vk", Cτ(1), . . . , Cτ($),σ), where σ = Sign(sigk",
(Cτ(1), . . . , Cτ($))) and τ : {1, . . . , %}→ {1, . . . , %} is a random permutation.
In the second phase, A makes further adaptive corruption queries for indices
i (∈ S0 1 S1 and B handles them as previously. Decryption queries are handled as
in the first phase. As before, we note that since vk (= vk", (i, vk) is always a valid
query to B’s challenger.
When A halts, it outputs a result b′ ∈ {0, 1} and B outputs b′ as well. If B did not
abort, its advantage is as large as the gap between A’s probabilities of outputting 0
in Game k and Game k− 1. Indeed, if B’s challenger sets its challenge bit as b = 0,
B is playing Game k − 1 with A whereas, if the challenger sets b = 1, B is playing
Game k.
Now, let us assess B’s probability not to abort. Recall that the adversary A
cannot legally corrupt any user in S0 1 S1 = {θφ+1, . . . , θ$, ρφ+1, . . . , ρ$}. For this
reason, a sufficient condition for A not to query the private keys skθk or skρk is
to have Good occurring. Since event Good occurs with probability Pr[Good] =
1/n(n− 1) > 1/n2, the claimed result follows. !
We have therefore proved that identity-based encryption can be used to obtain
a secure ANOBE scheme. We will next study the relation between ANOBE and
another important primitive, attribute-based encryption.
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4.5 ANOBE from Attribute-Based Encryption
Our goal is to establish the connections between attribute-based encryption (ABE)
and BE. As a warm up, we look at some security notions and properties in both
settings, and see how they relate to each other.
Before looking at the relation between the security models for BE and ABE, we
consider an important notion common to both primitives, namely collusion resis-
tance. As mentioned in Chapter 2, one of the defining properties of ABE is collusion
resistance, in the sense that users cannot combine their attributes and successfully
decrypt something they could have not decrypted individually. By building a BE
scheme from an ABE one, as we intend to do next, the collusion resistance of the
original ABE scheme is automatically inherited by the BE scheme. However in the
BE setting, the only attribute a user can be associated with is to have a certain
identity. In this sense, the collusion resistance property of ABE seems to be signifi-
cantly stronger than the notion having the same name in the BE setting. By pooling
identities together the users do not gain any advantage: either none of them is a
legitimate user, and so, by the security of the scheme, they still cannot decrypt, or
at least one is, but in this case it would make no sense for that user to collude with
others. Obviously a legitimate user can give his private key to a non-intended re-
cipient, but this is a completely different issue which does not fall in the framework
of collusion resistance.
Also in the BE setting there is a notion of resistance against collusion attacks,
i.e., attacks mounted by a coalition of users not in the target set who wish to decrypt
the broadcast message. If, as detailed next, we construct a BE scheme from an ABE
scheme, this property is naturally met by the security of the underlying ABE scheme,
as this guarantees that only the authorized users can decrypt successfully.
We now recall some types of adversary and security properties in the two settings.
In BE, we can find the following types of adversary, each of which we relate to
concepts in the ABE world.
• Static adversary. This is an adversary that commits to a set of users S∗ in
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an Initialize phase before the setup algorithm is run. S∗ is the set he wishes
to attack and therefore there are some standard restrictions to the key ex-
traction and decryption queries the adversary can issue (see [17] for details).
From an ABE perspective, this is precisely an adversary in the selective-set
(or selective-policy) security model.
• Semi-Static adversary. This notion has only recently been introduced in
[51] and addresses an adversary who has to commit to a set S˜ in the Initialize
phase, who can make private key extraction queries for any i /∈ S˜, and who
must choose a target set S∗ for the challenge ciphertext with the restriction
that S∗ ⊆ S˜. Such an adversary is weaker than an adaptive adversary, but
stronger than a static one, as the BE adversary can adaptively choose what
subset of S˜ to attack. There is no existing equivalent notion in the ABE world,
but it can be naturally introduced. For instance, in the key-policy setting, the
adversary will have to commit ahead to a set of attributes S˜; he will be able
to issue queries for attributes not in S˜ and finally he will choose an arbitrary
subset of S˜.
• Adaptive adversary. This is the strongest type of adversary against BE
[51], as he need not commit to any set of users before the setup algorithm is
run. In ABE, such an adversarial notion is captured by the standard security
model in which only in the challenge phase does the adversary select a set of
attributes (or a policy) he wishes to attack, with the restriction that none of
the answered queries allow him to win trivially.
As we have stressed so far, anonymity is a crucial security property for which
we aim in a BE system. In the context of relating BE to ABE, we can observe that
anonymity corresponds to the notion of attribute/policy-hiding, as defined in [58].
Briefly, the adversary selects two sets (policies) in either the Initialize phase or the
Challenge phase, and then he will have to guess under which set (policy) encryption
was performed.
We will now show how to obtain BE from ABE. As a consequence, any progress
in the efficiency and security of ABE can be translated directly into corresponding
improvements for ANOBE.
107
4.5 ANOBE from Attribute-Based Encryption
4.5.1 Generic constructions for ANOBE from ABE
This section is dedicated to formalizing the relation between ABE and BE. To this
end, we provide generic ways to achieve BE (and in particular ANOBE) from both
flavours of ABE, namely ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE) and key-policy ABE
(KP-ABE). While it is fairly natural to think of a BE scheme as a CP-ABE scheme
whose ciphertext policy is set-membership, it is perhaps not so intuitive to see BE
as arising as a special instance of KP-ABE.
We explore these ideas next, giving first some intuition and then the detailed
constructions and proofs.
BE and CP-ABE. Let U be the universe of users of the desired BE scheme.
We consider a CP-ABE scheme whose universe of attributes is precisely U . Being
user i will translate to having attribute i. Furthermore, belonging to the target
broadcast set S will correspond to a set-membership policy. This can be expressed
as a disjunction of attributes, i.e. users. It is then very intuitive to think of a BE
scheme as a CP-ABE scheme with the above-mentioned encryption policy.
More formally, let Γ = (CPABE.PG,CPABE.Setup, CPABE.KeyGen,CPABE.Enc,
CPABE.Dec) be a CP-ABE scheme which efficiently supports disjunction policies.
Let U be the universe of attributes, where |U | = n. We will construct a BE scheme
from Γ, having U as the universe of users and the same message and ciphertext
space, in the following way:
BE.PG(1λ, n): Run CPABE.PG on input 1λ and return pars, which implicitly contain
n and a description of the message space MsgSp and the ciphertext space CtSp
of the scheme.
BE.Setup(pars): Run CPABE.Setup(pars) to obtain the master public key CP-MPK
and the master secret key CP-MSK. Let BE-MPK := CP-MPK, BE-MSK :=
CP-MSK and output (BE-MPK,BE-MSK).
BE.KeyGen(BE-MPK,BE-MSK, i): Run CPABE.KeyGen(BE-MPK,BE-MSK, i) to
obtain ski, the secret key corresponding to user (attribute) i.
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BE.Enc(BE-MPK,M, S): Let
∨
j∈S j be the policy representing the disjunction of
attributes (users) j ∈ S. Let A be the access structure supporting this policy.
Run CPABE.Enc(BE-MPK,M,A) to obtain a ciphertext C.
BE.Dec(BE-MPK, C, ski): Run CPABE.Dec on the same input to obtain either a
message M or a failure symbol ⊥.
The correctness of the BE scheme follows directly from the correctness of the CP-
ABE scheme Γ used to construct it. This guarantees that if user i satisfies the
disjunction policy (i.e. i ∈ S) then he can successfully decrypt.
The following result holds.
Theorem 4.11 Let Γ be a policy-hiding and IND-CCA secure CP-ABE scheme sup-
porting disjunction policies. Then the BE scheme constructed as above is adaptively
ANO-IND-CCA secure.
Proof. Let A be an adversary against the ANO-IND-CCA security of the BE
scheme. We will construct an adversary B that will interact with A to break the
policy-hiding and IND-CCA security of Γ. The game proceeds as follows.
Setup. The challenger C runs CPABE.PG(1λ) to obtain pars and CPABE.Setup(pars)
to generate the master public key CP-MPK and the master secret key CP-MSK
and gives (pars,CP-MPK) to the adversary A.
Phase 1. A can adaptively issue key-extraction queries for any user i ∈ U . Such a
query is passed on to B, who gives it to C as secret-key query for attribute i. C
will respond to each query with the private key ski, which is passed to B, who
then forwards it to A as the key for user i. A may also issue decryption queries
of the type (C, i), where i ∈ U . B passes such queries to C and forwards C’s
response to A.
Challenge. A selects two equal-length messages M0 and M1 ∈ MsgSp and two
equal-size target sets S0, S1 ⊆ U , such that i /∈ S0 1 S1 for any of the queries
i made in Phase 1. If for any of such queries we have that i ∈ S0 ∩ S1 the we
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require M0 = M1. A passes M0,M1, S0, S1 to B. B creates access structures
A0 and A1 expressing the disjunction of all the indices j ∈ S0 and k ∈ S1,
respectively. It passes M0,M1,A0,A1 to C. C chooses a random b ← {0, 1},
computes C" ← CPABE.Enc(CP-MPK,Mb,Ab) and passes C" to B, who in turn
passes it to A.
Phase 2. A continues to issue secret-key-extraction queries with the restriction that
i /∈ S0 1 S1 and if i ∈ S0 ∩ S1 then we require M0 = M1. These queries are
dealt with by B as in Phase 1. A can also issue decryption queries with the
restriction that if C = C" then either i /∈ S01S1 or i ∈ S0∩S1 and M0 =M1.
Guess. The adversary outputs its guess b′ for b and B outputs the same guess.
B perfectly simulates the ANO-IND-CCA game for A. Hence A’s advantage is
as it would be in the real game and by construction B wins whenever A does. !
BE and KP-ABE. Not so intuitive is to see BE as arising as a special instance
of KP-ABE. In the definition of KP-ABE the policy input to the key generation
algorithm is expressed by an access structure, which in our model is represented by
an access tree. In order to realize BE using ABE, we select as the tree for generating
the key of user i the trivial tree consisting of a single leaf for attribute i. In KP-
ABE, decryption succeeds if the set of attributes S specified in the encryption phase
satisfies the policy given during key generation. In particular, for the degenerate
case of BE, the policy (tree) is satisfied if and only if the attribute (user) i is in S.
This is precisely what is needed in the BE setting, i.e., a user i can decrypt if and
only if i ∈ S, where S is the target broadcast set. Hence, BE can also be cast in the
framework of KP-ABE.
We formalize this by considering a KP-ABE scheme K = (KPABE.PG,
KPABE.Setup, KPABE.KeyGen,KPABE.Enc,KPABE.Dec). Let U be the universe of at-
tributes, where |U | = n. We will construct a BE scheme from K, having U as the
universe of users and the same message and ciphertext space, in the following way:
BE.PG(1λ, n): Run KPABE.PG on input 1λ and return pars, which implicitly contain
n and a description of the message space MsgSp and the ciphertext space CtSp
of the scheme.
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BE.Setup(pars): Run KPABE.Setup(pars) to obtain the master public key KP-MPK
and the master secret key KP-MSK. Let BE-MPK := KP-MPK, BE-MSK :=
KP-MSK and output (BE-MPK,BE-MSK).
BE.KeyGen(BE-MPK,BE-MSK, i): Run KPABE.KeyGen(BE-MPK,BE-MSK, i) to
obtain ski, the secret key corresponding to the single-leaf access tree i.
BE.Enc(BE-MPK,M, S): Run KPABE.Enc(BE-MPK,M, S) to obtain a ciphertext
C.
BE.Dec(BE-MPK, C, ski): Run KPABE.Dec on the same input to obtain either a
message M or a failure symbol ⊥.
The correctness of the BE scheme follows from the correctness of the KP-ABE
scheme K used to construct it since in our model a set of attributes S satisfies a
single-leaf access tree if and only if the attribute associated with that leaf is in S.
The following result holds.
Theorem 4.12 Let K be an attribute-hiding and IND-CCA secure KP-ABE scheme.
Then the BE scheme constructed as above is adaptively ANO-IND-CCA secure.
Proof. Let A be an adversary against the ANO-IND-CCA security of the BE
scheme. We will construct an adversary B that will interact with A to break the
attribute-hiding and IND-CCA security of K. The game proceeds as follows.
Setup. The challenger C runs KPABE.PG(1λ) to obtain pars and KPABE.Setup(pars)
to generate the master public key KP-MPK and the master secret key KP-MSK
and gives (pars,KP-MPK) to the adversary A.
Phase 1. A can adaptively issue key-extraction queries for any user i ∈ U . Such a
query is passed on to B, who gives it to C as secret-key query for the degenerate
single-leaf access tree i. C will respond to each query with the private key ski,
which is passed to B, who then forwards it to A as the key for user i. A may
also issue decryption queries of the type (C, i), where i ∈ U . B passes such
queries to C and forwards to C’s response to A.
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Challenge. A selects two equal-length messages M0 and M1 ∈ MsgSp and two
equal-size target sets S0, S1 ⊆ U , such that i /∈ S0 1 S1 for any of the queries
i made in Phase 1. If for any of such queries we have that i ∈ S0 ∩ S1 the we
require M0 =M1. A passes M0,M1, S0, S1 to B. B passes M0,M1, S0, S1 to C.
C chooses a random b← {0, 1}, computes C" ← KPABE.Enc(KP-MPK,Mb, Sb)
and passes C" to B, who in turn passes it to A.
Phase 2. A continues to issue secret-key-extraction queries with the restriction
that i /∈ S0 1 S1 and if i ∈ S0 ∩ S1 then we require M0 = M1. These queries
are dealt with by B as in Phase 1. A can also issue decryption queries with
the restriction that if (C, i) = (C", i) then either i /∈ S0 1 S1 or i ∈ S0 ∩ S1
and M0 =M1.
Guess. The adversary outputs its guess b′ for b and B outputs the same guess.
B perfectly simulates the ANO-IND-CCA game for A. Hence A’s advantage is
as it would be in the real game and by construction B wins whenever A does. !
What we have just proved provides us with a potentially powerful tool: all
the progress achieved in the area of ABE could be highly relevant to the improve-
ment of the state of the art of BE. In practice, this approach is limited to the
currently available ABE schemes. In particular, what we are looking for ideally is
an attribute(policy)-hiding KP(CP)-ABE scheme, with short ciphertexts, involving
efficient algorithms, and which is non-selectively IND-CCA secure in the standard
model. Unfortunately, we do not have such a scheme. We hence briefly recall what
are the features of the existing ABE schemes.
The ABE research community has focused on obtaining schemes allowing for poli-
cies that could be as expressive as possible [53, 32, 12, 70]. These schemes however
only achieve selective security and provide no anonymity guarantee. Furthermore,
they are not very efficient. In [54], the authors present a threshold CP-ABE scheme
with constant-size ciphertext. Even if this limited policy could fit our purposes, the
scheme unfortunately suffers from the same security drawbacks as the other ABE
schemes.
In a related line of research called predicate encryption [58], Katz et al. address
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the issue of anonymity, but the scheme the authors present is characterized by large
keys and ciphertexts, linear in n as opposed to the size of S. Similar considerations go
for the work in [61], where Lewko et al. introduce the notion of functional encryption
and provide a fully secure ABE scheme, but the private key and ciphertext sizes
prevent it from being a suitable candidate for the construction of BE. Follow-up
work in the area (for instance, [69]) suffers from the same limitation. Indeed these
recently proposed primitives, which have ABE as a special case, are very powerful
and their instantiation allows for great expressiveness. However, for the use of ABE
that we have in mind, namely constructing ANOBE schemes, finding anonymous and
fully secure ABE schemes that support even simple policies but that are efficient is
still an open problem.
4.6 Reducing the Size of the Ciphertext with Randomness
Re-Use
Our main focus so far has been to show that ANOBE is achievable. Indeed we have
proved that we can obtain it starting from public-key, identity-based and attribute-
based encryption. Our next step is to look at how to improve on the efficiency of
certain constructions, striving towards more practical ANOBE schemes.
To this end, we investigate the technique of randomness re-use, a rigorous and
formal study of which can be found in [9] (followed by [5]). The usefulness of this
technique appears obvious in the context of multi-recipient encryption, where the
same “base” encryption scheme is used to send messages to multiple receivers. Re-
using randomness has several practical implications: first of all, randomness is not
cheap, and therefore generating less of it already represents a performance improve-
ment. Secondly, it implies a saving in computational costs, since some components
will be re-used in the encryption process. Finally, it allows for smaller bandwidth
consumption.
While the efficiency benefits of applying this technique have always been clear,
the impact of randomness re-use on the security of the scheme has required some
attention. In particular, the authors of [9] provide a condition under which ran-
domness re-use is secure in the setting of public-key encryption. Namely, if the
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base scheme satisfies a certain property (called reproducibility) then sharing the
randomness across ciphertext components can be done without altering the security
of the scheme. Informally, a scheme is reproducible if there exists a polynomial-time
algorithm that on input the public parameters, a public key pk, a ciphertext C,
encryption of a message M under pk using randomness r, a public/secret key-pair
(pk′, sk′) and a message M ′, returns C ′, the encryption of M ′ under pk′ using the
same randomness r. We recall the formal definition from [9].
Let Π = (PKE.PG,PKE.KeyGen,PKE.Enc,PKE.Dec) be a PKE scheme. Let
MsgSp and RSp be the message and randomness space of Π, respectively. Let R
be an algorithm that takes as input the public parameters, a public key, a cipher-
text generated under such public key, a random message and a key-pair, and outputs
a ciphertext. Consider the following experiment.
ExpRepΠ,R(1
λ)
(pars)← PKE.PG(1λ)
(pk, sk)← PKE.KeyGen(pars)
M ← MsgSp; r ← RSp
C = PKE.Enc(pars,M, pk; r)
(pk′, sk′)← PKE.KeyGen(pars)
M ′ ← MsgSp
return 1 if PKE.Enc(pars,M ′, pk′; r) = R(pars, pk, C,M ′, pk′, sk′)
and 0 otherwise.
Definition 4.13 (Reproducibility) Π is reproducible if for any λ there is a p.t. al-
gorithm R such that the experiment ExpRepΠ,R(1
λ) outputs 1 with probability 1.
Informally, the main reproducibility theorem [9, Theorem 1] implies that if a PKE
scheme is reproducible and IND-CCA secure, then the corresponding randomness
re-using, multi-recipient PKE scheme is also IND-CCA secure.
Now, a crucial observation is that effectively some of our constructions for
ANOBE (we will focus on the one in Section 4.3.2) originate from a base encryption
scheme which is used repeatedly to encrypt the same message to multiple receivers.
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The relation between multi-recipient and broadcast encryption was briefly discussed
in [9]: a multi-recipient encryption scheme can indeed be transformed into a BE
scheme by encrypting the same message to each user in the target set, by broad-
casting the whole vector of ciphertext components, and by specifying a decryption
procedure that will allow each legitimate user to decrypt. Therefore it seems natural
to consider randomness re-use as an efficiency-enhancing technique in the context of
anonymous broadcast encryption.
It turns out that, in order to do so in a provably secure way, we have to introduce
a new notion of reproducibility, called key-less reproducibility, better suited for a
setting where anonymity is needed. In a nutshell, key-less reproducibility differs
from reproducibility in that the reproduction algorithm no longer requires as input
pk, the public key under which C was created. We formalize this as follows.
Let Π = (PKE.PG,PKE.KeyGen,PKE.Enc,PKE.Dec) be a PKE scheme. Let
MsgSp and RSp be the message and randomness space of Π, respectively. Let R
be an algorithm that takes as input public parameters, a ciphertext, a random mes-
sage and a key-pair, and outputs a ciphertext. Consider the experiment:
ExpKLRepΠ,R (1
λ)
(pars)← PKE.PG(1λ)
(pk, sk)← PKE.KeyGen(pars)
M ← MsgSp; r ← RSp
C = PKE.Enc(pars,M, pk; r)
(pk′, sk′)← PKE.KeyGen(pars)
M ′ ← MsgSp
return 1 if PKE.Enc(pars,M ′, pk′; r) = R(pars, C,M ′, pk′, sk′)
and 0 otherwise.
Definition 4.14 (Key-less reproducibility) Π is key-less reproducible if for any
λ there is a p.t. algorithm R such that the experiment ExpKLRepΠ,R (1
λ) outputs 1 with
probability 1.
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We note that we can recover the original reproducibility notion simply by in-
cluding a description of pk in the ciphertext C.
We now apply the technique of randomness re-use to obtain more efficient in-
stantiations for ANOBE. Let us reconsider the generic construction presented in
Section 4.3.2.
Let Π = (PKE.PG,PKE.KeyGen,PKE.Enc,PKE.Dec) be a key-less reproducible
PKE scheme, and let Σ = (Gen, Sign,Ver) be a signature scheme. We call ANOBE Π,Σrr
the scheme constructed from Π and Σ as follows.
BE.PG,BE.KeyGen,BE.Dec are as in Section 4.3.2.
BE.Enc(BE-MPK,M, S): to encrypt M for a receiver set S = {i1, . . . , i$} ⊆
{1, . . . , n} of size % = |S|, generate a signature key-pair (sigk, vk)← Gen(1λ).
Choose r ← RSp, where RSp is the randomness space of Π. Then, for each j =
1 to %, compute Cj = PKE.Enc(pars,M ||vk, pkij ; r). The final BE ciphertext
consists of C =
(
vk, Cτ(1), . . . , Cτ($),σ
)
, where σ = Sign
(
sigk, Cτ(1), . . . , Cτ($)
)
and τ : {1, . . . , %}→ {1, . . . , %} is a random permutation.
Theorem 4.15 Let Π be an IND-IK-CCA secure, weakly robust and key-less repro-
ducible PKE scheme. Let Σ be a strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme.
Then ANOBE Π,Σrr is adaptively ANO-IND-CCA secure.
Proof. The proof follows precisely the proof of Theorem 4.5 up until the BE chal-
lenge ciphertext is generated. The modifications are in the following steps and apply
to both Lemma 4.6 and Lemma 4.7.
1. For j = 1 to k − 1, B sets Cj = R(pars, C",M1||vk", pkρj , skρj ).
2. For j = k + 1 to %, B computes Cj = R(pars, C",M0||vk", pkθj , skθj ).
3. Finally, set Ck = C".
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We observe that B knows all the necessary secret keys since it generated them
on its own at the beginning of the simulation. The proof then continues as in
Theorem 4.5.
We note that there is no further loss in the security reduction since the key-
less reproducibility property of Π implies that PKE.Enc(pars,M ′, pk′; r) = R(pars,
PKE.Enc(pars,M, pk; r),M ′, pk′, sk′) with probability 1. !
We have shown that the key-less reproducibility of a PKE scheme guarantees
that randomness can be re-used securely. We can exploit this property to compress
the ANOBE ciphertexts and, depending on the concrete instantiation, significantly
increase the efficiency of the scheme. More precisely, given an ANOBE Π,Σrr cipher-
text C = (vk, Cτ(1), . . . , Cτ($),σ), let ccc denote the common ciphertext components
that may arise in Cτ(1), . . . , Cτ($) from sharing randomness across PKE components,
i.e.,
Cτ(1) = (ccc, c˜τ(1)), . . . , Cτ($) = (ccc, c˜τ($)).
The compressed ANOBE ciphertext will be C˜ = (vk, ccc, c˜τ(1), . . . , c˜τ($),σ). Upon
receipt, the user simply reconstitutes the original ciphertext C and runs BE.Dec as
usual. In Section 4.7 we will discuss briefly a possible instantiation of these ideas.
4.7 Further results
The results in [62] include parts of the work presented so far and go even further in
improving the efficiency of the introduced constructions. The authors provide a way
to speed-up decryption and finally they present a concrete ANOBE scheme, which
can be considered the state of the art. We give an overview of these results next.
4.7.1 Efficient decryption in the standard model
One major drawback of some of our constructions is that decryption takes linear
time in the size of the set S. This arises from the fact that users do not know
which ciphertext component is intended for them, and hence will have to perform
an average of |S|/2 decryptions before recovering the message. Clearly this procedure
is quite cumbersome. In [62], the authors present a technique allowing for constant
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decryption cost and which is proved secure in the standard model (i.e., without
random oracles) using our enhanced security definition. So far, the only known
technique – put forth by Barth et al. [6] – enabling constant-time decryption requires
the random oracle heuristic in the security analysis. To eliminate the random oracle,
the authors of [62] introduce a new primitive, called an anonymous hint system. In
essence, this primitive provides a way for an encrypter to securely tell receivers
which ciphertext component is intended for them, allowing them to ignore all but
one ciphertext component and so decrypt more efficiently. The hint primitive, for
which they provide an implementation based on the Decision-Diffie-Hellman (DDH)
assumption, is defined and realized in such a way that its integration with our generic
ANOBE constructions maintains compatibility with our proofs of adaptive security,
allowing to generically obtain ANOBE with efficient decryption.
4.7.2 A concrete ANOBE scheme
In [62] it is also established that the Kurosawa–Desmedt (KD) [60] hybrid encryption
scheme can be tweaked to have all the properties that are needed of the base PKE
scheme in our constructions. The KD scheme is an ideal starting point since it is one
of most efficient PKE schemes with IND-CCA security in the standard model. The
authors present KD∗, a modified version of the KD scheme, that is strongly robust
(although weak robustness suffices for our purposes), assuming that its symmetric
components satisfy some relatively mild conditions; anonymous under the DDH
assumption (and, again, under mild assumptions on its symmetric components) and
key-less reproducible. Tying everything together and using KD∗ as the base scheme,
they obtain the currently most efficient instantiation of an ANOBE scheme, for
which ciphertexts contain only 2 group elements and |S| symmetric ciphertexts (plus
a signature and a verification key). Decryption can be achieved in constant time by
combining this scheme with the DDH-based hint system mentioned in the previous
section, with an additional 2|S|+ 1 group elements in the ciphertext.
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Table 4.1: Comparison of broadcast encryption schemes
Scheme Security Private key size Ciphertext size
GW IND-CCA n · |g| n+ 3|g|
ANOBECS ANO-IND-CCA 5 · |a| s · 4|g|+ ω
ANOBEmG ANO-IND-CCA 1 · |a| s · (|g|+ 2|gT |) + ω
ANOBEKD∗ ANO-IND-CCA 4 · |a| s · |c|+ 2|g|+ ω
Let n be the size of the universe and s the size of the target set, let a ∈ Zp, g ∈ G, gT ∈ GT , let ω
be the cost of transmitting a signature and a verification key and let c be a symmetric ciphertext.
In light of this result, it could be helpful to summarize our findings and compare
the state of the art in this area. We do this in Table 4.1, where we consider various
BE schemes and focus on three important features: security level achieved, private
key storage requirements and ciphertext length. This choice is motivated by the fact
that these are the most commonly observed features. We note that other parameters
such as public key size, strength of security assumptions and computational costs
may be considered.
The notation used in the table is specified as follows.
- GW is the scheme by Gentry and Waters [51] recalled in Section 4.1.2.1;
- ANOBECS is the scheme that results from instantiating the construction in
Section 4.3.2 with the Cramer–Shoup encryption scheme;
- ANOBEmG is the scheme that results from instantiating the construction in
Section 4.4 with the multi-TA version of Gentry’s IBE scheme [50, 72];
- ANOBEKD∗ is the scheme in [62] mentioned in this section.
From Table 4.1 we can observe that the ANOBE schemes presented in this chapter
enjoy increasingly improved performance, with ANOBEKD∗ being almost competi-
tive with the non-anonymous but very efficient GW scheme. Once again we see the
challenges of maintaining a balance between security and efficiency.
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4.7.3 Extensions to identity-based broadcast encryption
When giving the formal definition of a public-key BE scheme in Section 4.2 we ob-
served that this was general enough to include the identity-based variant introduced
in [39]. This flexibility allows to readily extend some of our results to the identity-
based setting. Using an anonymous and weakly robust IBE scheme (see Section 2.3.2
and [2] for the relevant definitions) we can indeed obtain an anonymous identity-
based broadcast encryption scheme with a construction similar to the one presented
in Section 4.3.2. We can also extend the results in Section 4.4 by deploying a hier-
archical IBE scheme, and furthermore analyze techniques for randomness re-use in
this new setting. We leave details of these extensions to future work.
4.8 Conclusions
We have seen that in the context of broadcast encryption the main focus of research
to date has been on reducing ciphertext size. Achieving this has entailed sacrificing
all anonymity properties. Yet we have argued that anonymity is a fundamental
property to strive for in broadcast encryption. One may wonder why this feature
has been so neglected in the BE literature. It seems that a natural concern could be
that adding anonymity would severely damage the performance of the BE scheme.
Therefore, the obvious question is: how much does anonymity cost?
4.8.1 The price of anonymity
As can be seen from the details of our constructions, achieving anonymity does not
add any cost to the encryption process compared to non-anonymous schemes (for
example, [17, 51]): in our ANOBE schemes, encryption requires a number of group
operations that is linear in |S|. As for decryption, the speed-up technique presented
in [62] allows the legitimate user to recover the message in constant time. Our
ciphertext size is linear in |S| (and thus linear in n and of the same order of magnitude
as the true ciphertext size in existing BE schemes). Thus one interpretation of our
results is that anonymity does not “cost” anything in an asymptotic sense. Naturally,
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the constants matter in practice, and reducing the constant in the ciphertext size
for ANOBE to something closer to what can be achieved in the non-anonymous
setting is a major open problem. However, we reiterate that reducing the true size
of ciphertexts below linear in n in either the anonymous or non-anonymous setting
is impossible.
4.8.2 Open problems
With the aim of highlighting the importance of anonymity in broadcast encryption,
we have formally defined the notion of anonymous broadcast encryption (ANOBE)
and given several constructions for this primitive. We have also shown how these
constructions can be improved via randomness re-use techniques (to reduce the
ciphertext size and the computational costs of encryption) and pointed to further
results developed in [62]. Our constructions set a yardstick by which future ANOBE
schemes can be measured. Much work still needs to be done in this area, from im-
proving the efficiency of ANOBE schemes to considering all the additional properties
that can be found in standard BE, such as traitor tracing, revocation, dynamism
of users joining the system, and realising them in the anonymous setting. There is
still a gap between the sizes of ciphertexts in state-of-the-art BE schemes and our
ANOBE schemes. This gap is hidden in the constants in an asymptotic evaluation
of ciphertext size (when the true size of ciphertexts is measured) but is neverthe-
less significant in practice. A major challenge, then, is to further reduce the size of
ciphertexts in ANOBE, whilst maintaining its full anonymity properties.
Anonymity is of crucial importance in modern cryptography, in particular for
primitives which have immediate real-life applications, such as BE. We hence believe
that future work in this area should consider anonymity as one of the primary goals.
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This chapter introduces and explores the concept of time-specific encryption
(TSE), a newly designed primitive which allows the sender to specify in what time
interval a ciphertext can be decrypted. We present several flavours of TSE and pro-
vide generic constructions to achieve them securely in the standard model. Finally,
we suggest applications for our new primitive, and discuss its relationships with ex-
isting primitives, such as timed-release encryption and broadcast encryption. The
work in this chapter, fruit of a collaboration with Kenneth G. Paterson, was published
as [71] at the international cryptographic conference Security and Cryptography for
Networks 2010, and won the Best Paper Award.
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5.1 Introduction
5.1.1 Time and encryption
Time has always played an important role in communication. Information can be-
come useless after a certain point, sensitive data may not be released before a partic-
ular time, or we may wish to enable access to information for only a limited period
of time. In this context, being able to specify when a ciphertext can be decrypted by
a receiver is a useful and interesting property. Indeed, the idea of sending a message
“into the future”, i.e. encrypting a message so that it cannot be decrypted before a
pre-determined release time, has generated quite some interest in the cryptographic
community due to its many real-world applications such as electronic auctions, press
releases, etc. Timed-release encryption (TRE) precisely addresses this problem.
5.1.1.1 Timed-release encryption
Since its introduction by May [65], TRE has enjoyed significant development (see
[26, 27, 56, 41, 33], to name a few).
In TRE there are typically two potential approaches: the time-lock puzzle ap-
proach and the time server approach. In the former [78, 63, 20] the receiver is
required to make a substantial computational effort to solve a certain problem be-
fore recovering the message. This technique has some obvious practical limitations
since it is rather expensive for the receiver and also it guarantees only a delay in
the decryption time rather than providing the precise functionality of being able to
decrypt after a specified time. The time server approach overcomes these limita-
tions by introducing an entity, the time server (TS), which provides a common and
absolute time reference for all users in the system. In this setting, TS broadcasts
what we will call a time instant key (TIK) at each time unit and, ideally, it should
not interact with either the sender or the receiver. Most TRE literature follows this
approach.
A number of results have been achieved in this area, from providing scalable
and non-interactive systems [26, 27], to equipping TRE schemes with the additional
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functionality called pre-open capability [56, 41], which allows the receiver to decrypt
the ciphertext before the release time at the sender’s discretion. In all these systems
the key feature though is that at any point after the release time t the receiver
should be able to decrypt. However, in practice, in existing TRE schemes, successful
decryption occurs only with the TIK broadcast by TS at time t: any other key
broadcast after time t will not be useful to recover the message. Therefore these
schemes suffer from the limitation that some back-up mechanism must be provided
in case the receiver misses the key broadcast by the server at the release time.
Typically in the literature, it is assumed that the time server (or some other agency)
will make old keys available on a public server. Clearly this may be inconvenient
and would require additional infrastructure on top of the broadcast capability. The
consideration of this practical issue was key to the introduction and development of
a new cryptographic primitive which we call time-specific encryption (TSE).
5.1.1.2 Time-specific encryption
In time-specific encryption (TSE), as with TRE, a time server broadcasts a key at
the beginning of each time unit, a time instant key (TIK). But now, the sender of
a message can specify any time interval during the encryption process; the receiver
can decrypt to recover the message only if it has a TIK that corresponds to a time
in that interval.
More specifically, we consider a setting in which we have a (semi-)trusted time
server (TS). TS broadcasts a TIK kt at each time unit or “tick” of its clock, t, where
0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1. This TIK is available to all users, and we implicitly assume that it
contains a description of t. A sender can specify any interval [t0, t1], where t0 ≤ t1,
when encrypting a plaintext M to form a ciphertext C. In Plain TSE, we wish to
achieve the property that C can only be decrypted by a receiver to recover M if the
receiver is in possession of a TIK kt for some t with t ∈ [t0, t1]. Notice that we cannot
enforce the property that the receiver can only decrypt during the decryption time
interval (DTI) [t0, t1], since a receiver can always obtain an appropriate TIK and
then use it at any time later on to perform decryption. Achieving this stronger notion
could be done using trusted hardware, for example. Yet, as we discuss below, TSE
has several intriguing applications exploiting its defining property that a receiver
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must obtain a suitable TIK before being able to decrypt.
First of all, TSE generalizes TRE: indeed, TRE represents the special case of TSE
in which the sender can specify only intervals of the form [t, t]. As for the issue of
missed keys described above, TSE provides an elegant solution: if the sender specifies
an interval of the form [t, T −1] (where T −1 is the maximum time supported by the
scheme) then a receiver can decrypt using any TIK kt′ broadcast by the time server
at time t′ ≥ t. We note that the use of tree techniques to achieve this capability was
sketched in [26, 33], but without any formal security analysis. TSE, then, provides a
useful extension of TRE that can be exploited in any of the many applications that
have already been proposed for TRE in the literature, which, as mentioned before,
include electronic auctions, key escrow, on-line gaming, timed release of information
such as press releases, and so on.
However, TSE is more flexible than this in the range of applications that it
supports. For example, the encrypting party may specify an interval of the form
[0, t], meaning that a receiver can decrypt the ciphertext as soon as it is received
and a TIK has been obtained, but only up to time t. After this time, TIKs issued
by the time server will not help in decryption. Yet, a user might obtain a useful
TIK from some other user in the system, so this application of TSE only makes
sense in situations where users have a vested interest in not sharing TIKs with one
another, such as in situations where users are in competition with one another. For
example, the ciphertext may encrypt a ticket for accessing a service that is valid up
to time t. More generally, TSE can be used to support any application in which a
user benefits from accessing plaintext in a timely manner, and where the utility of
a TIK becomes limited shortly after its broadcast time. We sketch an example of
such an application in the domain of entity authentication next.
Consider a typical time-stamp based network authentication protocol, in which
entities A and B share a symmetric key K and in which A sends B messages of the
form MACK(T ||B) where T is the current time (at A) and MACK denotes a secure
MAC algorithm using the key K. Such a protocol requires roughly synchronised
clocks, and B needs to allow a “window of acceptance” for values T in A’s messages,
to cater for any loss of accuracy in synchronisation and network delay. In turn, this
means that B needs to keep a log of recently received messages to prevent replays by
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an attacker during the window. How can TSE help? Suppose B generates a nonce
N , encrypts it using a TSE scheme with an interval [t0, t1], where t1− t0 is equal to
the width of a suitable window of acceptance (to cater for network delay and clock
drift between A and B), and broadcasts the resulting ciphertext. Now A’s ability
to send a message of the form MACK(N ||B) to B before time t1 is a proof that A
obtained a TIK kt during the interval [t0, t1] and decrypted to obtain the nonce N .
Thus B obtains a proof of liveness of A within a certain window of acceptance, so
authenticating A to B. This basic protocol can be extended in a number of ways.
For example, B’s ciphertexts can be pre-distributed to A, giving A a set of tokens
which she can use to authenticate to B during specified time intervals. We can also
adapt the basic scheme to use pseudo-randomly generated nonces, so saving state
at B. We can modify it to provide key transport, by replacing the MAC with an
authenticated encryption scheme and including a session key in A’s message. We can
also add mutual authentication in obvious ways. What is notable about the protocol
design is that we no longer require synchronized clocks, and we have a window of
acceptance for responses by design. These features arise from the use of TSE.
5.1.2 Further related work
Range queries over encrypted data and related ideas: Shi et al. [84] pro-
posed schemes enabling multi-dimensional range queries over encrypted data
(MRQED). In the one-dimensional version of this primitive, data is associated with
a single value and is encrypted with respect to that value, while users are equipped
with keys enabling them to decrypt data whose values are in a given range. In
contrast, in TSE, encryption is performed with respect to a range, while the time
server makes available keys specific to a particular time value. Thus, our notion of
Plain TSE is precisely equivalent to the notion of dual MRQED, also introduced
but not formalised by Shi et al. [84]. We note that [84] gives a construction which
builds a dual MRQED scheme from a normal MRQED scheme, but this seems to
involve a doubling of dimension and, therefore, a significant loss of efficiency, a prob-
lem from which our constructions do not suffer. In addition, in our work, we give
constructions achieving non-selective security against chosen-ciphertext attackers,
whereas [84] only considers selective security notions and chosen-plaintext attackers
in any detail (and then in the MRQED setting rather than its dual). Moreover,
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we consider plain, public-key and identity-based settings, whereas [84] only handles
what amounts to the plain setting. In work related to that of Shi et al., Srivatsa et
al. [87] introduced trust-and-identity based encryption (TIBE). Replacing “trust”
with time in TIBE, and ignoring the identity-based aspects, we recover a special case
of MRQED of dimension 1, but handling only intervals of the form [t, T−1]. Another
related idea is sketched in [14], where it is shown how to transform a hierarchical
identity-based encryption scheme into an encryption system that can send messages
into the future. Translated into the language of this paper, this yields a Plain TSE
scheme that can only support intervals of the form [t, T −1]. Unfortunately, because
of specific details of the construction used, this approach does not seem capable of
being extended to support more general intervals.
ABE and PE: TSE can be seen as arising from a special case of ciphertext-
policy attribute-based encryption (ABE) [53, 12, 54], itself a special case of predicate
encryption (PE) [58], for a class of policies which express interval membership and
attributes which express specific times, and with the time server playing the role of
Attribute Authority. We note that most work on ABE and PE to date is limited to
the “selective-attribute” case. In the context of TSE, converting to a non-selective
security model would incur a cost of roughly O( 1
T 2
) in the tightness of the security
reduction. However, our constructions for TSE in this chapter already achieve fully
adaptive security in the standard model with a tight reduction to the security of the
IBE scheme used in the specific instantiation. On the other hand, ABE schemes that
do achieve full security, such as [61] and follow-up work, suffer from low performance,
as discussed in Section 4.5.
Broadcast encryption: As discussed in Chapter 4, broadcast encryption (BE) is
a cryptographic primitive designed to address the issue of broadcasting a message to
an arbitrary subset drawn from a universe of users. Although conceptually opposites
(in TSE the keys are broadcast while the message is sent beforehand), it can be
shown that a BE scheme can be used to construct a Plain TSE scheme: assume the
users in the BE scheme can be labeled with elements from [0, T−1], consider a DTI as
the target subset of addressed users in the BE encryption algorithm, and broadcast
the secret key for user with label t at time t. In Section 5.4.1 we show that a correct
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Plain TSE scheme results from this transformation, and moreover, that the security
of this scheme can be related to standard security properties of the underlying BE
scheme. There are however some caveats to this approach, which we discuss in
detail in Section 5.4.1. In particular, the advantages and shortcomings of BE over
our approach to the realisation of Plain TSE, as developed in Section 5.3.1, can
be cast in a framework of trade-offs between the sizes of public parameters, secret
keys and ciphertexts, together with computational costs and strength of security
achieved.
Temporal access control: Significant related work in the symmetric-key setting
exists in the area of cryptographically-enabled “temporal access control”, see for
example [38] and the references therein. In this line of work, a key is associated with
each time “point”, and a key assignment scheme is used to ensure that an authorized
user is able to derive keys for all the points contained in a designated interval. Such
schemes generally require the publication of rather large amounts of information in
order to achieve the desired functionality, but do allow efficient derivation of keys
associated with time points. In contrast, we use public-key techniques, achieving
small public parameters and greater flexibility in operation, at the cost of increased
computation.
5.1.3 Our contributions
In this chapter we first develop the basic flavour of TSE, namely Plain TSE, as
described in the previous section. We then extend Plain TSE to the public-key
and identity-based settings, where receivers are additionally equipped with secret
keys and either public keys or identities, and where decryption now requires the use
of the relevant secret key as well as an appropriate TIK. This provides protection
against a curious time server, as well as ensuring that a ciphertext is decryptable
only by a specified party. We introduce security models for the plain, public-key
and identity-based settings, considering both chosen-plaintext and chosen-ciphertext
adversaries.
We provide constructions for schemes in the different settings. Firstly, we build
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Plain TSE schemes by adapting ideas of [84, 87] which themselves employ identity-
based and tree techniques. Secondly, we show how to combine Plain TSE with
public-key and identity-based encryption schemes to obtain chosen-plaintext secure
TSE schemes in the public-key and identity-based settings. Thirdly, we show how
to adapt the CHK transformation [25] to the TSE setting, obtaining a generic con-
struction for a chosen-ciphertext secure TSE scheme in the public-key setting from
a chosen-plaintext secure, identity-based TSE scheme. Our focus is on providing
generic constructions that are secure in the standard model. Naturally, more effi-
cient constructions and concrete schemes can be obtained by working in the random
oracle model (ROM), and we sketch such constructions where appropriate. In our
closing section, we discuss possible extensions of our ideas and areas for future work.
5.2 Definitions and Security Notions for TSE
5.2.1 Notation
Throughout the chapter we will consider time as a discrete set of time units, regard-
ing these as integers between 0 and T − 1, where T represents the number of time
units supported by the system. We denote by [t0, t1], where t0 ≤ t1, the interval
containing all time units from t0 to t1 inclusive.
5.2.2 Plain TSE
We start by providing the definition and the security models for the basic form of
time-specific encryption, namely Plain TSE.
Definition 5.1 (Plain TSE) Let TSp = [0, T − 1] be the time space supported by
the scheme and let the parties involved be the Time Server (TS), the sender (S) and
a user (U). A Plain TSE scheme is defined by four algorithms, which are as follows.
Plain.Setup: Run by TS, this algorithm takes as input the security parameter 1λ
and T , and returns a master public key TS-MPK (which includes a description
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of the system’s parameters, the message space MsgSp and the ciphertext space
CtSp) and a master secret key TS-MSK. We write (TS-MPK,TS-MSK) ←
Plain.Setup(1λ, T ).
Plain.TIK-Ext: Run by TS, this is a key extraction algorithm that on input
TS-MPK, TS-MSK and a time instant t ∈ TSp outputs the time instant key
(TIK) kt. We write this as kt ← Plain.TIK-Ext(TS-MPK,TS-MSK, t). This is
broadcast by TS at time t.
Plain.Enc: Run by S, this is an encryption algorithm that on input TS-MPK, a mes-
sage M ∈ MsgSp and a decryption time interval (DTI) [t0, t1] ⊆ TSp returns
a ciphertext C ∈ CtSp. We write this as C ← Plain.Enc(TS-MPK,M, [t0, t1]).
The ciphertext C is broadcast by S to all users.
Plain.Dec: Run by U , this is a decryption algorithm that on input TS-MPK, a
ciphertext C and a key kt returns either a message M ∈ MsgSp or a failure
symbol ⊥. We write this as Plain.Dec(TS-MPK, C, kt) =M or ⊥.
These algorithms are required to satisfy the following correctness property: For
every λ and every T , for every TS-MPK, TS-MSK output by Plain.Setup, for every
message M ∈ MsgSp, every time instant t ∈ TSp and time interval [t0, t1] ⊆ TSp, if
kt ← Plain.TIK-Ext(TS-MPK,TS-MSK, t) and if C ← Plain.Enc(TS-MPK,M, [t0, t1])
then Plain.Dec(TS-MPK, C, kt) returns M when t ∈ [t0, t1] and ⊥ otherwise.
We note that for this primitive, as well as for the other flavours of TSE, the cor-
rectness property requires the decryption algorithm to return ⊥ if an inappropriate
TIK is used (i.e. a TIK not in the DTI). Including this condition here is largely
motivated by the ABE and PE literature, where correctness properties deal with
decryption with “incorrect” keys in a similar way. An alternative approach could
be to not specify this as a correctness requirement, but to consider it as a security
issue, and hence defer its handling to the security property of robustness.
We define the security notion of indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext at-
tacks (IND-CPA) for a Plain TSE scheme P = (Plain.Setup,Plain.TIK-Ext,Plain.Enc,
Plain.Dec) as follows.
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IND-CPA security game for Plain TSE
Setup. The challenger C runs Plain.Setup(1λ, T ) to obtain the master public key
TS-MPK and the master secret key TS-MSK and gives TS-MPK to the ad-
versary A.
Phase 1. A can adaptively issue TIK extraction queries to an oracle OTS-MSK
for any time t ∈ TSp. The oracle will respond to each query with kt ←
Plain.TIK-Ext(TS-MPK,TS-MSK, t).
Challenge. A selects two equal-length messages M0 and M1 ∈ MsgSp and a time
interval [t0, t1] ⊆ TSp with the restriction that t /∈ [t0, t1] for all of the TIK
extraction queries t in Phase 1. A passes M0,M1, [t0, t1] to C. C chooses a
random bit b ← {0, 1} and computes C" ← Plain.Enc(TS-MPK,Mb, [t0, t1]).
C" is called the challenge ciphertext and it is passed to A.
Phase 2. A continues to have access to a TIK extraction oracle OTS-MSK, with the
same restriction we have in the Challenge phase.
Guess. The adversary outputs its guess b′ for b.
We define A’s advantage in the above game as AdvIND−CPAA,P (λ) =
∣∣Pr[b′ = b]− 12 ∣∣.
Definition 5.2 (IND-CPA) A Plain TSE scheme P = (Plain.Setup,Plain.KeyExt,
Plain.Enc, Plain.Dec) is indistinguishable under chosen-plaintext attacks (or is IND-
CPA secure) if all p.p.t. adversaries have at most negligible advantage in the above
game.
We can extend this definition to address IND-CCA security by considering, in
addition, a decryption oracle that acts as follows. On input the pair (C, t), where C is
a ciphertext and t ∈ TSp, it passes t to the TIK extraction oracle, which will respond
with kt. The decryption oracle will then compute Plain.Dec(TS-MPK, C, kt) and
return either a message M or a failure symbol ⊥ to the adversary. The decryption
oracle can be adaptively issued queries (C, t) in both Phase 1 and Phase 2, but in the
latter phase with the restriction that if C" and [t0, t1] are the challenge ciphertext
and time interval, respectively, then the adversary cannot make a decryption query
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(C, t) where C = C" and t ∈ [t0, t1]. This restriction prevents the adversary from
winning the game trivially.
5.2.3 Public-key TSE
We now define another version of TSE called public-key TSE (PK-TSE) in which
the sender S encrypts a message M to a particular receiver R who holds a key-pair
(pk, sk). The message M has an associated decryption time interval [t0, t1] specified
by S. R can decrypt if he has his private key sk and a time instant key (TIK) issued
by TS between time t0 and time t1. We provide a formal definition of PK-TSE next.
Definition 5.3 Let TSp = [0, T − 1] be the time space supported by the scheme and
let the parties involved be the Time Server (TS), the sender (S) and the receiver
(R). A PK-TSE scheme is defined by five algorithms, which are as follows.
PK.Setup: Run by TS, this algorithm takes as input the security parameter 1λ and
T , and returns a master public key TS-MPK (which includes a description of
the system’s parameters, the message space MsgSp and the ciphertext space
CtSp) and a master secret key TS-MSK. We write (TS-MPK,TS-MSK) ←
PK.Setup(1λ, T ).
PK.TIK-Ext: Run by TS, this is a key extraction algorithm that on input TS-MPK,
TS-MSK and a time instant t ∈ TSp outputs the TIK kt. We write this as
kt ← PK.TIK-Ext(TS-MPK,TS-MSK, t). This is broadcast by TS at time t.
PK.KeyGen: Run by R, this is a key generation algorithm that on input the se-
curity parameter 1λ outputs a key-pair (pk, sk). We write this as (pk, sk) ←
PK.KeyGen(1λ).
PK.Enc: Run by S, this is an encryption algorithm that on input TS-MPK, a
message M ∈ MsgSp, a decryption time interval (DTI) [t0, t1] ⊆ TSp and
a public key pk returns a ciphertext C ∈ CtSp. We write this as C ←
PK.Enc(TS-MPK,M, [t0, t1], pk).
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PK.Dec: Run by R, this is a decryption algorithm that on input TS-MPK, a cipher-
text C, a TIK kt and a private key sk returns either a message M ∈ MsgSp or
⊥. We write this as PK.Dec(TS-MPK, C, kt, sk) =M or ⊥.
These algorithms are required to satisfy the following correctness property: For
every λ and every T , for every TS-MPK, TS-MSK output by PK.Setup, for every
message M ∈ MsgSp, every time instant t ∈ TSp and time interval [t0, t1] ⊆ TSp,
and every (pk, sk) output by PK.KeyGen, if kt ← PK.TIK-Ext(TS-MPK,TS-MSK, t)
and if C ← PK.Enc(TS-MPK,M, [t0, t1], pk) then PK.Dec(TS-MPK, C, kt, sk) re-
turns M when t ∈ [t0, t1] and ⊥ otherwise.
To model the security of a PK-TSE scheme, we consider (as in [41] for the TRE
case) the following kinds of adversaries:
• A curious TS who holds TS-MSK and wishes to break the confidentiality of
the message.
• An intended but curious receiver who wishes to decrypt the message outside
of the appropriate decryption time interval.
We observe that security against an outside adversary (who is not the intended
recipient and does not know TS-MSK) trivially follows from security against either
type of adversary considered above.
Remark 2 In Plain TSE there is only one type of adversary, i.e. the curious user,
since there is no specific receiver and TS can trivially decrypt any message.
We define the security notion of indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext at-
tacks against a curious TS (IND-CPATS) for a PK-TSE scheme PK = (PK.Setup,
PK.TIK-Ext,PK.KeyGen,PK.Enc, PK.Dec) as follows1.
1We note that in defining the security models for PK-TSE we consider, for simplicity, a single-
user setting. This also justifies the fact that a separate parameter generation algorithm is not
required in the definition of PK-TSE.
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IND-CPATS security game for PK-TSE
Consider the following game, which we call GamePK-TS.
Setup. The challenger C runs PK.Setup(1λ, T ) to obtain the master public key
TS-MPK and the master secret key TS-MSK and runs PK.KeyGen(1λ) to get
a pair (pk, sk). C gives (TS-MPK,TS-MSK, pk) to the adversary A.
Challenge. A selects two equal-length messages M0 and M1 ∈ MsgSp and a time
interval [t0, t1] ⊆ TSp. A passes M0,M1, [t0, t1] to C. C chooses a random bit
b← {0, 1} and computes C" ← PK.Enc(TS-MPK,Mb, [t0, t1], pk). C" is called
the challenge ciphertext and it is passed to A.
Guess. The adversary outputs its guess b′ for b.
We define A’s advantage in the above game asAdvIND−CPATSA,PK (λ) =
∣∣Pr[b′ = b]− 12 ∣∣.
Definition 5.4 (IND-CPATS) We say that a PK-TSE scheme is IND-CPATS
secure if all p.p.t. adversaries have at most negligible advantage in GamePK-TS.
We can extend this definition to address IND-CCATS security by considering, in
addition, a decryption oracle that on input the pair (C, t), where C is a ciphertext
and t ∈ TSp, returns either a message M or failure symbol ⊥ to the adversary.
The decryption oracle can be adaptively issued queries (C, t) before and after the
Challenge phase, but with the obvious restriction that the adversary cannot make
queries of the form (C, t) where C = C" and t ∈ [t0, t1] after the Challenge phase.
For both IND-CPA and IND-CCA settings, it is possible to model security games
in which the public keys are maliciously generated. In our work, however, we will
consider only honest key-generation, leaving such extension for future research.
We now address IND-CPA security against a curious receiver (IND-CPACR).
IND-CPACR security game for PK-TSE
Consider the following game, which we call GamePK-CR.
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Setup. The challenger C runs PK.Setup(1λ, T ) to obtain the master public key
TS-MPK and the master secret key TS-MSK, and runs PK.KeyGen(1λ) to
get a key-pair (pk, sk). C gives (TS-MPK, pk, sk) to the adversary A.
Phase 1. A can adaptively issue TIK extraction queries for any time t ∈ TSp. The
challenger responds to each query with kt ← PK.TIK-Ext(TS-MPK,TS-MSK, t).
Challenge. A selects two equal-length messages M0 and M1 ∈ MsgSp and a time
interval [t0, t1] ⊆ TSp with the restriction that t /∈ [t0, t1] for all of the TIK
extraction queries t in Phase 1. A passes M0,M1, [t0, t1] to C. C chooses a
random bit b ← {0, 1} and computes C" ← PK.Enc(TS-MPK,Mb, [t0, t1], pk).
C" is called the challenge ciphertext and it is passed to A.
Phase 2. A continues to make TIK extraction queries with the same restriction we
have in the Challenge phase.
Guess. The adversary outputs its guess b′ for b.
We define A’s advantage in the above game asAdvIND−CPACRA,PK (λ) =
∣∣Pr[b′ = b]− 12 ∣∣.
Definition 5.5 (IND-CPACR) We say that a PK-TSE scheme is IND-CPACR
secure if all p.p.t. adversaries have at most negligible advantage in GamePK-CR.
We observe that this chosen-plaintext notion of security is sufficient to capture
all realistic attacks that can be mounted by a curious receiver, so that a chosen-
ciphertext notion of security is not required for curious receivers. Indeed such a
receiver would be the only entity in possession of its private key, and so would be
the only entity that could implement a general decryption oracle in practice. We
show next that such an oracle would either allow the receiver to win trivially or
would not provide any advantage over just having access to the TIK extraction
oracle in the chosen-plaintext setting. More precisely, suppose C" is the challenge
ciphertext and [t0, t1] the challenge interval. To handle decryption queries of the
form (C, t) where C (= C" and t ∈ [t0, t1], the receiver would need to use its private
key in combination with a key kt obtained from TS. But then having such a key kt
would also allow the curious receiver to decrypt C" and so win the security game
trivially. For any other decryption query (C, t), where now t /∈ [t0, t1], the curious
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receiver would be able to obtain the key kt by making a TIK extraction query, and
then use kt together with its private key sk to decrypt c. So, in this situation, the
curious receiver would gain no advantage from having access to a decryption oracle.
We formalize the unified notion of indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext
attacks for PK-TSE as follows.
Definition 5.6 (IND-CPA) We say that a PK-TSE scheme PK = (PK.Setup,
PK.TIK-Ext,PK.KeyGen,PK.Enc, PK.Dec) is IND-CPA secure if it is both is IND-
CPATS and IND-CPACR secure.
5.2.4 Identity-based TSE
We finally consider an identity-based version of TSE, called ID-TSE, in which the
sender encrypts a messageM under the identity of a particular receiver. The message
M has an associated decryption time interval [t0, t1] specified by the sender. The
receiver can decrypt if he holds the private key associated with his identity (as
issued by a (semi-)trusted authority TA) and a time instant key (TIK) issued by
TS between time t0 and time t1. We now provide the formal definition of ID-TSE.
Definition 5.7 Let TSp = [0, T − 1] be the time space supported by the scheme
and let the parties involved be the Time Server (TS), a trusted authority (TA), the
sender (S) and the receiver (R). An ID-TSE scheme is defined by six algorithms,
which are as follows.
TS.Setup: Run by TS, this algorithm takes as input the security parameter 1λ and
T , and returns a master public key TS-MPK (which includes a description of
the system’s parameters, the message space MsgSp, the identity space IdSp
and the ciphertext space CtSp) and a master secret key TS-MSK. We write
(TS-MPK,TS-MSK)← TS.Setup(1λ, T ).
ID.Setup: Run by TA, this algorithm takes as input the security parameter 1λ and
outputs the master public key ID-MPK and the master secret key ID-MSK.
We write this as (ID-MPK, ID-MSK)← ID.Setup(1λ).
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ID.TIK-Ext: Run by TS, this is a key extraction algorithm that on input TS-MPK,
TS-MSK and a time instant t ∈ TSp outputs the time instant key (TIK) kt.
We write this as kt ← ID.TIK-Ext(TS-MPK,TS-MSK, t). This is broadcast by
TS at time t.
ID.Key-Ext: Run by TA, this is a key extraction algorithm that on input ID-MPK,
ID-MSK and an id ∈ IdSp outputs the secret key skid corresponding to id. We
write skid ← ID.Key-Ext(ID-MPK, ID-MSK, id).
ID.Enc: Run by S, this is an encryption algorithm that on input TS-MPK, ID-MPK,
a message M ∈ MsgSp, a decryption time interval (DTI) [t0, t1] ⊆ TSp and
an identity id ∈ IdSp returns a ciphertext C ∈ CtSp. We write this as C ←
ID.Enc(TS-MPK,ID-MPK,M, [t0, t1], id).
ID.Dec: Run by R, this is a decryption algorithm that on input TS-MPK, ID-MPK,
a ciphertext C, a TIK kt and a private key skid returns either a message M ∈
MsgSp or a failure symbol⊥. We write this as ID.Dec(TS-MPK, ID-MPK, C, kt,
skid) =M or ⊥.
These algorithms are required to satisfy the following correctness property: For ev-
ery λ and every T , for every TS-MPK, TS-MSK output by TS.Setup, for every
ID-MPK, ID-MSK output by ID.Setup, for every message M ∈ MsgSp, every time
instant t ∈ TSp, every time interval [t0, t1] ⊆ TSp, and for every id ∈ IdSp, if skid ←
ID.Key-Ext(ID-MPK, ID-MSK, id), if kt ← ID.TIK-Ext(TS-MPK,TS-MSK, t) and if
C ← ID.Enc(TS-MPK, ID-MPK,M, [t0, t1], id) then ID.Dec(TS-MPK, ID-MPK, C, kt,
skid) returns M when t ∈ [t0, t1] and ⊥ otherwise.
We now model the security of an ID-TSE scheme. Since we are in an ID-based
setting we will consider adversaries that interact with multiple users. We consider
the following two types of adversaries:
• A curious TS who holds TS-MSK, and hence can derive TIKs for any time t,
and wishes to break the confidentiality of the message.
• A curious TA who holds ID-MSK, and hence can derive private keys for any
identity id, and wishes to break the confidentiality of the message.
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We note that the latter adversary is more powerful than the natural analogue of the
curious receiver in the ID setting, so we do not give a separate security definition
for the curious receivers.
We first define IND-CPA security against a curious TS, which we denote IND-
CPATS .
IND-CPATS security game for ID-TSE
Consider the following game, which we call GameID-TS.
Setup. The challenger C runs TS.Setup(1λ, T ) to obtain the master public key
TS-MPK and the master secret key TS-MSK, and runs ID.Setup(1λ) to gen-
erate ID-MPK and ID-MSK. C gives (TS-MPK,TS-MSK, ID-MPK) to the
adversary A.
Phase 1. A can adaptively issue queries to a secret key extraction oracle to get
the secret keys corresponding to identities id of its choice. C will respond with
skid ← ID.Key-Ext(ID-MPK, ID-MSK, id).
Challenge. A selects two equal-length messagesM0 andM1 ∈ MsgSp and a time in-
terval [t0, t1] ⊆ TSp and id" ∈ IdSp with the restriction that id" was not queried
to the secret key extraction oracle in Phase 1. A passes M0,M1, [t0, t1], id" to
C. C chooses a random bit b ← {0, 1} and computes C" ← ID.Enc(TS-MPK,
ID-MPK,Mb, [t0, t1], id"). C" is called the challenge ciphertext and it is passed
to A.
Phase 2. A continues to make secret key extraction queries with the same restric-
tion we have in the Challenge phase.
Guess. The adversary outputs its guess b′ for b.
We can easily modify this game to obtain a selective-id security notion (as per
Definition 2.6), by requiring that at the beginning of the game, before the Setup
phase, the adversary will output the identity id" on which it wishes to be challenged.
We define A’s advantage in the above game asAdvIND−CPATSA,ID (λ) =
∣∣Pr[b′ = b]− 12 ∣∣.
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Definition 5.8 (IND-CPATS) We say that an ID-TSE scheme is IND-CPATS
secure if all p.p.t. adversaries have at most negligible advantage in GameID-TS.
We now define IND-CPA security against a curious TA (IND-CPATA).
IND-CPATA security game for ID-TSE
Consider the following game, which we call GameID-TA.
Setup. The challenger C runs TS.Setup(1λ, T ) to obtain the master public key
TS-MPK and the master secret key TS-MSK, and runs ID.Setup(1λ) to gen-
erate ID-MPK and ID-MSK. C gives (TS-MPK, ID-MPK, ID-MSK) to the
adversary A.
Phase 1. A can adaptively issue TIK extraction queries for any time t ∈ TSp. The
challenger responds to each query with kt ← ID.TIK-Ext(TS-MPK,TS-MSK, t).
Challenge. A selects two equal-length messages M0 and M1 ∈ MsgSp and a time
interval [t0, t1] ⊆ TSp, with the restriction that t /∈ [t0, t1] for all of the TIK ex-
traction queries t in Phase 1, and id" ∈ IdSp. A passesM0,M1, [t0, t1], id" to C.
C chooses a random b← {0, 1} and computes C" ← ID.Enc(TS-MPK, ID-MPK,
Mb, [t0, t1], id"). C" is called the challenge ciphertext and it is passed to A.
Phase 2. A continues to make TIK extraction queries with the same restriction as
in the Challenge phase.
Guess. The adversary outputs its guess b′ for b.
We define A’s advantage in the above game asAdvIND−CPATAA,ID (λ) =
∣∣Pr[b′ = b]− 12 ∣∣.
Definition 5.9 (IND-CPATA) We say that an ID-TSE scheme is IND-CPATA
secure if all p.p.t. adversaries have at most negligible advantage in GameID-TA.
We finally give the unified notion of indistinguishability under chosen-plaintext
attacks for ID-TSE next.
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Definition 5.10 We say that an ID-TSE scheme ID = (TS.Setup, ID.Setup,
ID.TIK-Ext, ID.Key-Ext, ID.Enc, ID.Dec) is IND-CPA secure if it is both IND-CPATS
and IND-CPATA secure.
IND-CCA security for ID-TSE can be defined by giving the adversary suitably re-
stricted access to a decryption oracle. However, we do not formalise this notion
here, since we are mainly interested in using ID-TSE as a building block to obtain
PK-TSE schemes.
5.3 Constructions for TSE Schemes
From the discussion on related work at the beginning of this chapter it is clear
that TSE is achievable. For instance, we can build Plain TSE from attribute-based
or broadcast encryption. In our work we explore alternative ways of achieving all
flavours of TSE, with the aim of obtaining more efficient constructions through a
dedicated approach.
5.3.1 Plain TSE
Our first step towards building TSE schemes is to focus on how to achieve Plain
TSE. We have to find a way to express time so that the Time Server can extract
time instant keys (TIKs) and the sender can specify a decryption time interval. Our
approach will make use of a binary tree of depth d, where we denote with parent(x)
and child(x) the standard notions of parent and child of a node x in a tree. The
input T to Plain.Setup, which represents the number of allowed time units, will be
of the form T = 2d. The root node of the tree is labeled with ∅ and the non-root
nodes are labeled with binary strings of lengths between 1 and d, as illustrated for
the case d = 3 in Figure 5.1. Hence each node is associated with a binary string
t0t1...tl−1 of length l ≤ d. In particular we will have that the leaves of the tree are
binary strings of length d labeled from 0...0 (on the left) to 1...1 (on the right). Each
leaf will represent a time instant t = Σd−1i=0 ti2
d−1−i between 0 and T − 1.
We now define two particular sets of nodes.
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∅
0
00
000 001
01
010 011
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10
100 101
11
110 111
Figure 5.1: Example of binary tree of depth d = 3 used in our construction.
• Path Pt to t. Given a time instant t = Σd−1i=0 ti2d−1−i we construct the fol-
lowing path Pt in the tree, where the last node is the leaf corresponding to
t:
∅, t0, t0t1, ..., t0...td−1.
• Set S[t0,t1] covering the interval [t0, t1]. S[t0,t1] is defined to be the minimal
set of roots of subtrees that cover exactly the leaves representing time instants
in [t0, t1]. We will call this the cover set for [t0, t1]. Such a set is unique and
of size at most2 2d. We can compute the labels of the nodes in S[t0,t1] in a
particular order by running Algorithm 1 on input [t0, t1].
It is easy to see that Pt and S[t0,t1] intersect in a unique node if and only if
t ∈ [t0, t1]. This property will ensure that the correctness requirement holds for
the Plain TSE scheme that we will construct. The key idea, then, is to view the
nodes of the tree as identities and make use of identity-based encryption techniques
to instantiate a Plain TSE scheme. Informally, the sender will encrypt under the
nodes in the cover set for the decryption time interval (DTI), and the TIK for time
t will be the set of private keys associated to the nodes on the path Pt to t.
More formally, we use an IBE scheme I = (IBE.PG, IBE.Setup, IBE.KeyExt,
IBE.Enc, IBE.Dec) with message space MsgSp and IdSp= {0, 1}≤d to construct P =
(Plain.Setup,Plain.TIK-Ext,Plain.Enc,Plain.Dec), a Plain TSE scheme with the same
message space, in the following way.
2This can be proved by induction on d and it can be seen intuitively by considering the interval
[1, T − 1], which gives rise to the largest possible cover set. Indeed, S[1,T−1] has size 2d.
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Algorithm 1 Compute S[t0,t1].
Let L be the binary expansion of t0.
Let R be the binary expansion of t1.
Let S = ∅.
while L < R do
if L ≡ 0 mod 2 then
L = parent(L)
else
S = S ∪ {L}
L = parent(L) + 1
end if
if R ≡ 0 mod 2 then
S = S ∪ {R}
R = parent(R)− 1
else
R = parent(R)
end if
end while
if L = R then
S = S ∪ {L}
end if
return S
Plain.Setup(1λ, T ): Run IBE.PG on input 1λ to obtain pars and IBE.Setup(pars) to
obtain TS-MPK and the master secret key TS-MSK. We set T = 2d, where d
is the depth of the tree used in our construction.
Plain.TIK-Ext(TS-MPK,TS-MSK, t): Construct Pt to obtain the list of nodes {∅,
p1, ..., pd} on the path to t. Run IBE.KeyExt on all nodes p in Pt to obtain a
set of private keys Dt = {dp : p ∈ Pt}. Return Dt (we implicitly assume that t
can be recovered from this set because Dt will be broadcast at the particular
time t).
Plain.Enc(TS-MPK,M, [t0, t1]): Run Algorithm 1 on input [t0, t1] to compute a list
of nodes S[t0,t1]. For each s ∈ S[t0,t1] run IBE.Enc(TS-MPK,M, s) to obtain a
list of ciphertexts CT [t0,t1] = {cs : s ∈ S[t0,t1]}. Output C = (CT [t0,t1], [t0, t1]).
Plain.Dec(TS-MPK, C,Dt): Here C = (CT , [t0, t1]) denotes a list of ciphertexts for
the scheme I together with a time interval. If t /∈ [t0, t1] return ⊥. Otherwise
run Algorithm 1 to generate an ordered list of nodes S[t0,t1] and generate the
set Pt; the intersection of these sets is a unique node p. Obtain the key dp
corresponding to p from Dt. Run IBE.Dec(TS-MPK, cp, dp), where cp ∈ CT is
in the same position in the list CT as p is in S[t0,t1], to obtain either a message
M or a failure symbol ⊥. Output the result.
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We provide a small example to illustrate our construction. Consider d = 3 as in
Figure 1.
Example: Suppose we wish to decrypt a message that was encrypted using
time interval [2, 6]. In the tree, these endpoints will correspond to nodes with labels
010 and 110, respectively. We compute S[2,6] = {110, 01, 10}. Suppose we obtain
the TIK broadcast by TS at time 4 (corresponding to the leaf node labelled 100).
This means that we obtain a list of private keys for nodes on the path P4 from the
root to 100. In particular, we have the key corresponding to node 10, the unique
intersection of P4 and S[2,6]. Hence, we are able to decrypt. We observe that for
any time t outside of the interval [2, 6], there is no intersection between P4 and S[2,6].
For the above construction, the following result holds.
Theorem 5.11 Let I be an IND-CPA secure IBE scheme. Then the Plain TSE
scheme P constructed from I as above is IND-CPA secure, and is correct.
Proof. The proof of IND-CPA security works in two steps. In the first step, we
show that for any IND-CPA attacker A with non-negligible advantage against the
Plain TSE scheme, there is a modified IND-CPA adversary B having non-negligible
advantage against the IBE scheme. This modified adversary specifies in its challenge
phase a list of % identities, none of which are allowed to be queried to the ID-
based private key extraction oracle at any point in the game, along with a pair of
messages M0,M1. In return, B receives from its challenger the encryption of Mb
under each of the identities in its list. As usual B’s task is to find b. This reduction
is straightforward, relying on the fact that the restriction t /∈ [t0, t1] imposed on the
TIKs kt that the Plain TSE adversary A can obtain from its TIK extraction oracle
means that B can handle A’s queries to its TIK extraction oracle by passing them
to its ID-based private key extraction oracle.
In the second step, we use a standard hybrid argument to reduce the IND-CPA
security of the IBE scheme against modified adversaries to its IND-CPA security
against normal adversaries (who specify just one identity in the challenge phase).
Indeed, we can define a sequence of games starting with Game0, which is the original
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game in which the challenger encrypts M0 under all % identities, and then slightly
modify the game as usual up to Game$, the last game, in which the challenger
encrypts M1. It is easy to see that if an adversary can distinguish between any
two successive games then this can be turned into an adversary that breaks the
IND-CPA security of the underlying IBE scheme I.
The proof of correctness is straightforward, relying on the fact that Pt does not
intersect S[t0,t1] if t /∈ [t0, t1]. !
In general, ciphertexts in the Plain TSE scheme P consist of up to 2d ciphertexts
from the IBE scheme I, while private keys consist of at most d private keys from I.
The public parameters of P are the same size as those of I. The cost of encryption
for the scheme P is up to 2d times greater than its cost for the scheme I, while
decryption for P costs the same as for I. This compares well with the naive solution
of encrypting with a single private key to every time instant in the interval, as it
allows for shorter ciphertexts.
A variety of IBE schemes can be used to instantiate the above construction,
including Waters’ [90] and Gentry’s [50] schemes in the standard model, and the
Boneh-Franklin scheme [16] and the Sakai-Kasahara scheme (as analysed in [31])
in the ROM. Each of them has various advantages and disadvantages in terms of
efficiency and the sizes of public parameters and ciphertexts. For example, Waters’
scheme has relatively large public parameters, compact ciphertexts, and depends for
its security on the Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem, while Gentry’s scheme has small
public parameters and ciphertexts, but its security depends on a non-standard hard-
ness assumption, the q-Truncated Decisional Augmented Bilinear Diffie-Hellman
Exponent (q-TDABDHE) problem.
A potentially more efficient approach would be to use a multi-recipient, single
key, ID-based Key Encapsulation Mechanism (MR-SK-IBKEM), as defined in [4],
which would allow encapsulation of the same key for multiple recipients id1, ..., idn
in an efficient and secure manner. Using an approach similar to that in [87], we can
combine an MR-SK-IBKEM with a (symmetric) Data Encapsulation Mechanism
(DEM) to produce a multi-recipient IBE scheme in a standard way [11]; if the
underlying KEM and DEM satisfy appropriate security notions, then the resulting
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multi-recipient IBE scheme will be IND-CPA secure [11]. This primitive perfectly
matches our requirement to be able to encrypt the same message to all nodes in
a cover set simultaneously, and it is easy to see how to obtain IND-CPA secure
Plain TSE from such a primitive. However, current instantiations for IND-CPA
secure MR-SK-IBKEMs are only known in the random oracle model (ROM) (see
for example [4]). To the best of our knowledge, it remains an open problem to find
efficient instantiations that are secure in the standard model. We recall that the
scheme in [87] actually solves the dual of our problem and can only handle intervals
of the type [t, T − 1].
5.3.2 PK-TSE
Having presented a way to efficiently construct Plain TSE, we now wish to address
the problem of obtaining PK-TSE. We first look at how to achieve IND-CPA security
in the public-key setting.
5.3.2.1 IND-CPA Security
In our construction we will use a PKE scheme and a Plain TSE scheme as building
blocks3. The idea is to split the message into two parts, each of which will be
encrypted under a different primitive. To recover the message, a user will need both
appropriate keys, as desired.
Let Π = (PKE.PG,PKE.KeyGen,PKE.Enc,PKE.Dec) be a PKE scheme with mes-
sage space {0, 1}l. We will construct a PK-TSE scheme from a Plain TSE scheme
P = (Plain.Setup,Plain.TIK-Ext,Plain.Enc,Plain.Dec) with MsgSp = {0, 1}l and Π in
the following way:
PK.Setup(1λ, T ): Run Plain.Setup on the same input to obtain TS-MPK and the
master secret key TS-MSK.
3Here, we will assume the schemes have the same message space consisting of bit-strings of a
fixed length.
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PK.TIK-Ext(TS-MPK,TS-MSK, t): Run Plain.TIK-Ext(TS-MPK,TS-MSK, t) to ob-
tain kt, broadcast by TS at time t.
PK.KeyGen(1λ): Run PKE.PG(1λ) to obtain pars and PKE.KeyGen(pars) to obtain
a key-pair (pk, sk).
PK.Enc(TS-MPK,M, [t0, t1], pk): Pick a random r ∈ {0, 1}l and set M ′ = M ⊕ r.
Then run Plain.Enc(TS-MPK, r, [t0, t1]) to obtain C0 and PKE.Enc(M ′, pk) to
get C1. The ciphertext will be C = (C0, C1).
PK.Dec(TS-MPK, C, kt, sk): Parse C as C0 and C1. Run Plain.Dec(TS-MPK, C0, kt)
which will output either a message r or a failure symbol ⊥. Run PKE.Dec(C1,
sk) which will output either a message M ′ or ⊥. If either of the decryption
algorithms returns ⊥, then output ⊥; otherwise output M = r ⊕M ′.
Lemma 5.12 Let Π = (PKE.PG,PKE.KeyGen,PKE.Enc,PKE.Dec) be an IND-CPA
secure PKE scheme. Then the PK-TSE scheme PK constructed as above is IND-
CPATS secure.
Proof. Suppose we have an IND-CPATS adversary A against the PK-TSE scheme.
We will construct an adversary B that will interact with A to break the IND-CPA
security of the PKE scheme. The game proceeds as follows.
Setup. The challenger C runs PKE.PG(1λ) to obtain pars and PKE.KeyGen(pars) to
generate a pair (pk, sk). It gives pk to B. B runs Plain.Setup(1λ, T ) to generate
(TS-MPK,TS-MSK) and gives (TS-MPK,TS-MSK, pk) to the adversary A.
Challenge. A outputs two equal-length messages M0 and M1 ∈ MsgSp and a
time interval [t0, t1] ⊆ T . A passes M0,M1, [t0, t1] to B. B picks a random
r ∈ {0, 1}l and passesM0⊕r,M1⊕r to C. C picks a random bit b← {0, 1} and
computes C ′′ = PKE.Enc(Mb ⊕ r, pk). B runs Plain.Enc(TS-MPK, r, [t0, t1]) to
obtain C ′. Finally, B passes C" = (C ′, C ′′) to A.
Guess. The adversary outputs its guess b′ for b and B outputs the same guess.
B perfectly simulates the IND-CPATS game for A. Hence A’s advantage is as it
would be in GamePK-TS and by construction B wins whenever A does. !
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We can prove the following result in an analogous way.
Lemma 5.13 Let P be an IND-CPA secure Plain TSE scheme. Then the PK-TSE
scheme, constructed as above, is IND-CPACR secure. Moreover, if P is correct, then
so is the resulting PK-TSE scheme.
Proof. Suppose we have an IND-CPACR adversary A against the PK-TSE scheme.
We will construct an adversary B that will interact with A to break the IND-CPA
security of the Plain TSE scheme P . The game proceeds as follows.
Setup. The challenger C runs Plain.Setup(1λ, T ) to generate (TS-MPK,TS-MSK)
and gives TS-MPK to B. B runs PKE.PG(1λ) to obtain pars and
PKE.KeyGen(pars) to generate a pair (pk, sk) and gives (TS-MPK, pk, sk) to
the adversary A.
Phase 1. A can adaptively issue TIK extraction queries for any time t ∈ TSp.
When B receives such a query, it simply passes it on to its own challenger C.
C responds to each query with kt which B forwards to A as a response.
Challenge. A outputs two equal-length messages M0 and M1 ∈ MsgSp and a
time interval [t0, t1] ⊆ T . A passes M0,M1, [t0, t1] to B. B picks a random
r ∈ {0, 1}l and passesM0⊕r,M1⊕r to C. C picks a random bit b← {0, 1} and
computes C ′ = Plain.Enc(TS-MPK,Mb ⊕ r, [t0, t1]). B runs PKE.Enc(r, pk) to
obtain C ′′. Finally, B passes C" = (C ′, C ′′) to A.
Phase 2. A continues to make TIK extraction queries and B handles them as
before.
Guess. The adversary outputs its guess b′ for b and B outputs the same guess.
B perfectly simulates the IND-CPACR game for A. Hence A’s advantage is as it
would be in the real game and by construction B wins whenever A does. We observe
that the correctness of PK follows directly from the correctness of P . !
Hence, the following theorem holds.
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Theorem 5.14 Let P be an IND-CPA secure Plain TSE scheme and Π be an IND-
CPA secure PKE scheme. Then the PK-TSE scheme, constructed as above, is IND-
CPA secure. Moreover, if P is correct, then so is the resulting PK-TSE scheme.
5.3.2.2 IND-CPA secure ID-TSE
To achieve IND-CPA security in the ID-TSE setting we can adopt an approach simi-
lar to the one used above to build a PK-TSE scheme, where instead of a PKE scheme
we employ an IBE scheme I = (IBE.PG, IBE.Setup, IBE.KeyExt, IBE.Enc, IBE.Dec) in
the obvious manner. In this setting we obtain an analogous result:
Theorem 5.15 Let P be an IND-CPA secure Plain TSE scheme and I be an IND-
CPA secure IBE scheme. Then the ID-TSE scheme, constructed analogously to the
construction of the PK-TSE scheme above, is IND-CPA secure. Moreover, if P is
correct, then so is the resulting ID-TSE scheme.
In particular, we observe that if I is a selective-id IND-CPA secure IBE scheme,
then it can be shown that the resulting ID-TSE scheme is also selectively secure.
5.3.2.3 IND-CCA Security
We will now address the problem of building IND-CCATS secure PK-TSE schemes,
using an approach similar to that of [25].
Consider a selective-id IND-CPATS secure ID-TSE scheme ID = (TS-Setup,
ID-Setup, ID.TIK-Ext, ID.Key-Ext, ID.Enc, ID.Dec), with MsgSp = {0, 1}l and IdSp =
{0, 1}n. We will construct from ID an IND-CCATS secure PK-TSE scheme PK =
(PK.Setup,PK.TIK-Ext,PK.KeyGen,PK.Enc,PK.Dec). In the construction, we will
also use a signature scheme Σ = (Gen, Sign,Ver), whose generation algorithm Gen
outputs verification keys of length n. We construct the algorithms of PK as follows.
PK.Setup(1λ, T ): Run TS-Setup(1λ, T ) to get TS-MPK,TS-MSK.
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PK.TIK-Ext(TS-MPK,TS-MSK, t): Run ID.TIK-Ext(TS-MPK,TS-MSK, t) to ob-
tain TIK kt.
PK.KeyGen(1λ): Run ID-Setup(1λ) to get (ID-MPK, ID-MSK), a key-pair.
PK.Enc(TS-MPK,M, [t0, t1], ID-MPK): Run Gen(1λ) and obtain (sigk, vk). Com-
pute c← ID.Enc(TS-MPK, ID-MPK,M, [t0, t1], vk). Produce σ ←Sign(sigk, c).
The final ciphertext will be C = (vk, c,σ).
PK.Dec(TS-MPK, C, kt, ID-MSK): Parse C as (vk, c,σ). Check if Ver(vk, c,σ) = 1.
If not, output ⊥. Otherwise, run ID.Key-Ext(ID-MPK, ID-MSK, vk) to obtain
skvk and decrypt c by running ID.Dec with inputs kt, skvk.
The following result holds.
Theorem 5.16 Let ID be a correct, selective-id IND-CPATS secure ID-TSE scheme
and Σ a strongly unforgeable one-time signature scheme. Then PK, as constructed
above, is an IND-CCATS secure PK-TSE scheme.
Proof. Our proof follows closely the proof of [25, Theorem 1], with suitable modifi-
cations. Given an IND-CCATS adversary A against PK we construct an adversary
B that will interact with A to break the selective-id IND-CPATS security of ID.
Before presenting the game, we make the following important definitions.
First, we denote by PrA,S [Event] the probability that Event occurs when an
adversary A interacts with a scheme S in a specified security game. By ¬Event we
denote the complement of Event. In particular, we denote by Succ the event that
b′ = b in the games played in this proof.
We say that a ciphertext C = (vk, c,σ) is valid if Ver(vk, c,σ) = 1. Let C" =
(vk", c",σ") denote the challenge ciphertext received by A during the game, and let
F denote the event that in this game A submits a valid ciphertext C = (vk", c,σ)
to its decryption oracle. It can be shown that A can be used to break the under-
lying one-time signature scheme Σ with probability exactly PrA,PK [F]. Since Σ is
a strongly unforgeable one-time signature (as per Definition 2.15), we can assume
that PrA,PK [F] is negligible in the security parameter λ.
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We now describe the simulation.
Initialize. B runs Gen(1λ) to get (sigk", vk"). The string vk" will be the target
identity used by B.
Setup. C runs TS-Setup, ID-Setup to get (TS-MPK,TS-MSK, ID-MPK, ID-MSK).
It gives B (TS-MPK,TS-MSK, ID-MPK). B passes the same information to
A.
Phase 1. A can issue queries of the form (C, t) to its decryption oracle, where C is
of the form (vk, c,σ). B responds as follows:
• if Ver(vk, c,σ) (= 1 then B returns ⊥;
• if Ver(vk, c,σ) = 1 and vk = vk" then B aborts and outputs a random
bit (event F just occurred);
• if Ver(vk, c,σ) = 1 and vk (= vk" then B makes a query vk to its secret key
extraction oracle to obtain skvk. B can compute the TIK kt as it obtained
TS-MSK from its challenger. B then computes ID.Dec(TS-MPK, ID-MPK,
kt, skvk) and obtains either a message M or failure symbol ⊥, which is
passed to A.
Challenge. A outputsM0,M1 and [t0, t1] and passes the tuple (M0,M1, [t0, t1]) to B,
who then sends (M0,M1, [t0, t1], vk") to C as its challenge query. C picks a ran-
dom bit b and computes c" ← ID.Enc(TS-MPK, ID-MPK,Mb, [t0, t1], vk"). C
gives c" to B, who computes σ" = Sign(sigk", c") and returns C" = (vk", c",σ")
to A.
Phase 2. A can continue issuing queries of the form (C, t), where C = (vk, c,σ),
with the restriction that (C, t) (= (C", t′), where t′ ∈ [t0, t1]. If Ver(vk, c,σ) (= 1
then B returns⊥. Otherwise, B will respond as described in the following cases:
• Case 1: C (= C".
– if c (= c" and vk = vk" then B aborts and outputs a random bit
(event F just occurred);
– if c = c" and vk = vk" then B aborts and outputs a random bit
(event F just occurred);
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– if c = c" and vk (= vk" then B passes the oracle query vk to its chal-
lenger to obtain skvk. B then computes the TIK kt using TS-MSK.
B then computes ID.Dec(TS-MPK, ID-MPK, kt, skvk) and obtains ei-
ther a message M or failure symbol ⊥, which it passes to A.
• Case 2: C = C" and t′ /∈ [t0, t1].
In this case, the correctness of the scheme ID implies that the decryption
algorithm ID.Dec applied to c" with key kt and identity vk" should output
⊥, so B returns ⊥.
Guess. A outputs b′ as its guess for b. B outputs the same bit.
We note that B provides a perfect simulation for A as well as a legal strategy
for attacking scheme ID, provided that B is not forced to abort (a situation that
occurs only when the event F occurs). In particular B never queries its challenger
for the secret key corresponding to the target identity vk". We hence have that B
wins if A does, and this can only happen when the event F does not occur. In that
case, B is forced to abort and outputs a random bit. We therefore have
|PrB,ID[Succ]− 12 | = |PrA,PK [Succ ∧ ¬F] + 12 PrA,PK [F]− 12 | .
We observe that the RHS of above the equation is negligible since both PrA,PK [F]
and
∣∣PrB,ID[Succ]− 12 ∣∣ are negligible, assuming the security of schemes ID and Σ.
Finally we have:
|PrA,PK [Succ]− 12 |
= |PrA,PK [Succ ∧ F] + PrA,PK [Succ ∧ ¬F]− 12 PrA,PK [F] + 12 PrA,PK [F]− 12 |
≤ |PrA,PK [Succ ∧ F]− 12 PrA,PK [F]|+ |PrA,PK [Succ ∧ ¬F] + 12 PrA,PK [F]− 12 |
≤ 12 PrA,PK [F] + |PrA,PK [Succ ∧ ¬F] + 12 PrA,PK [F]− 12 | ,
where on the RHS we have two negligible quantities. We have hence proved that
A’s advantage in winning the IND-CCATS game is negligible. !
We have therefore provided a way to generically and efficiently achieve IND-
CCA secure PK-TSE. We could also use a variant of the more complex Boneh-Katz
transform [19] to again construct PK-TSE schemes that are IND-CCA secure in the
standard model. The resulting schemes would generally have improved efficiency.
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5.4 Extensions
There are several other possible extensions to this area of research. These include
alternative approaches to the TSE problem as well as the development of additional
capabilities provided to the system. We give an overview of the ones we have con-
sidered and some that have arisen after our initial work.
5.4.1 Plain TSE from BE
As mentioned in the introduction of this chapter, Plain TSE can be seen as a special
case of broadcast encryption (BE), where time instants are the users in the BE
setting and the DTI is the target set. We formalize this idea next.
Let B = (BE.PG,BE.Setup,BE.KeyGen,BE.Enc,BE.Dec) be a BE scheme with
message space MsgSp, and let U = {0, ..., T − 1} be the universe of users in the
system. We will construct P = (Plain.Setup,Plain.TIK-Ext,Plain.Enc,Plain.Dec), a
Plain TSE scheme with the same message space, using B in the following way.
Plain.Setup(1λ, T ): Run BE.PG(1λ, T ) to obtain pars and run BE.Setup(pars) to ob-
tain BE-MPK, BE-MSK. Set TS-MPK = BE-MPK and TS-MSK = BE-MSK.
Plain.TIK-Ext(TS-MPK,TS-MSK, t): Run BE.Key-Gen on the same inputs to obtain
the TIK kt for t.
Plain.Enc(TS-MPK,M, [t0, t1]): Run BE.Enc(TS-MPK,M, S), where S is the set
{t : t ∈ [t0, t1]}, to obtain a ciphertext C.
Plain.Dec(TS-MPK, C, kt). Run BE.Dec(TS-MPK, C, kt) to obtain either a message
M or a failure symbol ⊥.
For the above construction, the following result holds.
Theorem 5.17 Let B be a fully collusion resistant, adaptively IND-CPA secure BE
scheme. Then the Plain TSE scheme P constructed from B as above is IND-CPA
secure.
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Proof. Suppose we have an adversary A against the Plain TSE scheme P . We will
construct an adversary B that will interact with A to break the IND-CPA security
of the BE scheme B used in the construction. The game proceeds as follows.
Setup. The challenger C runs BE.PG(λ, T ) to obtain pars and BE.Setup to obtain
a pair (BE-MPK,BE-MSK). It gives BE-MPK to B, who passes it on to A.
Phase 1. A can adaptively issue TIK extraction queries for any time t ∈ T . Such
a query is passed on to B, who gives it to C as secret key query for user t. C
will respond to each query with the private key skt, which is passed to B, who
then forwards it to A as the TIK for time t.
Challenge. A selects two equal-length messages M0, M1 ∈ MsgSp and a challenge
interval [t0, t1] ⊆ T , such that t /∈ [t0, t1] for any of the queries t in made in
Phase 1. A passes M0,M1, [t0, t1] to B, who passes them to C. C chooses a
random bit b and computes C" = BE.Enc(BE-MPK,Mb, [t0, t1]). C" is passed
to B, who in turn passes it to A.
Phase 2. A continues to issue TIK extraction queries with the same restriction as
in the Challenge phase. These queries are dealt with by B as in Phase 1.
Guess. The adversary A outputs its guess b′ for b and B outputs the same guess.
B perfectly simulates the IND-CPA game for A. Hence A’s advantage is as it
would be in the real security game for the BE scheme B and by construction B wins
whenever A does. !
While the above result provides an alternative way of achieving secure Plain
TSE, namely from BE, this approach has some limitations.
First of all, to meet our TSE security requirement, we need the BE scheme to be
fully collusion resistant. This condition immediately rules out many of the existing
schemes. Secondly, satisfying the TSE correctness property, as we have defined it
in Section 5.2, requires the underlying BE scheme to have appropriate robustness
guarantees, which may incur in additional computational and communication costs.
Furthermore, if adaptive security is our aim, then the currently most efficient adap-
tively secure scheme is that of Gentry and Waters in [51]. As we know from Chapter
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4, this scheme requires the specification of the target set (in our case, the DTI) as
an input to the decryption algorithm, inherently preventing the resulting Plain TSE
scheme from having the DTI confidentiality property. In terms of efficiency, the BE
scheme in [51] has constant size secret keys, but public parameters and ciphertexts
of size O(
√
T ). The resulting Plain TSE scheme inherits these sizes. If we are willing
to give up on adaptive security, then other schemes may be considered. In partic-
ular, the BE scheme of Boneh et al. in [17], proved only statically secure, results
in a Plain TSE scheme with again constant size secret keys, public parameters and
ciphertexts of size O(
√
T ). In [51] Gentry and Waters introduce the new notion of
semi-static security and provide a BE scheme achieving this notion which can be
used to construct a Plain TSE scheme with constant size secret keys and ciphertexts
but public parameters whose size is linear in T .
On the other hand, our tree-based solution results in schemes which are fully
secure, with constant size public parameters, and secret keys and ciphertexts of size
O(log T ). This brief comparison illustrates the value of a dedicated approach when
realising Plain TSE.
5.4.2 Decryption time interval confidentiality
We could consider TSE schemes (in all three settings) that have the property of
hiding the decryption time interval of ciphertexts from adversaries. Our current
constructions do not offer this. We call such a property DTIC (decryption time
interval confidentiality). We can model the DTIC-IND-CPA/CCA security of a TSE
scheme by allowing the adversary to select two messages and two time intervals in
the challenge phase and requiring him to guess which message was encrypted under
which interval. We distinguish between the plain setting, where the decryption time
interval is hidden from all users, making successful decryption a kind of proof of
work (since every user will need to attempt decryption under possibly many keys),
and the public-key and identity-based settings, where the decryption time interval
is hidden from everyone except the intended recipient.
In light of the results in Section 5.4.1 and our work on anonymous broadcast en-
cryption (ANOBE) in Chapter 4, it seems very natural to consider using an ANOBE
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scheme to build TSE having decryption time interval confidentiality. While this
approach would guarantee the desired security properties, currently known instanti-
ations of ANOBE do not provide a significant efficiency improvement over the naive
solution to the TSE problem. Indeed, the spirit of state-of-the-art ANOBE schemes
[62], even if highly optimized, is essentially that of encrypting the same message
multiple times, and therefore the resulting TSE ciphertext would have size linear in
that of the time interval.
Achieving better performing TSE schemes with DTIC, perhaps exploring possi-
ble extensions of the key-privacy/recipient-anonymity properties in the public-key
and identity-based settings, represents an interesting direction for future work.
5.4.3 Time and parameters
The model for TSE we put forth in this chapter deals with intervals of the form
[t0, t1], where 0 ≤ t0 ≤ t1 < T . In certain scenarios it could be useful to be able
to address more elaborate decryption time sets (we may want to grant access to
information only between 6 and 7 pm on Thursdays, for instance). This is clearly
a more complex problem and our current tree-based approach does not generically
guarantee an efficient solution to this: indeed, in the case of the time set being every
other time unit, our approach would degenerate to the naive solution of encrypting to
each time unit. In the plain setting, BE could achieve the desired functionality since,
by definition, in BE we can address an arbitrary subset of a universe. An interesting
extension is to consider potential approaches in the public-key and identity-based
setting as well.
In terms of practical considerations, relevant issues concerning time are for ex-
ample how to allow for a dynamic selection of time-granularity (such a consideration
was made in [87] for TIBE), or how to securely extend the maximum time value T
without resetting the parameters of the time server. Furthermore, in view of de-
signing a real-world system, one could envisage schemes supporting multiple time
servers, as well as revocation and delegation mechanisms. We observe that, in our
constructions, we used the same security parameter across the components of the
system, i.e. the TSE time server, the key generation algorithms and the IBE trusted
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authority: in reality, these may not share the same security concerns, and therefore
require different security levels.
5.4.4 Follow-up work
In [71], the published version of this chapter, we left as an interesting direction for
future work that of constructing TSE schemes allowing the capability of opening the
message outside of the decryption time interval, a useful feature supporting break
the glass policies [3]. This extension has already been considered in the setting of
TRE [56, 41]. In [64], the authors address this problem in the public-key setting
and provide a generic construction for a PK-TSE scheme with pre-open capability
which is IND-CCATS and IND-CPACR secure.
In this thesis, we have constructed PK-TSE/ID-TSE schemes in the IND-CPA
setting by combining Plain TSE schemes and PKE/IBE schemes. We have then
used the CHK technique to obtain CCA security for PK-TSE. It might be worth
investigating an alternative approach in which one first obtains an IND-CCA secure
Plain TSE scheme, and then applies a Dodis-Katz style construction [44] to combine
this with IND-CCA secure PKE/IBE schemes. This may lead to efficiency gains as
compared to our CHK-based constructions. It would also be useful to solve the open
problem of constructing MR-SK-IBKEMs that are provably secure in the standard
model, in order to improve the efficiency of our Plain TSE constructions.
Our focus has been on achieving IND-CCA security of PK-TSE in the standard
model. This leaves the problem of constructing IND-CCA secure ID-TSE schemes, in
either the standard model or the ROM. The former, we believe, should be achievable
by introducing hierarchical ID-TSE notions and further extending the CHK-style
transformation to this setting. The latter can be achieved by developing Fujisaki-
Okamoto style transformations for the TSE setting.
Thinking more broadly, one can envisage the development of the wider concept of
time-specific cryptography. This could include, for example, time-specific signatures
(where signatures can only be created within certain time intervals). We believe
there is much interesting work still to be done in this area.
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